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TAKING CARE SERIOUSLY: RELATIONAL
FEMINISM, SEXUAL DIFFERENCE, AND
ABORTION
DONALD P. JUDGES*
Relational feminism, which celebrates a uniquely
feminine approach to moral problem solving that embodies
an "ethic of care," has been criticized by feminist writers who
fear that its endorsement of traditionally feminine traits will
impede women's progress toward equality and threaten
women's reproductive freedom. In this Article, Professor
Donald Judges argues that there is an overlooked middle
ground between the view of feminists who advocate a rights-
based approach to reproductive freedom and the relational
feminists' care-based perspective. The author suggests that
relational feminism's concept of care and connection, when
developed to its fullest potential, can yield beneficial support
for abortion rights. He concludes that a richer account of
relation and care can supplement our conception of the
constitutional values of autonomy and equality, and thereby
enhance claims for abortion rights based on those values.
Professor Judges urges relationists and anti-relationists to
abandon the contrived conflict between rights- and care-based
theories, and instead, to develop relationalism's potential to
make a positive contribution to the case for abortion rights.
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INTRODUCTION
The power to describe can mean the power to control.1 The
1. See Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 DUKE L.J. 492, 506
(1993); John Hardwig, Should Women Think in Terms of Rights?, 94 ETHIcs 441, 449
(1984); Donald R. Kinder & Lynn M. Sanders, Mimicking Political Debate with Survey
Questions: The Case of White Opinion on Affirmative Actionfor Blacks, 8 SOc. COGNITION
73, 74 (1990). "One of the prerogatives of the dominant class is that it gets to define what
is real and what is good. The prevalent pictures and models are those generated by the
dominant class, generally in the perceived interest of the dominant class." Hardwig, supra,
at 449. Social scientists, as well as political operatives, have recognized that how discourse
around a policy is framed heavily influences how the public receives that policy.
[F]rames lead a double life: they are internal structures of the mind that help
individuals to order and give meaning to the dizzying parade of events they
witness as political history unfolds; they are also devices embedded in political
discourse, invented and employed by political elites, often with an eye on




socially salient definition of "man" and "woman"-whether from a
biological, psychological, political, or philosophical perspective-has
until recently been largely the creation of men. The result has been
descriptions of sexual difference that have sometimes served to justify
the subjugation of women.2 This legacy has led to a fundamental
conflict among feminists, whose common goal is to eliminate male
domination-including a kind of semiotic domination by description.
On the one hand, emphasis on women's role in human reproduc-
tion and stereotypic descriptions of women-as less inclined to
rational, abstract, and universalizable thought than men; as more
nurturing, relational, and particularistic; and as more inclined to
sacrifice principle in the name of care-have been deployed to justify
women's confinement to the domestic sphere (especially in the role
of childbearer and childrearer) and their exclusion from many
important aspects of public life.3 Accordingly, some feminists have
sought equality by deconstructing the concept of difference and
denying attributes stereotypically defined as feminine (especially those
commonly associated with motherhood, such as nurturance).4
On the other hand, there are feminists who celebrate rather than
deny sexual difference. Prominently associated with this view is Carol
Gilligan, who has observed that the historical exclusion of women's
perspectives has impoverished prevailing descriptions of moral
development.5 She and others assert that there is a uniquely
Kinder & Sanders, supra, at 74.
In short, it is the ability to apply the dualistic labels, and to thereby invoke an
entire set of associations that go with them, that enables those with social power
in society to believe, and to convince others, that the position they enjoy and the
power they wield are natural and just. That is, the power to define others-to
affect how they are perceived-is the power to control them.
Ehrenreich, supra, at 506.
2. Sylvia J. Yanagisako & Jane F. Collier, The Mode of Reproduction in Anthropolo-
gy, in THEORETICAL PERSPECrIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 131,137 (Deborah L. Rhode
ed., 1990) ("A central dimension of male domination in most, if not all, societies is men's
authority to define their actions and the social relations they organize as constructing
culturally valid collectivities.").
3. E.g., Susan Moller Okin, Thinking Like a Woman, in THEORETICAL PERSPECriVES
ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE, supra note 2, at 145, 145-50.
4. Id. at 151-52.
5. Gilligan's research was in part a response to the exclusion of a feminine
perspective from samples used to derive theories of moral development, principally those
of Lawrence Kohlberg and Jean Piaget, and to the corresponding perception that women's
moral development was being prejudicially evaluated by a male-centered standard. See
infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. Gilligan discovered a "disparity between
women's experience and the representation of human development, noted throughout the
psychological literature, [that] has generally been seen to signify a problem in women's
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feminine approach to moral problem solving that embodies an "ethic
of care," based on relationship and responsibility, and that stands in
stark contrast to what she describes as a typically masculine approach
that emphasizes the logic of abstract rights and justice. Under the
gendered version of this dichotomy, women tend to value intimacy
and connection and to define themselves in terms of their relation-
ships to others; men tend to value separation and autonomy and to
define themselves in terms of their personal achievements. 6  For
these "relational feminists,",7 women's disadvantage results not from
the recognition of difference but from a male-constructed hierarchical
ordering of values that places feminine attributes in an inferior
position. In their view, denial of difference in our pervasively
gendered culture inevitably would result in the further devaluation of
women's experience!
A number of legal scholars have drawn prescriptive inferences
from this (partly) descriptive work. They have associated the
masculine logic of justice described by Gilligan with what Robin West
calls "liberal legalism," in which the atomistic holder of negative
rights is insulated "against the judgment, scrutiny, sympathy, or simple
understanding of presumably hostile dictators, majorities, com-
munities, or fellow citizens."9 They also have linked Gilligan's ethic
of care and relation to an approach to legal problem solving that
includes responsibilities as well as rights, connection rather than
separation, and community rather than stark individualism. These
scholars have suggested that the world might be a better place if the
development." CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 1-2 (1982). Gilligan concluded that this disparity resulted
from the exclusion of women from prevailing descriptions of moral development,
producing "a limitation in the conception of human condition [and] an omission of certain
truths about life." Id.
6. Whether these gender types correlate to sexual identity is problematic. See infra
notes 79-106 and accompanying text.
7. See Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 140 (1987)
[hereinafter West, Women's Hedonic Lives] ("Women's lives are not autonomous, they are
profoundly relational."). West subsequently characterized this branch of feminist theory
as "cultural feminism," to indicate its prevalent status in feminist thinking. Robin L. West,
Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1988) [hereinafter West, Jurisprudence
& Gender].
8. See infra notes 18-29 and accompanying text.
9. Robin L. West, Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43, 71




"feminine voice" were heard more clearly in the discourse that
structures legal relations.'0
Not surprisingly, endorsement of traditionally feminine qualities
has drawn criticism from feminist writers who feat that it will retard
women's progress toward equality." Recently, several legal scholars
have argued in particular that the "ethic of care" may threaten
abortion rights. 2 For example, Pamela Karlan and Daniel Ortiz
contend that relational feminism's emphasis on connection and
responsibility makes defending abortion difficult. 3 Elsewhere, Linda
McClain suggests that "[a]bortion may be the most difficult test case
for the translation of the relational approach and the ethic of care
into substantive law. Ironically, recognizing a duty to aid that is
derived from a feminist ethic of care and responsibility might threaten
women's reproductive freedom."' 4 Both articles look to traditional
forms of autonomy-talk to protect abortion rights.'
This Article argues that between these two camps lies an
overlooked middle ground, exploration of which would yield valuable
support for abortion rights. The real threat to equality and abortion
rights derives not from recognition of care and connection as
intrinsically fructuous values but from a cramped conception of the
content of those values. This problem is partly abetted by
relationalism's preoccupation with sexual difference and its correlative
group-based perspective. If care about individuals is regarded as
worthy in itself and not necessarily as an exclusively or even
predominantly female concern, then a robust ethic of care would insist
not only on care by, but also care for, unwanting pregnant women 6
as people intrinsically worthy of care. The "anti-relationalist"
objection, for its part, simultaneously places too much faith in more
individualistic, neutralist defenses of abortion and overlooks an ethic
10. See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 57-76 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the division in feminist opinion on the issue of abortion rights,
see Ronald Dworkin, Feminism and Abortion, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 10, 1993, at 27.
13. Pamela S. Katlan & Daniel R. Ortiz, In a Diffident Voice: Relational Feminism
Abortion Rights, and the Feminist Legal Agenda, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 858, 870-90 (1993),
14. Linda C. McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited." Liberalism, Connection, and
Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1242 (1992).
15. McClain also includes equality-based arguments in her discussion of abortion
rights. See id. at 1259-61.
16. I use this term throughout to refer to women facing an unwanted pregnancy. I
intend "unwanting" to describe only their predominant position with respect to their
pregnancy; I do not imply the absence of ambivalence about pregnancy or any
characterization of their feelings or attitudes with respect to any other aspect of their lives,
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of care's potential to reinforce autonomy- and equality-based claims
to abortion rights. This Article considers how a richer conception of
care could enhance the case for abortion rights. I argue that if real-
world results are what matter, 7 we should transcend this contrived
conflict between supposed theoretical antimonies of sexual difference
and make of both perspectives the practical best they can be in
addressing the abortion issue.
Part I of this Article briefly describes Gilligan's influential work,
the legal scholarship of relational feminists, and recent criticisms of
those writings as applied to abortion rights. Part II suggests that
relationalism sometimes stumbles in translating observations concer-
ning sexual difference into policy decisions and interpretive theory,
thereby feeding the fears of the anti-relationalists. I argue that
ultimately the more important question is not the sexual distribution
of an ethic of care, but the content and application of that ethic itself.
Conversely, Part III challenges the anti-relationalists' endorsement of
a more "masculinist" paradigm and argues that autonomy- and rights-
talk standing alone fail to provide an adequate foundation for
abortion rights.
Part IV explores the content of an ethic of care and contrasts it
with rights. I explain that the perceived conflict between rights- and
care-based perspectives results from a failure to bridge the gap
between personal and impersonal relations. I suggest that par-
ticularistic care, which provides an ethical basis for regulating
behavior in close personal relations, is replaced by abstract univer-
salized rights in the impersonal realm. I propose that
rights-including those relating to abortion-might usefully be
interpreted to resemble more closely what they are a substitute for.
In other words, care in the relationalist sense, which requires specific
interpersonal encounters with others, is by definition out of its
element in the impersonal, institutionalized, public sector. But we can
still ask what a caring person "would like to have done," and thus
seek care-like considerations, in defining the scope of rights in a given
situation.
Part V shows how this approach might support recognition of
abortion rights, a result consistent with the pro-choice orientation of
some prominent relationalists. Part VI applies this framework to
17. This criterion is implicit in the result-orientation of both the Karlan and Ortiz and
the McClain articles. The Karlan and Ortiz article is especially opaque on the issue of
interpretive theory. See infra part II.B. (discussing masculine/feminine distinction and
constitutional interpretation).
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several Supreme Court abortion rights cases and demonstrates how
the present injustice and inequality in the distribution of access to
abortion has resulted in spite of, and in some instances directly




Women do, men don't-according to the common understan-
ding18 of Carol Gilligan's book, In a Different Voice: Psychological
Theory and Women's Development." Gilligan and others have
suggested that women and men view moral problems and human
relationships in fundamentally different ways.2' This "moderate"
version, which has been so influential that Robin West has termed it
the "official story" of feminism,2' "neither reject[s] male thought
18. E.g., West, Women's Hedonic Lives, supra note 7, at 140.
19. GILLIGAN, supra note 5.
20. E.g., NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING:
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 92-93 (1978); DOROTHY DIN-
NERSTEIN, THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR: SEXUAL ARRANGEMENTS AND HUMAN
MALAISE 5-9 (1987); NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AND
MORAL EDUCATION 97 (1984) [hereinafter NODDINGS, CARING]; SARA RUDDICK,
MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE 7-12 (1989); Carol Gilligan,
Prologue: Adolescent Development Reconsidered, in MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN: A
CONTRIBUTION OF WOMEN'S THINKING TO PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND EDUCATION
vii (Carol Gilligan et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter Gilligan, Adolescent Development]; Carol
Gilligan, Remapping the Moral Domai: New Images of Self in Relationship, in MAPPING
THE MORAL DOMAIN, supra, at 3; Carol Gilligan & Jane Attanucci, Two Moral
Orientations, in MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN, supra, at 74; D. Kay Johnston,
Adolescents' Solutions to Dilemmas in Fables: Two Moral Orientations-Two Problem
Solving Strategies, in MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN, supra, at 50; Nona Plessner Lyons,
Two Perspectives: On Self, Relationships, and Morality, in MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN,
supra, at 23; Nel Noddings, Ethics from the Standpoint of Women, in THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE, supra note 2, at 160 [hereinafter Noddings,
Ethics].
21. West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 7, at 15. It might be more historically
precise to characterize Gilligan's brand of feminism as an effort to synthesize two
"intertwined strands" of feminist thought, which Karen Offen has labelled "relational" and
"individualist" feminism. Karen Offen, Feminism and Sexual Difference in Historical
Perspective, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE, supra note 2, at
13, 18. What she calls relational feminism "emphasizes the family, the couple, or the
mother/child dyad as the basic social unit of the nation.... The requirements of
community, not the needs of the individual, dictate[] the sociopolitical program, and what
some call womanliness and others femininity was asserted as an enduring and worthy social
characteristic." Id. In the other strand, "[p]hysiological differences and hence
sociopolitical differences are muted, and equality of individuals and their claim to certain
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'rights' or entitlements, based on an eighteenth-century model devised for male heads of
households (not single men), is uncompromisingly asserted. Within individualist feminism
womanly qualities are necessarily downplayed." Id. As discussed below, Gilligan's
relational feminism attempts to recognize traditionally feminine qualities as morally worthy
while asserting a claim to the moral value of female self-determination.
There are, however, other feminist perspectives. For example, Okin organizes the
other principal feminist perspectives into two general categories. One shares the
traditional view of women as "intellectually limited, overemotional, and partial in their
perspective," but locates the source of those attributes politically in women's subordination
rather than biologically in an intrinsically "feminine" nature. Okin, supra note 3, at 151.
0kin identifies John Stuart Mill (applying the term "feminist" rather loosely in his case)
and Simone de Beauvoir with this view. Id. at 152. Women will be liberated, these writers
argue, when they "live as men do, independent and individual, in the previously male-and
presumably always predominantly male-world of reason and transcendence." Id. At the
opposite end of the ideological spectrum is a range of feminists who, while agreeing that
women's thinking is more subjective, emotional, and particular, contend that it is also
superior to men's thinking-which they see as the cause of most of what is wrong with the
world. The more extreme version of this perspective asserts that "phallocentric,
logocentric thinking has dominated Western philosophy and literature because of its
patriarchal social context and that it is the enemy, to be rejected or overturned in favor
of female (preferably homosexual) thinking." Id. at 152-53.
In her Jurisprudence and Gender essay, Robin West describes feminist theory of
human ontology as "sharply divided" into two camps: relational (which she calls
"cultural") feminism and "radical" feminism. West, Jurisprudence & Gender, supra note
7, at 28. She divides "masculinist" jurisprudence into liberal legalism and critical legalism.
The foregoing review of Gilligan's theory captures the essence of what West characterizes
as the "official" masculinist and feminist stories:
Whereas according to liberal legalism, men value autonomy from the other and
fear annihilation by him, women, according to cultural feminism, value intimacy
with the other and fear separation from her. Women's sense of connection with
others determines our special competencies and special vulnerabilities, just as
men's sense of separation from others determines theirs. Women value and have
a special competency for intimacy and nurturance, and relational thinking, and
a special vulnerability to and fear of isolation, separation from the other, and
abandonment, just as men value and have a special competency for autonomy,
and a special vulnerability to and fear of annihilation.
Id. Her account of the "unofficial" stories summarizes the "other," radical feminist view:
Against the cultural feminist backdrop, the story that radical feminists tell of
women's invaded violated lives is "subterranean" in the same sense that, against
the backdrop of liberal legalism, the story critical legal theorists tell of men's
alienation and isolation from others is subterranean. According to radical
feminism, women's connection to others is the source of women's misery, not a
source of value worth celebrating. For cultural feminists, women's connectedness
to the other (whether material or cultural) is the source, the heart, the root, and
the cause of women's different morality, different voice, different "ways of
knowing," different genius, different capacity for care, and different ability to
nurture. For radical feminists, that same potential for connection-experienced
materially in intercourse and pregnancy, but experienced existentially in all
spheres of life-is the source of women's debasement, powerlessness, subjugation,
and misery. It is the cause of our pain, and the reason for our stunted lives.
Invasion and intrusion, rather than intimacy, nurturance and care, is the
"unofficial" story of women's subjective experience of connection.
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entirely nor seek[s] to reverse totally the patriarchical valuing of
men's thinking over women's"; it also regards difference as a product
of a "gendered social structure," rather than of biology.'
The traditional "male-stream" perspective, including the views of
psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg, "regard[s] women's moral
peculiarities as functional for the private life of the patriarchal family,
though not for political life."'  Challenging Kohlberg's theory of
moral development is a central focus of Gilligan's effort to describe
a feminine perspective on morality?4 Under his hierarchical system,
which equates higher moral development with impartial, univer-
salizable, abstract justice,' "the thinking of women is often classified
Id. at 28-29.
22. Okin, supra note 3, at 154.
23. Id. at 145, 148. For example, the writings of Plato, Hegel, Bentham, and Freud
reflect the belief that
men's judgment is based on reason, but women's is based on sympathy and
feelings, especially for the members of their families; that therefore they cannot
be expected to uphold the principle of utility, the consideration for the happiness
and suffering of all on which all good government and law must be built. While
admirably suiting them for dedication to their families, their essential incapacity
to universalize their moral judgments makes them a subversive force in the
political arena.
Id. at 147 (paraphrasing JEREMY BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION 64 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970) (1789).
24. According to Gilligan, the point of reference for Kohlberg's six-stage theory of
moral development is "conventional morality," which equates the right with existing
norms. GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at 73. Thus, "preconventional judgment [stages one and
two] is egocentric and derives moral constructs from individual needs; conventional
judgment [stages three and four] is based on the shared norms and values that sustain
relationships, groups, communities, and societies; and postconventional judgment [stages
five and six] adopts a reflective perspective on societal values and constructs moral
principles that are universal in application." Id.
Stages three through six are especially relevant to the issue of difference because
Kohlberg found that many more men than women progress past stage three. Okin, supra
note 3, at 149. At stage three, moral judgment is concerned with earning the approval of
others by "being nice," by having good intentions, and by conforming one's behavior to
the majority's stereotypical expectations. Id. Stage four consists of respect for law and
order, established authority, and existing moral imperatives. Id. At stage five, the
individual begins to see the possibility of modifying prescripts to achieve a desired end
(such as enhanced utility) but remains committed to a legalistic approach to moral
decisions (such as the refinement of procedural devices for shaping law). Id. At the sixth,
most liberal stage, the moral agent acts on the basis of "self-chosen ethical principles,"
which are "universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights,
and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individuals"; the legitimating
characteristics of those principles are "logical comprehensiveness, universality, and
consistency." Id. at 149; see LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, 1 ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOP-
MENTI THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT 409-12 (1981).
25. Gilligan's writing prompted Kohlberg to speculate whether a yet higher stage of
moral development might be reached which encompasses both care and justice. Kohlberg
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with that of children."26  Whereas Kohlberg originally based his
theories of moral development on an all-male sample,27 Gilligan's
study included women; in comparison to prevailing models of moral
development, "the women's voices sounded distinct. ' Gilligan's
work has helped both to describe that difference and to suggest that
the cropped picture of women's moral development that emerges
from Kohlberg's scale may reflect, not inadequacy in women's moral
thinking, but a deficiency in his theory of moral development.29
The presentation of sexual difference in moral development for
which Gilligan seems to be best known derives from her "rights and
responsibilities" study.3' To illustrate her theory, she describes the
responses of Jake and Amy, two bright and' articulate eleven-year-
olds, to one of Kohlberg's hypothetical moral dilemmas and to more
focused questions about moral conflict, choice, and self. Jake
approaches the dilemma, in which a man named Heinz contemplates
whether to steal a life-saving drug which he cannot afford to buy for
his dying wife, as a conflict between life and property that can be
resolved by relying on abstraction, logic, hierarchical ordering of
concluded, however, that the moral resolution of justice problems must remain rooted in
Stage 6 fairness principles. Okin, supra note 3, at 150 (citing LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENr. MORAL STAGES AND THE IDEA OF JUSTICE
353-54 (1981)).
26. GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at 70.
27. Kohlberg's work originally was based on a 20-year longitudinal study of 84 boys.
Id. at 18. Jean Piaget's work also focused almost exclusively on males; indeed the index
to his study of child moral development "omits 'boys' altogether because 'the child' is
assumed to be male." Id. (quoting JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD
39 (1932)).
28. Id. at 1.
29. Okin, supra note 3, at 156-57. According to Gilligan, "the failure of women to fit
existing models of human growth may point to a problem in the representation, a
limitation in the conception of human condition, an omission of certain truths about life."
GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at 2.
30. Three studies formed the basis for Gilligan's ideas on moral development and the
contrast between an ethic of responsibility or care and an ethic of rights or justice.
GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at 2, 17-22. The "abortion study" interviewed 29 women, whom
Gilligan claimed were ethnically and socially diverse, who were considering first-trimester
abortion. Id. at 3. They were not selected based on any particular views about abortion,
but Gilligan believed that they were "in greater than usual conflict over the decision." Id.
at 72. The "college student study," like the abortion study, asked the subjects to describe
their experience of moral conflicts and self, rather than presenting them with specific
problems for resolution. Id. at 2-3. Both studies also included follow-up interviews. Id.
The third study, which Gilligan termed the "rights and responsibilities study," also
collected responses to hypothetical moral dilemmas. Id. at 3. The sample included pairs
of males and females matched according to age, intelligence, and socioeconomic variables
at various points in the life cycle from ages six to 60. Id.
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values, and law.3 He concludes that Heinz should steal the drug
and that if Heinz is caught, the judge should take Heinz's dilemma
into account in sentencing him. While Jake's eleven-year-old's
judgment places him in Kohlberg's conventional category, his
application of deductive logic, distinction between morality and law,
and perception that law can err all reflect a developing autonomy that
tends toward the higher stages of Kohlbergian moral maturity.
32
Amy's responses reveal a different approach to moral dilem-
mas.33 She sounds unsure about whether Heinz should steal the
drug, and does not quantitatively weigh property rights against the
value of human life but instead qualitatively assesses the effect that
Heinz's actions might have on his relationship with his wife.' Amy
searches for an alternative that will protect that relationship and
suggests that if Heinz and the druggist could only communicate, the
druggist might realize the wife's needs and work out some solution
other than Heinz's stealing the drug. Amy thus constructs the
problem as "a narrative of relationships that extends over time" and
views the dilemma as arising "not from the druggist's assertion of
rights but from his failure of response."3 Where Jake sees a conflict
between competing claims that is to be mediated by math-like logic
and law, Amy sees a "a fracture of human relationship that must be
mended with its own thread" through communication.36
31. Id. at 26. For example, at one point Jake appears as an 11-year-old utility
maximizer who weighs the cost of a lost life against the cost of lost property. Id.
32. Id. at 27. In evaluating Jake's response, Gilligan explains:
In resolving Heinz's dilemma, Jake relies on theft to avoid confrontation and
turns to the law to mediate the dispute. Transposing a hierarchy of power into
a hierarchy of values, he defuses a potentially explosive conflict between people
by casting it as an impersonal conflict of claims. In this way, he abstracts the
moral problem from the interpersonal situation, finding in the logic of fairness
an objective way to decide who will win the dispute.
Id. at 32.
33. Id. at 27-28. Of course, if Amy's perspective were considered the baseline of
moral development, we would describe Jake's perspective as "different." See supra note
1.
34. Id. at 28. For example, Amy worries that if Heinz is caugit and goes to prison,
his wife might have a relapse and would have no one to care for her and no way -to obtain
more medicine. Id.
35. Id. at 28-29.
36. Id. at 29-31. One might object that Gilligan fails to address the possibility that
Jake too would have preferred to solve the dilemma by, in effect, changing the facts of the
hypothetical, but instead decided to cooperate with the implicit assumption that no amount
of communication would save the life of Heinz's wife. See id. at 29. Gilligan does visit
this issue in her discussion of challenges that other subjects explicitly raised to Heinz's
dilemma. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
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To Gilligan, Amy's responses reflect moral and cognitive maturity
expressed through an ethic of care (just as Jake's do through the logic
of justice). Measured against the Kohlbergian standards of moral
autonomy, however, Amy's emphasis on relationship, communication,
and nonviolent conflict resolution appears naive and powerless. She
seems unable to reason systematically about moral problems,
unwilling to challenge existing authority structures, and reluctant to
act affirmatively to save a life.37 This places her substantially behind
Jake on Kohlberg's scale." Under Kohlberg's view, Amy appears
to be evading the dilemma; to Gilligan, however, Amy's approach has
an intrinsic moral value that Kohlberg's theory fails to appreciate.39
The subjects' responses to more general questions about self and
morality also reveal different perspectives. Jake's description of self
is premised on an "abstract ideal of perfection" and separation from
others; responsibility to him means socialization in a world where
"you have to live with other people."'  Gilligan concludes that Jake
"seeks rules to limit interference and thus to minimize hurt.
Responsibility in his construction pertains to a limitation of action, a
restraint of aggression .... Thus rules, by limiting interference, make
life in a community safe.... . 4  By contrast, Amy "proceed[s] from
37. GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at 30.
38. Id. Gilligan noticed that the interviewer seemed to have trouble even hearing
Amy's responses. Id. at 29. Kohlberg's conception assumes that the key questions are
whether Heinz should steal the drug and by what justification. Id. at 31. Amy's
interviewer reacted to her unexpected responses by repeating the questions over and over
with evident frustration, as though Amy's answers were either not heard or were incorrect,
until the 11-year-old's confidence and the coherence of her responses crumbled. Id. at 28-
29. This breakdown in communication, which resulted in the interviewer's resort to
domination, derived from the interviewer's (and Kohlberg's) failure to understand that
Amy had reconstructed the moral dilemma from a self-contained problem in logic to a
dialogue about relationships and responsibility, yet it is Amy's responses that were judged
to be inadequate. Id. at 29-31.
39. Id. at 30-32. Contrasting Amy's response with Jake's, Gilligan asserts:
Her incipient awareness of the "method of truth," the central tenet of nonviolent
conflict resolution, and her belief in the restorative activity of care, lead her to
see the actors in the dilemma arrayed not as opponents in a contest of rights but
as members of a network of relationships on whose continuation they all depend.
Consequently her solution to the dilemma lies in activating the network by com-
munication, securing the inclusion of the wife by strengthening rather than
severing connections.
Id. at 30-31.
40. Id. at 37.
41. Id. at 37-38. This difference in themes of separation and connection is highlighted
in a study of the imagery of violence in college students' responses to pictures on the
Thematic Apperception Test. Id. at 39. Gilligan and her associates found not only a
higher incidence of violent images in male responses, but also sex differences in the
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a premise of connection." To her, "responsibility signifies response,
an extension rather than a limitation of action. Thus it connotes an
act of care rather than the restraint of aggression."4' More general-
ly, Gilligan found that women tend to see morality as defined by a
responsibility to recognize and to meet the need for care; men tend
to see it as a negative command to respect others' rights to noninter-
ference with life and self-fulfillment.43
substance of violent fantasies, which indicated differences in how men and women perceive
social danger and relationships. Id. at 39-46. The study concluded that images of violence
(and presumably perception of danger) in men's stories increase as characters in the test
pictures were brought closer together, while such images in women's stories increased as
the characters were moved further apart. Id. at 42. Gilligan's analysis identifies a
fundamental difference in outlook:
The prevalence of violence in male fantasy, like the explosive imagery in the
moral judgment of the eleven-year-old boy and the representation of theft as the
way to resolve a dispute, is consonant with the view of aggression as endemic in
human relationships. But these male fantasies and images also reveal a world
where connection is fragmented and communication fails, where betrayal
threatens because there seems to be no way of knowing the truth....
Thus, although aggression has been construed as instinctual and separation
has been thought necessary for its constraint, the violence in male fantasy seems
rather to arise from a problem in communication and an absence of knowledge
about human relationships. But as eleven-year-old Amy sets out to build
connection where Kohlberg assumes it will fail, and women in their fantasies
create nets of safety where men depict annihilation, the voices of women
comment on the problem of aggression that both sexes face, locating the problem
in the isolation of self and in the hierarchical construction of human relationships.
Id. at 45. This difference gives rise to differences in perspectives on rules: women are
willing to change the rules to preserve relationships, while men, "in abiding by these rules,
depict relationships as easily replaced." Id. at 44.
42. Id. at 38. Gilligan's report on the responses of Claire, a participant in the college
student study, further illustrates the discrepancy between Kohlbergian moral maturity and
the ethic of care. See id. at 51-62. Like Amy, Claire defines responsibility in terms of
one's recognition of another's need and one's ability to provide a response. Id. at 53-54.
In Claire's view, Heinz's obligation to his wife arises not from his affection for her, but
from his awareness of her need. Id. at 54. In her first interview, Claire scored a four on
Kohlberg's scale because of her ability to articulate the law in a systematic way. Id. In
a follow-up interview five years later, however, her score actually regressed, even though
she had resolved her own personal crisis and had achieved a much deeper understanding
of her own identity. Id. at 55-56. She became impatient with Heinz's dilemma, seeing the
druggist's claim to property rights as contradicting her conception of social reality as "a
web of interconnection where 'everybody belongs to it and you all come from it.' " Id.
at 57. This perspective caused her to "challengeo the premise of separation underlying
the notion of rights and [to] articulatel] a 'guiding principle of connection.'" Id. She thus
conceived of morality as " 'the constant tension between being part of something larger
and a sort of self-contained entity,' and she saw the ability to live with that tension as the
source of moral character and strength." Id.
43. See id. at 37-51. This theme also emerged in the college student study. See id. at
61-105. Gilligan's ethic of care in that study would further reconstruct Heinz's dilemma,
attempting to particularize and to flesh out the context in order to engage the compassion
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Gilligan's study of women's experience in making the abortion
decision demonstrates an ethic of care in the context of women's
special circumstances and seeks to synthesize the values of connection
and autonomy." She notes that
the exercise of such choice brings [a woman] privately into
conflict with the conventions of femininity, particularly the
moral equation of goodness with self-sacrifice. Although
independent assertion in judgment and action is considered
to be the hallmark of adulthood, it is rather in their care and
concern for others that women have both judged themselves
and been judged.'
The insight that abortion poses "a dilemma whose resolution requires
a reconciliation between femininity and adulthood" led Gilligan to
suggest a three-part theory of moral development under which a
woman's moral maturity is determined not by the outcome of the
abortion decision, but by her commitment to protect self and others
from exploitation and hurt, by the scope of her care, and by the
integrity of her choice.46 According to Gilligan's theory, a woman's
and tolerance that she sees as characterizing women's moral thinking. See id. at 95-96.
Viewed this way, the ethic of care would challenge the assumed necessity of rendering a
moral judgment on Heinz's conduct-which is the exclusive focus of Kohlberg's
approach-and would instead shift the focus to the harm created by the dilemma itself and
to Heinz's decision whether to sacrifice himself:
The morality of Heinz's theft is not in question, given the circumstances that
necessitated it. What is at issue is his willingness to substitute himself for his wife
and become, in her stead, the victim of exploitation by a society which breeds
and legitimizes the druggist's irresponsibility and whose injustice is thus manifest
in the very occurrence of the dilemma.
Id. at 103. Gilligan ultimately condemns the "blind willingness to sacrifice people to truth"
and the "danger of an ethics abstacted [sic] from life" that can result from an extreme
application of the logic of justice. Id. at 104. As an example, she contrasts the story of
Abraham, who was prepared to sacrifice the life of his son to prove his faith, with "the
woman who comes before Solomon and verifies her motherhood by relinquishing truth in
order to save the life of her child." Id. at 104-05; see also NODDINGS, CARING, supra note
20, at 43-44 (analyzing the story of Abraham and Isaac).
44. See, e.g., GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at 71-97. Curiously, Gilligan's abortion study,
which takes up most of IN A DIFFERENT VOICE, received little attention in the law reviews
until the Karlan and Ortiz critique. See Karlan & Ortiz, supra note 13, at 860-71.
45. GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at 70.
46. See id. at 73-74. The experience of 25-year-old Sarah, who faced the decision
whether to have a second abortion, reflects a transition through all three perspectives and
illustrates the importance of self-concept to a mature ethic of care. See id. at 91-95.
Feeling that having a second abortion would be emotionally unbearable-it would make
her feel like a "walking slaughter-house"-she initially attempts to protect herself by
isolating herself from the decision and its consequences. Id. at 91. First she hopes that
welfare officials would deny her benefits so that she could abort out of financial necessity,
and then she misses her appointments at the abortion clinic when she discovers that she
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moral maturity progresses from: (1) self-centered concern with
survival; to (2) other-centered concern with "goodness" and accep-
tance; to (3) responsibility for choice as the woman "strives to
encompass the needs of both self and others, to be responsible to
others and thus to be 'good' but also to be responsible to herself and
thus to be 'honest' and 'real.' 7
The morally mature woman casts off the "assumptions underlying
the conventions of female self-abnegation and moral self-sacrifice" as
"immoral in their power to hurt."4' She universalizes the injunction
against hurting as a self-chosen ethic, which includes a morally equal
self and other within the circle of care.49 In this way, women
conceive of relationships in terms of dynamic interdependence rather
than confining dependence, and they expand the concept of care from
is eligible for welfare after all. Id. Her thinking at this point straddles Gilligan's first two
levels as it is shaped by her feelings of desperate loneliness, her perception of a threat to
her psychic survival, and a desire to appear "good" to others (including the father, who
has threatened to leave her if she has the child). Id. Her concept of goodness in this
regard is one of self-sacrifice. Eventually, however, Sarah realizes that the dilemma she
must confront includes taking responsibility both for herself and to herself. Id. at 91-92.
She sees that some hurt is inevitable in this situation, recognizes that the decision is a
serious one affecting others and herself, and understands that she must take responsibility
for defining herself in the circumstances. See id. One aspect of this transition is to
confront her relationship with the father, which she concludes she must end, but in a
responsible way to minimize the hurt. Id at 92-95.
47. Id. at 84-85. At the most basic level, a woman's care is directed primarily toward
survival of her isolated self when she feels alone and powerless and experiences
relationships as disappointing and hurtful. Id. at 76. "Should" at this level becomes
equivalent to "would," and morality becomes "a matter of sanctions imposed by a society
of which one is more subject than citizen." Id. at 79. At the next, transitional phase,
concern begins to shift from "selfishness" to a recognition of connection to others and the
concept of responsibility. Id. Here the good translates into care for others as morality is
defined more by shared norms and "[c]onsensual judgment about goodness becomes the
overriding concern as survival is now seen to depend on acceptance by others"; but the
distinction between self-sacrifice and care remains confused (as it is in traditional models
of femininity), and the woman herself is excluded from her own care. Id.
The woman now constructs a world perfused with the assumptions about
feminine goodness that are reflected in the stereotypes . . . where all the
attributes considered desirable for women presume an other-the recipient of the
"tact, gentleness and easy expression of feeling" which allow the woman to
respond sensitively while evoking in return the care that meets her "very strong
need for security."
Id. (quoting Inge K. Broverman et al., Sex-role Stereotypes: A Current Appraisal, 28 J.
Soc. IssuEs 59, 63 (1972)). This disequilibrium is reconciled at the third level, which
"focuses on the dynamics of relationships and dissipates the tension between selfishness
and responsibility through a new understanding of the interconnection between other and
self." Id. at 74.
48. Id. at 90.
49. Id.
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the limits of a self-isolating injunction not to hurt others to a more
complex, enriching obligation to sustain connection by acting
responsibly toward self and others."0
B. Gilligan's influence on legal theory
Some legal scholars have endorsed Gilligan's ethic of care,
connection, and responsibility as a distinctive perception of social
relations and moral judgment, the inclusion of which would enrich
and transform legal discourse. For example, some writers have
criticized "[c]ontemporary constitutional interpretation [as] grounded
on a thoroughly individualist liberal philosophy" based on
stereotypically masculine values of autonomy and separation that
emphasize noninterference and neutrality with respect to the good."1
Suzanna Sherry has suggested that an emergence of a "feminine
jurisprudence, instead of rejecting the communitarian and virtue-based
framework of Jeffersonian republicanism, might embrace and adapt
it for modem society."52 Robin West has observed that "[p]recisely
50. Id. at 148-49.
51. Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Ad-
judication, 72 VA. L. REv. 543, 543 (1986). According to Sherry, that atomistic
constitutional vision displaced the civic republicanism of Jefferson, which "finds its primary
purpose to be definition of community values and creation of the public and private virtue
necessary for societal achievement of those values." Id. at 551. Kenneth Karst has
characterized constitutional law as "an institutional reflection of the view from the ladder;
safety from aggression was to be found not in connection with others but in rules
reinforcing separation and noninterference." Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution,
1984 DuKE LJ. 447, 486-87. Karst urges us "to anticipate the possibility that some of our
constitutional assumptions may come to be modified, not by dismantling the ladder, but
by taking account of the view from the web." Id. at 487. While Karst does not believe
that amplification of women's voice in constitutional law will eliminate conflict, he hopes
for a change in our approach to conflict resolution. See id. at 486-95. In Karst's idealized
conception, women have little need "to climb the ladder to define themselves" and thus
view power as a capacity to provide care rather than as a means to dominate. Id. at 487.
Nevertheless, conflict will arise because resistance to (presumably male-initiated)
domination will generate it. Id. "But the 'guiding principle of connection,' and the
rejection of a view of life in society as a zero-sum game, encourage efforts to resolve
conflicts by widening the range of inquiry, seeking ways for the conflicting parties to define
new goals that they can share." Id. at 487-88 (footnote omitted).
52. Sherry, supra note 51, at 544. This transformation will occur, Sherry believes, as
women bring their feminine perspective with them onto the bench. Id. at 592. For
example, she has attempted to show that Justice O'Connor's opinions reflect the feminine
paradigm of contextuality and community. See id. at 593-613; Suzanna Sherry, The Gender
of Judges, 4 LAW & INEQUALrTY J. 159, 165 (1986). For a critique of her argument as
tainted by stereotype, see infra note 91.
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, also influenced by Gilligan, considers what impact the
increased entry of women into the legal profession might have. She envisions an increase
in alternative dispute resolution, a more egalitarian and pleasant work environment, some
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because of its insistence on insularity, liberal legalism demands of the
citizen almost none of the so-called 'civic virtues': mercy, compassion,
public involvement, fellow-feeling, sympathy, or, simply, love."'53
Others have applied relational feminism to non-constitutional
realms such as tort law, defining legal duty in terms of a feminist ethic
of care, responsibility, and interconnectedness. For example, Leslie
Bender has criticized tort law's no-duty-to-rescue-strangers rule as an
indifferent, individualistic, and insulating approach to legal relations,
which lends the law's legitimacy to instances of moral bankruptcy.'M
Bender sees people tied to each other in webs of connection: The
bystander is connected to the person in peril as a fellow human being,
and through the imperiled person to everyone with whom he or she
is in turn linked (friends, co-workers, family, etc.). Those bonds form
the moral basis for imposing a legal duty to aid strangers according to
the proximity of the relation; in her view, no one is truly a stranger."
West also has criticized autonomy-based belief systems, including
those underlying tort law, as unresponsive to the needs of others. She
has instead urged that we "should pay close heed to the pains and
moderation of the adversarial system, and perhaps modification of evidentiary rules to
encompass women's ideas of relevancy. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different
Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39,51-
60 (1985); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiations:
The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984) (considering the impact
women will have on legal negotiations). For a detailed consideration of "the ways in
which evidentiary rules reflect traditionally masculine norms" and suggestions for inclusion
of a feminist perspective, see Kit Kinports, Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV.
413.
53. West, supra note 9, at 71 (citations omitted). She argues that "[ilf 'We the People'
rather than 'They the Court' are to be responsible in the future for the burden of
individual freedoms, we may in the long run better protect those freedoms by seriously
attending to our very concrete responsibilities, as well as to our abstract and dangerously
threatened rights." Id. at 106.
54. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUc. 3, 33-36 (1988) [hereinafter Bender, Lawyer's Primer]. More recently, Bender has
applied relational feminist concepts of connection and responsibility more broadly to tort
law. See Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts,
Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE LJ. 848, 895-908 [hereinafter Bender, Feminist
(Re)torts].
55. To Bender, "what matters is that someone, a human being, a part of us, is
drowning and will die without some affirmative action. That seems more urgent, more
imperative, more important than any possible infringement of individual autonomy by the
imposition of an affirmative duty." Bender, Lawyer's Primer, supra note 54, at 34; see also
McClain, supra note 14, at 1228-32 (discussing Bender's proposal to reform the tort law
standard of care).
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pleasures of others, we are a community, and their pains and
pleasures are ours.""
C. Anti-relationalism
The recent critique of relational feminism as antithetical to
abortion rights is part of a larger objection to the relational perspec-
tive. 7 To more radical feminists, relational feminism's celebration
of care, motherhood, and heterosexual intimacy "constitutes a form
of denial, bad faith, and, ultimately, collaboration with patriarchy.)58
While admiring Gilligan's effort to lend dignity to the concept of
sexual difference, Catharine MacKinnon ultimately regards relational
feminism as "reifying" the damage of sexism into a theory of
difference, which "is an insult to our possibilities" and contributes to
the silencing of women's voices. 9 Even some moderate feminists
56. Robin L. West, Submission, Choice, and Ethics: A Rejoinder to Judge Posner, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1455 (1986).
57. These criticisms go beyond a feminist objection to the underlying gender role
dualism (particularly the self-sacrifice of feminine domesticity on the one hand and the
separation and self-interest of masculine autonomy on the other) that Gilligan describes,
to attack relation itself as a worthy value for women. Joan Williams has distinguished
criticisms of such dualism: "Gilligan's 'conventional feminine voice' reflects how
conventional gender training instructs women to behave; her narratives demonstrate how
many women internalize society's mandates. In a Different Voice is best understood as a
status report on female gender ideology." Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women
in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1565-66 (1991). Gilligan herself
suggests, however, that moral maturity requires women to challenge such female gender
ideology. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
58. West, Jurisprudence & Gender, supra note 7, at 43. According to Andrea
Dworkin,
[t]here is the initial complicity, the acts of self-mutilation, self-diminishing, self-
reconstruction, until there is no self, only the diminished, mutilated reconstruc-
tion.... So the act goes beyond complicity to collaboration; but collaboration
requires a preparing of the ground, an undermining of values and vision and
dignity, a sense of alienation from the worth of other human beings.
Andrea Dworkin, INTERCOURSE 141 (1987).
59. Criticizing Gilligan's conclusions, MacKinnon argues:
I do not think that the way women reason morally is morality "in a different
voice." I think it is morality in a higher register, in the feminine voice. Women
value care because men have valued us according to the care we give them, and
we could probably use some. Women think in relational terms because our
existence is defined in relation to men. Further, when you are powerless, you
don't just speak differently. A lot, you don't speak. Your speech is not just
differently articulated, it is silenced.... You aren't just deprived of a language
with which to articulate your distinctiveness, although you are; you are deprived
of a life out of which articulation might come.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
39 (1987). MacKinnon sees the issue as one of power, not difference: "Let what we say
matter, then we will discourse on questions of morality. Take your foot off our necks,
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view relationalism askance-as threatening women's autonomy and
equality.60
More specifically, Pamela Karlan and Daniel Ortiz claim that
relational feminism is "dangerous and misguided" because, in addition
to "celebrat[ing] the terms of women's oppression," it also "stands in
some tension with women's felt needs, particularly as expressed in the
feminist legal agenda... [and especially] in the context of perhaps
the most central plank of that agenda: reproductive rights.",6' They
argue that "the different voice speaks largely against abortion rights.
Its communitarian underpinnings and tendency to impose moral
responsibility in situations of need make defending abortion difficult.
Compared to the traditional, masculinist autonomy regime, where
individuals hold and assert rights, this brand of relational feminism is
hostile to abortion."' Karlan and Ortiz seek to protect reproductive
freedom by criticizing Gilligan's work and arguing that "[tihe
language of autonomy has provided the central rationale for protec-
ting individual women's control over the abortion decision."'63 They
also point to specific examples of how relational-talk has been both
deployed by pro-life feminists in attacking Roe v. Wade64 and
advanced by the Supreme Court in narrowly interpreting Roe.65
then we will hear in what tongue women speak." Id. at 45.
60. For example, Nancy Chodorow warns:
[W]omen's relational self can be a strength or a pitfall in feminine psychic life:
it enables empathy, nurturance, and intimacy but threatens to undermine
autonomy and to dissolve self into others. Women's mothering itself shares this
-ambivalent position, as it both generates pleasure and fulfillment and is
fundamentally related to women's secondary position in society and to the fear
of women in men.
Nancy Chodorow, What is the Relation Between Psychoanalytic Feminism and the
Psychoanalytic Psychology of Women?, in THEORETICAL PERSPECrIVES ON SEXUAL
DIFFERENCE, supra note 2, at 121. Chodorow's object-relations theory, like Gilligan's
interpersonal/relational approach, describes feminine qualities of "affiliativeness,
relatedness, empathy, and nurturance" and explains how those qualities are devalued and
damaged in a male-dominated culture. Id. at 120. Jean Baker Miller, while regarding
women's capacity for affiliation as containing "the possibilities for an entirely different
(and more advanced) approach to living and functioning," also has warned that some
traditionally "feminine" attributes--such as submissiveness and dependence-are
functional only for a subordinate role and derive from women's powerlessness in a male-
dominated society. JEAN BAKER MILLER, TOWARD A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN 83
(2d ed. 1986).
61. Karlan & Ortiz, supra note 13, at 860-61.
62. Id. at 861.
63. Id. at 876.
64. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
65. Karlan & Ortiz, supra note 13, at 880-82. In addition to the sources cited by
Karlan and Ortiz, for opposition to abortion that invokes relational or communal themes,
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Linda McClain fears that a relational approach to "reproductive
responsibility" will lead to coercive state efforts to ensure that a
woman's decision is based on the "proper" relational concerns,
reminiscent of pre-Roe hospital screening committees,66 and that
Bender's tort-law duty of care could be invoked to impose a "pro-life"
duty of maternal care.67 Unlike Karlan and Ortiz, McClain is less
directly critical of an ethic of care itself and instead argues that the
liberalism of John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin already recognizes care
and connection.' Thus, where Karlan and Ortiz would privilege a
more "masculinist" rights-based interpretation, McClain contends that
liberal theory already incorporates an element of relationalism.69
McClain's ethic of care, however, is a relatively thin version. Her
foundation remains primarily noninterventionist and individualistic, as
she reasons that including elements of self-determination in an
account of autonomy reflects adequate recognition of "connection."
Although self-definition is a point of intersection between McClain
and relationalists like Gilligan," her analysis fails to shift the focus
see Sidney Callahan, Context of the Abortion Debate, in 1 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES: WEBSTER v. REPRODUC-
TIVE HEALTH SERVICES 17 (Roy M. Mersky & Gary R. Hartman eds., 1990) [hereinafter
MERSKY & HARTMAN]; Brief of Covenant House and Good Counsel, Inc., Amicus Curiae,
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605), reprinted in 3
MERSKY & HARTMAN, supra, at 3; Brief of Feminists for Life of America et al., Amici
Curiae, Webster (No. 88-605), reprinted in 3 MERSKY & HARTMAN, supra, at 70.
66. McClain, supra note 14, at 1251-53 (referring to an article by Robin West that is
discussed infra note 263).
67. Id. at 1256-58.
68. The feminist critique of liberalism, principally that of Rawls, relies in part on
Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Roberto Unger in describing liberalism as
contractarian, atomistic, and insular. Id. at 1177-80. For a general treatment of the
communitarian position, see Amy Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 308 (1985). McClain criticizes West for ignoring that liberals "have justified
legal protection of the abortion decision in terms of an allocation of decision making
power and responsibility to the woman ... [and that] liberal legalism has recognized that
the pregnant woman's decision making may well include relational concerns." McClain,
supra note 14, at 1248.
69. McClain also briefly mentions equality-based arguments that focus on "responsi-
bility of self-determination as a component of equal citizenship and how restricting
abortion 'denies women the capacity of responsible citizenship,' "and on how reproductive
freedom allows women to attend to their responsibilities and relationships in life. McClain,
supra note 14, at 1249-50.
70. See id. at 1244. This concept overlaps West's Jurisprudence & Gender article,
supra note 7, and Sherry's Civic Virtue piece as well, supra note 51. Gilligan's third stage
of feminine moral maturity includes a strong element of self-determination. See supra note
47 and accompanying text. McClain does identify an often-overlooked thread in the
liberal literature that has become even more evident in Ronald Dworkin's most recent
writing about abortion, RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION (1993), which, as discussed
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to full consideration of robust care.
Like that of many others, these authors' approach to abortion
rights relies heavily on Judith Jarvis Thomson's A Defense of
Abortion.7 ' Thomson contends that abortion prohibitions force
women to serve as involuntary gestational Good Samaritans by
imposing an extraordinary obligation of life-sustaining care not
generally required by law or morality and not justified by a woman's
decision to engage in voluntary sexual intercourse.7 This argument
rests on both autonomy and equality premises.
Although Thomson concedes that an unborn child might
sometimes legitimately make such a claim on the pregnant woman,
her autonomy premise asserts that in general "nobody is morally
required to make large sacrifices, of health, of all other interests and
concerns, of all other duties and commitments, for nine years, or even
for nine months, in order to keep another person alive."'73 Written
two years before Roe v. Wade, Thomson's equality premise observes
that abortion prohibitions stood as a stark exception to the general
no-duty-to-aid-strangers rule: "[I]n no state in this country is any man
compelled by law to be even a Minimally Decent Samaritan to any
person.... By contrast, in most states ... women are compelled by
law to not merely be Minimally Decent Samaritans, but Good
below, ties important relational themes to the abortion problem. See infra notes 270-76
and accompanying text.
71. Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AP. 47 (1971).
McClain writes: "It has been suggested that the most powerful argument against laws
prohibiting abortion, even if the pre-viable fetus is viewed as a full person, stems from the
fact that our law does not require people in general to be Good Samaritans." McClain,
supra note 14, at 1258; see Karlan & Ortiz, supra note 13, at 873-75. For examples of
other writers who rely on Thomson, including some who also embrace relational feminism,
see, Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1569, 1576 (1979);
Suzanna Sherry, Women's Virtue, 63 TUL. L. REv. 1591, 1593 (1989); Cass Sunstein,
Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and
Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31-32 (1992).
Thomson's analysis is especially powerful because: (1) it asserts a moral basis for
abortion rights even assuming fetal personhood (an assumption Thomson ultimately
rejects) and voluntary sexual intercourse; (2) it recognizes fetal dependency on the
pregnant woman; and (3) it considerk the moral implications of pregnancy's unique
burdens on women by repeatedly reminding us that pregnancy uses and occupies the
woman's body. Thomson, supra, passim. Thomson thus avoids getting stuck in two
different quagmires of the abortion debate-whether the fetus is a "person" entitled to
claim a right to life and whether women's sexual subordination and victimization renders
their "consent" to intercourse problematic-and thereby is able to reach the central
problem of what it means to have a "right to life." See Thomson, supra, at 60-66; infra
notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
72. Thomson, supra note 71, at 62-64.
73. Id. at 61-62.
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Samaritans to unborn persons inside them."'74 Moreover, she rejects
the notion that consent to intercourse estops a woman from claiming
a right to abortion by pointing out that leaving open a window hardly
precludes one from ejecting from one's home an intruder who enters
thereby.75
Finally, Karlan and Ortiz argue that Gilligan's "redescription of
care"-her third stage of feminine moral development-transforms
the ethic of care into something that looks suspiciously like the logic
of justice in drag. They contend that the only way Gilligan can make
her ethic of care work for women is to turn it into a thinly disguised
form of masculinist rights theory.76
74. Id. at 63. A Minimally Decent Samaritan would at least go to negligible trouble
to aid someone who desperately needed help. Thirty-eight bystanders did not even pick
up the telephone to call the police while they watched or listened to Kitty Genovese being
murdered. See, e.g., Joel Greenberg, Why Do Some People Turn Away from Others in
Trouble?, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1981, at Cl; see also Thomson, supra note 71, at 62-63.
"Minimally Decent Samaritanism would call for doing at least that, and their not having
done it was monstrous." Id.
Other writers have also emphasized similar equality arguments against abortion
prohibitions. E.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REv. 375, 382-83 (1985); Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex
and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 955 (1984); Regan, supra note 71, at 1621-29;
Sunstein, supra note 71, at 31-44.
75. Thomson argues:
If the room is stuffy, and I therefore open a window to air it, and a burglar
climbs in, it would be absurd to say, "Ah, now he can stay, she's given him a
right to the use of her house-for she is partially responsible for his presence
there, having voluntarily done what enabled him to get in, in full knowledge that
there are such things as burglars, and that burglars burgle."
Thomson, supra note 71, at 58-59.
76. Karlan & Ortiz, supra note 13, at 890. The authors describe their observation:
When pressed by women's experience, webs give way to hierarchies and the ethic
of care unravels to resemble the logic of justice. As flattering as Gilligan's ethic
of care may be to women, it remains inadequate in some crucial respects to
enable them honestly and truthfully to live their lives.
Id.; cf. McClain, supra note 14, at 1262 ("The message of responsibility analysis of
pregnancy and the abortion decision is ultimately not dissimilar to that of an autonomy
analysis."). Karlan and Ortiz conclude by insisting on "the necessity of taking real world
politics into account in constructing feminist ethics." Karlan & Ortiz, supra note 13, at
895. They fling the Parthian shot that "relational feminism devalues experience that differs
from its measure" and "squelches those who dissent from the identity it would impose."
Id. They further propose that a politically conscious feminist ethic requires "listening
sympathetically to women's voices but in full awareness of the historical and cultural
contexts in which women's needs, desires, and self-image have been allowed to find expres-
sion." Id. at 896.
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II. WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE?
Even if such a danger [of antifeminist use of feminist theory]
materializes, however, feminists can ill afford to adopt a
corrective strategy of silencing other female voices. An
imposed unity of correct views can never be an appropriate
goal for a movement devoted above all to the awakening of
female consciousness.
77
Relationalism's critics make an important contribution in warning
of the dangers inherent in sexual stereotypes. However, their fear
that a particular feminist theory can be deployed to justify an-
tifeminist goals manifests itself in an unfortunate "reverse-essentialist"
backlash aimed at preempting discourse and denouncing relational
theory itself rather than its antifeminist application.' It is therefore
77. Herma Hill Kay, Perspectives on Sociobiology, Feminism, and the Law, in
THEORETICAL PERSPECrIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE, supra note 2, at 74, 85
[hereinafter Kay, Perspectives]; see also Regenia Gagnier, Feminist Postmodernism: The
End of Feminism or the Ends of Theory?, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL
DIFFERENCE, supra note 2, at 21,21 (arguing that "[fleminist theory has long proved itself
equal to the battle of difference between men and women. Its task today is to take into
account differences among women").
78. The essentialism charge that Karlan and Ortiz level against Gilligan, see supra note
76, is puzzling. First, although Gilligan does seem to valorize the "feminine" perspective
of care and connection that she describes, she has expressly recognized that not all women
exhibit it. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. Second, while acknowledging that
relational theory has a strong resonance for many women, who feel uplifted and honored
by Gilligan's account (and indeed may find in it a claim to moral superiority to men),
Karlan and Ortiz seek to prescribe their own version of women's experience-defined
largely in terms of opposition to stereotypic gender roles. Karlan & Ortiz, supra note 13,
at 894-95. This effort to keep the issue of women's subordination in the foreground has
instrumental political value, but it risks the same kind of essentialist imperialism of which
the authors accuse relational feminism. In particular, the accusation that relational
feminist theory "squelches" dissenting viewpoints, "imposes" an identity, or "silences
women's voices" seems overblown and more than a little ironic. See, e.g., David
Margolick, Catering to an Academic Superstar, Judges Find Themselves Tangled in Free-
Speech Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1993, at B1I (discussing allegations that feminists
"who consider [MacKinnon's] views censorious and harmful to women have grown used
to being unceremoniously dropped from programs at which she is scheduled to appear").
MacKinnon's response to the suggestion that she ought to engage in a dialogue with other
women who have different views is revealing:
I do not allow myself to be used to orchestrate and legitimate a so-called "debate
within feminism" over whether pornography harms women. It is my analysis that
that is the pimps' current strategy for legitimizing a slave trade in women. I do
not need to be suckered into the pornographers' strategy, period.
Id.
There is a further irony here. In a larger sense, Karlan and Ortiz follow a pattern
more consonant with the ethic of care than the logic of justice. Theirs is not an argument
from neutral principles of constitutional law; they are quite open in their result orientation.
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advisable to distinguish objection to a theory from objection to a
particular policy decision purporting to rest on that theory. This Part
will consider the problem of difference and suggest a shift in focus
from the sexual distribution of care to care itself.
A. Snips and snails, sugar and spice
Sexual difference is an unstable foundation for constructing an
ethic of care. What difference means and the extent of its incidence
are very much in dispute. Furthermore, the tensions that are created
when theoretical perspectives on sexual difference translate into policy
distinctions that can either liberate or oppress have produced a
vigorous but inconclusive dialectic which at times shades into
caricature.79 There is a reductionistic tendency, as exploration of
difference combines with a desire to attribute distinctive values to
women, for the resulting description to sketch cartoonish figures of
both sexes: Women are caring paragons of "feminine virtues" capable
of experiencing richly textured relational lives that men cannot begin
to imagine; men are unfeeling, logic-bound brutes who understand
only power and domination.' The accuracy of these stereotypes
Their primary reason for rejecting relational feminism is their fear that it will yield
undesirable consequences for women, not that it violates some canon of constitutional
interpretation. In other words, they appear to care deeply about women's welfare, and
their evaluation of theory tnd principle is largely a function of the impact that they believe
It will have on women rather than its abstract logical coherence. Karlan & Ortiz, supra
note 13, at 862 ("Our overall aim is to question the prominence of relational feminism by
showing its tension with many women's felt needs.").
Finally, if anyone has occasion to complain of "essentialism" in relational feminism,
as well as more radical feminist writing, it is-dare I say it?-men, who are so routinely
and aggressively demorized and stereotyped as to ceqse to appear human. See infra notes
100-04.
79. McClain's account of the feminist critique of Rawlsian liberalism senses this
problem. McClain, supra note 14, at 1203-28.
80. According to Robin West, for example,
women value love and intimacy because they express the unity of self and nature
within our own selves. More generally, women do not struggle toward
connection with others, against what turn out to be insurmountable obstacles.
Intimacy is not something which women fight to become capable of. We just do
it. It is ridiculously easy, It is also, I suspect, qualitatively beyond the pale of
male effort.
West, Jurisprudence & Gender, supra note 7, at 40.
According to some radical feminists, sex and motherhood constitute the existential
murder of women, and men are irredeemable rapists, exploiters, and oppressors. See, e.g.,
DWORKIN, supra note 58, passim. For an overview of that viewpoint, see West,
Jurisprudence & Gender, supra note 7, at 28-36. These kinds of essentialism, whether
relational or radical, arise as the barely implicit "some" (or even "many") in the
description of difference between women and men is consistently elided into just "women"
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would seem to be an objective question, but descriptive claims about
difference or sameness can be difficult to sort from prescriptive
agendas about sexual equality (or inequality). This observation
applies to accounts of difference's origins as well as its nature,
whether described by traditional "male-stream" writers or modem feminists.'
and "men."
To be sure, the "official" version of the story often begins with a stock qualification,
apparently intended to forestall criticisms of stereotyping and essentialism, that the
"women" and "men" referred to are not actual women and men but rather shorthand for
a statistical distribution of traits shared by real women and men alike. Karst provides one
example:
Throughout this article, when I speak of the qualities of "women as a group" or
"men as a group," the generalization I have in mind is not universal but
statistical. I refer not to the traits of any particular woman or man, but to a
characteristic more frequently found among one sex than among the other.
Karst, supra note 51, at 448 n.5. Such disclaimers, however, usually buried in the
footnotes, quickly give way in the text to unqualified references to "women" and "men"
as though they were homogenous, dimorphous groups for relevant purposes, and we are
back to the problem of essentialism. See, e.g., id. at 472-75; West, Jurisprudence & Gender,
supra, passim.
81. The extended, complex debate over whether difference is biologically or culturally
determined illustrates this point. Much feminist activism has challenged the "prevailing
cultural assumptions about females' limited physical, psychological, and cognitive
capacities" underlying the nineteenth-century "separate spheres" view of sexual difference,
which "served to justify a wide variety of inequalities in social status." Deborah L. Rhode,
Definitions of Difference, in THEORETICAL PERSPECrIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE, supra
note 2, at 197,199-200; see also Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections
on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 175,176-80 (1982) (describing
separate-spheres view). That view is expressed, for example, in Justice Bradley's infamous
concurring opinion in Bradwell v. Illinois, which invoked the "Law of the Creator" to
conclude that "[t]he natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female
sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life," including the rough-and-
tumble world of law practice. 83 U.S. 130, 137 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
Particularly in the past several decades, some feminists have argued that the identities
labeled "man" and "woman" are, apart from their respective procreative roles, culturally
constructed. See, e.g., CHODOROW, supra note 20, at 11-39 (arguing that sexual differences
are largely attributable to psychological impact of different roles in childrearing); Karst,
supra note 51, at 448 ("Apart from the narrowest sort of biological characteristics, both
woman and man are social constructs"); Judith Shapiro, Anthropology and the Study of
Gender, 64 SOUNDINGS 446, 449 (1981) (arguing that the term "sex" refers to biological
differences and "gender" to socially, culturally, and psychologically determined characteris-
tics); Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 800-01 (1989)
("Gender differences do exist: That is, men as a group differ from women as a group not
only on the basis of biological 'sex' differences, but on the basis of social 'gender'
differences. What I reject is Gilligan's description of gender differences, which I think is
inaccurate and potentially destructive."); see also AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY 58
(Jane E. Edgerton & Robert J. Campbell III, M.D., eds., 7th ed. 1994) ("Gender identity
is distinguished from sexual identity, which is biologically determined.").
This feminist project of distinguishing sex from gender contends that sex roles reflect
an historically and culturally constituted system of male dominance rather than result from
biological differences. Yanagisako & Collier, supra note 2, at 131,139-41. More recently,
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however, biological accounts of sexual difference have seen a revival in the work of
"sociobiologists," who offer neo-Darwinian explanations (in terms of "inclusive fitness")
for stereotypic differences between male and female sexuality and childrearing roles. For
example, under this view the male's reproductive role is, literally, to disseminate his genes;
the female's role is to nurture the product of conception. His investment in reproduction
is, relative to hers, extraordinarily cheap-his numerous gametes have no nutrients
(compared to the female's much smaller number of nutrient-rich eggs), he does not make
the prodigious investment of gestation, and he does not lactate. See Kay, Perspectives,
supra note 77, at 76-78 (summarizing literature). Some sociobiologists point to those
observations to explain stereotypic patterns of sexual and parenting behavior, and even to
justify policy decisions such as a maternal preference in child custody disputes: Women
are more sexually discriminating and form stronger, more nurturing attachments to
offspring; men are more promiscuous, more easily aroused by visual stimuli, and less
attached to their offspring. For an overview of this literature, see John Duprd, Global
Versus Local Perspectives on Sexual Difference, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
SEXUAL DIFFERENCE, supra note 2, at 47, 50-56; Ruth Hubbard, The Political Nature of
"Human Nature," in THEORETICAL PERSPECrIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE, supra note
2, at 63, 65-68; Kay, Perspectives, supra note 77, at 76-80.
Some feminists see contemporary theories of biological determinism as a rear-guard
action of a reactionary patriarchy that threatens to legitimize some of the most
objectionable aspects of the status quo of male domination: male sexual aggression; the
sexual objectification and degradation of women (including through prostitution and
pornography); the exploitation and oppression of women through inequalities in allocation
of childrearing and other domestic responsibilities; and a generalized resurgence in
"separate spheres" mentality. Some of these writers would deem questions of biological
difference inadmissible in discourse about gender and would focus instead on cultural
forces. See, e.g., Dupr6, supra, at 48, 50-56; Hubbard, supra, at 63, 65-68; Kay, supra, at
76-80. Others have challenged the purportedly neutral underpinnings of science itself,
asserting that "scientific theory is permeated by masculinist biases." Dupr6, supra, at 56-57
(reviewing the literature); see also Ehrenreich, supra note 1, at 532-45 (criticizing the
(masculinist) "medical model of reproduction").
Not all feminists agree that recognition of biological difference is inherently
incompatible with women's equality. Earlier in the twentieth century biological accounts
of sexual difference served as a basis for asserting claims to advances in sexual equality
and to justify what was then regarded as progressive reform legislation. Carl N. Degler,
Darwinians Confront Gender; Or, There Is More to It than History, in THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE, supra note 2, at 33,35. Some turn-of-the-century
theorists drew from Darwinism (although Darwin himself seemed to regard women as
biologically inferior to men) to propound a "gynecocentric view" of human development.
Id. at 34-35. However, as Herma Hill Kay has observed,
To posit the existence of difference in the context of legal analysis ... is to admit
the possibility of rational classification between different groups. As Deborah L.
Rhode has noted, historically, "arguments emphasizing sexual difference, even
those designed to advance feminist causes, risked contributing to the stereotypes
on which antifeminism rested." Mindful of the hazards they confronted, the
earliest feminist reconceptualizations of legal equality began cautiously. They
focused on the undeniable biological reproductive sex differences between men
and women, primarily stressing pregnancy. They suggested that pregnancy might
be taken into account under certain circumstances as an appropriate basis for the
differential treatment of women and men in order to ensure substantive, rather
than formal, equality.
Kay, Perspectives, supra note 77, at 75 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Deborah L. Rhode,
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Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1163,1168 (1988)). Kay also wrote,
"[flor the past twenty-five years, American feminist legal scholars and practitioners have
been trying to remove sex-based generalizations from the law... This effort has sought
to remove legal barriers that hindered both sexes in making nontraditional choices
affecting their public and private lives." Id. at 74. Rhode has explained that dif-
ference-even when invoked to defend progressive reform-has contributed to women's
disadvantage. Rhode, Definitions of Difference, supra, at 204-11. One example is
protective labor regulations, upheld in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), to address
the disparities resulting from workplace and family structures that tended to keep most
wives out of the workforce in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. "In the
Court's view, woman's reproductive functions, physical limitations, and special 'dispositions
and habits of life' placed her at a disadvantage in the 'struggle for subsistence.' "Rhode,
Definitions of Difference, supra, at 205. The ensuing debate over such laws split the
feminist community for decades, and "also obscured the complexities of the concerns at
issue." Id. at 206. While such legislation tended to drive up the wages of working women,
"the price of such protection was increased female unemployment and competitive
disadvantage in contexts where male workers were available." Id.
In any event, "[c]ontrary to what some recent opponents of biological explanations
have contended, historically no necessary connection exists between the use of biological
arguments and any particular social or political ideology." Degler, supra, at 35. Biological
theories can sometimes aid oppressed groups. For example, recent research suggesting
that biological structure and genetics may play a substantial role in a person's sexual
orientation could significantly advance homosexuals' struggle for equality by shifting the
focus from arguments about lifestyle choices to issues of identity and self-hood. See Dean
Hamer et al., A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and Male Sexual
Orientation, 261 SCIENCE 321,321 (1993); see also Robert Pool, Evidence of Homosexuality
Gene, 261 SCIENCE 291, 291 (1993) (providing a nontechnical overview of the
chromosomal study).
More recently, some feminists have rejected both cultural determinism and the notion
that equality presupposes sameness. Alice Rossi, for example, simultaneously: (1)
maintains that the universal cultural imperative for a close mother-infant bond has a
biological, adaptive basis that differs from males' role in reproduction; and (2) rejects the
notion that this difference requires women's subjugation. Alice S. Rossi, The Biosocial
Side of Parenthood, 1 HUMAN NATURE 72, 79 (1978) ("Difference is a biological fact..
. [but] equality is a political, ethical, and social concept. No rule of nature or of social
organization says that the sexes have to be the same or do the same things in order to be
social, political, and economic equals."). She argues that both biological difference and
cultural forces must be taken into account in redefining sex roles. Alice S. Rossi, Gender
and Parenthood, in GENDER AND THE LIFE COURSE 161,177-86 (Alice S. Rossi ed., 1985)
[hereinafter Rossi, Gender & Parenthood]. Fathers, she suggests, will require social
training to compensate for their different evolutionary role in reproduction and the
absence of the experience of pregnancy, birth, and nursing. Id. at 186. Sara Ruddick has
suggested that:
Although most mothers have been and are women, mothering is potentially work
for men and women. This is not to deny, in advance of future data, that there
may be biologically based differences in styles of mothering. "Biology" is not
fixed; we have no idea of the potentialities and limitations of male and female
bodies in a society free of gender stereotypes and respectful of female humans.
I am suggesting that, whatever difference might exist between female and male
mothers, there is no reason to believe that one sex rather than the other is more
capable of doing maternal work.
SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE 41 (1989).
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Whether difference in moral thinking really exists also is in
dispute. Some of Gilligan's critics challenge the empirical validity of
the claim that men and women envision morality differently.'
Other critics note that Giligan's studies fail to account for other
important influences on identity, such as race, economic status, and
sexual orientation.s Some studies, however, indicate that relational
differences do exist, and research recently has pointed to possible
hormonal influences on nurturing, affiliative, and sexual behavior. 4
More generally, salient sex differences in social behavior-especially
Others, however, have asserted a nonbiological basis for difference. Nancy Chodorow's
object relations approach, challenging the traditional Freudian phallocentric conception of
gender identity, asserts that sexual difference results from the fact that parenting primarily
is done by women. Because girls are mothered by women, they grow up to be mothers;
their sense of self is continuous with others and relational. Boys, on the other hand,
develop a sense of self based more on separation, denial of relation, and a repressed self-
object world. This difference manifests itself in the hallmarks of a male-dominated society:
Notions of scientific objectivity, the technical rationality of advanced capitalism,
individualistic political and social theories that assume the inevitability of
hierarchy and the need to create society out of asocial individuals, practices of
erotic, scientific, and technical domination-all find their psychological roots as
defensive institutionalizations of a rigid separateness needed by the masculine
psyche and are built on a latent structure of anger and repudiation of women.
Chodorow, supra note 60 at 116-19 (footnote omitted). This view thus "stands the
traditional Freudian understanding on its head" and sees a connection between
construction of masculine and feminine roles, and "it to some extent valorizes women's
construction of self and makes normal masculinity problematic." Id. at 120.
82. They point to literature questioning that claim as well as other stereotypic notions
of sex difference. E.g., John Broughton, Women's Rationality and Men's Virtues: A
Critique of Gender Dualism in Gilligan's Theory of Moral Development, 50 Soc. REs. 597,
616-22 (1983). In fact, Broughton suggeststhat even Gilligan's own anecdotal data call her
conclusions into question. He cites instances of "masculine" rights-talk in the transcripts
of female subjects and a striking example of care-talk in the transcript of a male subject.
Id. at 603-09.
83. For citations to criticisms of Gilligan's studies, see Karlan & Ortiz, supra note 13,
at 869 n.57.
84. See generally Rossi, Gender and Parenthood, supra note 81, at 182-84 (reviewing
research into sexual differences in sensory modalities and social and cognitive skills;
concluding that there is "a good deal of evidence in animal and human research to support
the view that sex hormones and sex differentiation in neurological organization of the
brain contribute to these differences;" and suggesting biological role in differences in
parenting behavior). One recent cross-cultural study found support for "the beliefs that
women prefer a more caring moral perspective and that the differences exist across
cultures." David Stimpson et al., Cross-Cultural Gender Differences in Preference for a
Caring Morality, 132 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 317,320 (1991). Designed to test predictions from
Gilligan's theory, the study found significant sex differences in samples from the People's
Republic of China, Thailand, Korea, and the United States. Id. Recent research also has
suggested a link between the hormone vasopressin and affiliative, sexual, and parenting
behavior in male mammals. Natalie Angier, What Makes a Parent Put up with it All?: The
Uxorious Vole Offers a Clue to the Role of Hormones, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1993, at Cl.
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behaviors closely related to childrearing tasks of nurturing and
socialization-have been linked to peer-group influences beginning in
early childhood.'
Gilligan's In a Different Voice begins by denying any
generalization about either sex,s but the balance of her book seems
largely to the contrary. In subsequent research, she found that while
85. Eleanor Maccoby has found in her own and others' research on sex differences in
development that, when viewed from an individual differences perspective, "male and
female persons are much alike, and their lives are governed mainly by the attributes that
all persons in a given culture have in common." Eleanor Maccoby, Gender and
Relationships: A Developmental Account, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 513, 513 (1990).
Although research does show stable differences on some attributes-for example,
performance on tests of mathematical and spatial aptitude, frequency of aggression,
susceptibility to influence, and propensity to help others-the amount of variance between
the two sexes is small relative to the amount of variance within the sexes. Id. For
Maccoby's earlier work on sex difference, see ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & CAROL N.
JACKLIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES (1974). In her 1990 article, she
concluded that increasingly sophisticated research over the intervening 15 years had
affirmed her basic conclusion that sex differences are limited in degree and kind. Her
recent work, however, has found a strong tendency toward gender separation in children
across cultures (observed as early as three years old and increasing in strength as children
mature), which: appears spontaneously, is resistant to change, does vary depending on the
situation (e.g., whether public or private, structured and supervised or unstructured), and
is not much tied to sex-typed activities. Maccoby, supra, at 513-15. She argues that
childhood's "segregated play groups constitute powerful socialization environments in
which children acquire distinctive interaction skills that are adapted to same-sex partners."
Id. at 516.
Summarizing studies of interactive patterns of sex-homogenous dyads or groups in
childhood, adolescence, and adulthood, Maccoby suggests that: (1) "it is because women
and girls use more enabling styles that they are able to form more intimate and more
integrated relationships"; and (2) "it is the male concern for turf and dominance-that is,
with not showing weakness to other men and boys-that underlies their restrictive
interaction style and their lack of self-disclosure." Id. at 517. She posits that the
emergence of sex-differentiated interaction styles may have less to do with either the fact
that most childrearing is done by women or "identification with the same-sex parent, as
Gilligan and others have claimed, than with peer-group influence." Id. at 519. Maccoby
has explained that women's typical interactive style is appropriate to the traditional role
of caregiver to infants and that men's typical style is appropriate to socializing children as
they mature. Id. To Maccoby, "the peer group [is] the setting in which children first
discover the compatibility of same-sex others, in which boys first discover the requirements
of maintaining one's status in the male hierarchy, and in which the gender of one's
partners becomes supremely important." Id.
86. Gilligan writes:
The different voice I describe is characterized not by gender but theme. Its
association with women is an empirical observation, and it is primarily through
women's voices that I trace its development. But this association is not absolute,
and the contrasts between male and female voices are presented here to highlight
a distinction between two modes of thought and to focus a problem of
interpretation rather than to represent a generalization about either sex.
GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at 2.
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most men and women tend to "focus" their attention either on justice
or care concerns, statistically significant sex differences appeared in
the direction of focusY Almost all of the men who demonstrated
focus oriented toward justice; slightly more than half of the women
who demonstrated focus did so toward care. Thus, Gilligan
concluded, "[c]are focus, although not characteristic of all women, was
almost exclusively a female phenomenon ... If girls and women
were eliminated from the study, care focus in moral reasoning would
disappear."'  Other evidence, however, calls into question the
conclusion that care focus is an exclusively female phenomenon. 9
B. Beyond difference
There are substantial risks in the categorical interpretation of
sexual difference, which threatens to make us captives of a destructive
form of gender politics.' Both sides in the relationalist/anti-
87. She reported "systematic evidence that people raise both justice and care concerns
in describing moral conflicts and that these concerns organize people's thinking about
choices they make." Gilligan, Adolescent Development, supra note 20, at xviii.
88. Id. at xviii-xix (describing results from study of three samples of well-educated
North Americans).
89. The cross-cultural study mentioned above did not show an absence of a caring
perspective by men; to the contrary, American and Korean men displayed a higher "caring
rating" than Thai women. Stimpson et al., supra note 84, at 321 fig. 1. The study's
authors, however, made no observations concerning the potential significance of that
disparity; indeed, they did not appear to notice it. Other research has found that men are
more likely to help others. A.H. EAGLY, SEX DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: A
SOCIAL ROLE INTERPRETATION 42-69 (1987).
90. Faced with an as-yet inconclusive debate about the origins, extent, and content of
difference, I, like Robin West, am tempted to test the stereotypes "against the evidence
of our own experienced lives, if not the evidence of art, literature and legal doctrine."
West, Jurisprudence & Gender, supra note 7, at 55. She concluded that the theories are
incomplete rather than erroneous: that women (and men) experience real contradiction
in their lives-although women do so within the further confines of patriarchy. Id. at 55-
57. Gilligan's description of women's moral lives and care, as well as Andrea Dworkin's
description of how women are violated by intercourse and pregnancy, rang true for West
and the women she knows. Id. Gilligan's work touches upon a stereotype so familiar that
it has become a clich6, but the implication that men categorically do not experience and
seek deeply connected and caring relations is not consistent with my personal experience
and what I perceive to be that of many men I know who are very connected and caring
sons, brothers, husbands and fathers. Firthermore, more recent detailed studies of caring
compassion, and communitarianism have been written by men. E.g., JEFFERY BLUSTEIN,
CARE AND COMMrrMENT: TAKING THE PERSONAL POINT OF VIEW 11-13 (1991); AMITAI
ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY 247-50 (1993); MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND
THE LIMrrS OF JUSTICE 133-73 (1982); ROBERT WUTHNOW, ACTS OF COMPASSION:
CARING FOR OTHERS AND HELPING OURSELVES 282-310 (1991). Men are concerned
about the harm that the abortion conflict is doing to real people, view a substantial part
of the problem as one of a failure of response and relation, and try to address the problem
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relationalist debate suffer from their own form of gender stereotyping,
which ironically undermines their respective positions. Both are
dogged by the process of "descriptive reification," in which as-
sessments of potential and estimates of probability with respect to
sexual distribution of behaviors, attitudes, and outlooks that may
statistically tend to be associated with sex often quietly slip into
"inflexible and often ephemeral conceptions of the nature of woman
and man."9'
in a way that is more inclusive of the felt needs of various sides. E.g., DONALD P.
JUDGES, HARD CHOICES, LOST VOICES: How THE ABORTION CONFLICr HAS DIVIDED
AMERICA, DISTORTED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, AND DAMAGED THE COURTS xiii
(1993); infra note 260.
91. Kay Deaux & Brenda Major, A Social-Psychological Model of Gender, in
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE, supra note 2, at 89, 90. Thus,
using "a set of fallible indicators (e.g., a list of interests, opinions, or attitudes) ... to
indicate the likelihood that one is male (a categorical classification) [rather than] the
degree to which one is masculine (a dimensional classification)" risks arbitrariness,
unreliability, poor information retention (because "[m]embers and nonmembers of a
category tend not to be homogenous with respect to criteria that were used to make the
[classification]"), and inflexibility across a range of applications. Thomas A. Widiger &
Allen J. Frances, Toward a Dimensional Model for the Personality Disorders, in
PERSONALITY DISORDERS AND THE FIVE FACTOR MODEL OF PERSONALITY 19, 19-24
(Paul T. Costa, Jr. & Thomas A. Widiger eds., 1994). The statement of one of Gilligan's
male subjects that is cited by John Broughton, see supra note 82, which sounds relational
to me and probably would be assumed to have come from a woman if the speaker's sex
were not known, raises the question whether Gilligan's perception of her subjects'
responses has at times been colored by her expectations about their gender.
This problem pervades the feminist legal literature. A notable example is Suzanna
Sherry's conclusion that the opinions of Justice O'Connor manifest an ethic of care, a
conclusion that seems to stretch the facts to conform to the stereotype. See Sherry, supra
note 51, at 613. Even when Justice O'Connor's opinions do reflect some abstract
appreciation of context and relation, she is just as likely to lose that perspective in getting
down to actual cases. For example, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch v.
Donnelly asked the key relational question by focusing on the problem of exclu-
sion-whether the nativity display communicated "to nonadherents that they are outsiders,
not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to the
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community." 465 U.S.
668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). It is of more than incidental importance in
assessing Justice O'Connor's relational orientation, however, that she gave the wrong
answer. See, e.g., Donald P. Judges, Keeping the Faith?: The Lower Courts' Dubious
Reading of Lynch v. Donnelly and Stare Decisis, 24 U. WYO. LAND & WATER L. REV.
167, 186-90 (1989) (arguing that her answer was very wrong). Similarly, in Employment
Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith she correctly concluded that the First
Amendment required heightened judicial scrutiny of Oregon's failure to make an
exception to its controlled substances laws, and consequently to its unemployment compen-
sation system, for the sacramental use of peyote. 494 U.S. 872, 902 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Her application of that scrutiny relied heavily, however, on abstract and
sweeping generalizations about the problem of drug abuse, id. at 905, and failed to
consider adequately the respondents' claim in the context of their particular circumstances
and to take seriously their strong showing that exceptions for sacramental use of peyote
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The anti-relationalists, especially Karlan and Ortiz, unwittingly
fall into this trap by failing even to imagine a conception of care that
does not stereotypically place women in an oppressed role as
unwilling caregiver. 2 They seem to assume that because women
traditionally have been consigned to that role, ascendancy of an ethic
of care inevitably will exacerbate the historically unequal allocation
of the burden of care-work; they fail to envision a world in which care
consists not only of care by but also more care for women. Their
conception shortchanges an ethic of care's possibilities and
are well-established and workable. Cf. id. at 909-19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In
addition, her opinion for the Court in Coleman v. Thompson, which upheld denial of
federal habeas review of Coleman's death sentence on the ground that he procedurally
defaulted his federal claim because his lawyers filed his notice of appeal from state
proceedings three days late, could serve as a model of "masculinist" devotion to abstract
principle from the opinion's very first sentence: "This is a case about federalism"-rather
than a case about the killing of a human being. 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2552 (1991); see Donald
P. Judges, Confirmation as Consciousness-Raising: Lessons for the Supreme Court from
the Clarence Thomas Confirmation Hearings, 7 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 147, 164-
66 (1991) (discussing Coleman as an example of the Court's resistance to judicial empathy).
More to the immediate point and as discussed more fully below, her corpus juris with
respect to abortion taken as a whole can scarcely be regarded as the most "relational" on
the Court-at least not in the sense described in this Article.
If one considers substance-rather than stereotype, a much more promising candidate
for the "Most Relational Feminist Justice" is Justice Harry Blackmun. From Roe to
DeShaney to Smith to Webster to Rust v. Sullivan to Coleman to Casey, and numerous
other cases, Justice Blackmun has frequently connected-sometimes quite poignant-
ly-with the real human elements underlying the legal principles and has been very
responsive to the particular human contexts the legal questions present. Apparently
Justice O'Connor agrees. See Henry J. Reske, A Justice Defined by A Ruling: Blackmun's
Roe Decision Inspired Women's Privacy Rights Movement, 80 ABA J., June, 1994, at 20,
21 (commenting on his retirement, Justice O'Connor praised Justice Blackmun for his
"compassion for individual litigants"). His dissent in DeShaney is an especially vivid
example:
Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible, bullying, cowardly,
and intemperate father, and abandoned by respondents who placed him in a
dangerous predicament and who knew or learned what was going on, and yet did
essentially nothing.... [I]t is a sad commentary upon American life, and
constitutional principles-so full of late of patriotic fervor and proud
proclamations about "liberty and justice for all," that this child, Joshua
DeShaney, now is assigned to live out the remainder of his life profoundly
retarded.
DeShaney v. Winnebago City Soc. Servs. Dep't, 489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun seems more consistently sensitive and responsive to real
human harm than Justice O'Connor has ever been. For example, Justice Blackmun's
dissent characterized O'Connor's Coleman opinion as an "unjustifiable elevation of
abstract federalism over fundamental precepts of liberty and fairness." Coleman, 111 S.
Ct. at 2571 (Blackmun, J, dissenting). If such sensitivity and responsiveness is a valid test
of relational feminist values, as I believe it is, then male judges can and do care.
92. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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demonstrates that endorsement of rights-talk is no talisman against
even unintended gender-role stereotyping. To be sure, the concern
that relational feminism itself risks glorifying oppressive stereotypes
is legitimate; but the anti-relationalists miss an important opportunity
to develop relationalism's message about the value of care beyond the
dilemma of difference and the stigma of stereotype.
Furthermore, the anti-relational critique proceeds from a flawed
premise not necessarily implied by relationalism: that the existence
of statistical difference (here a greater care focus among women)
justifies policy decisions based on stereotype (that women should
therefore be coerced to act in the realm of reproduction in accordance
with that statistical prediction). One function of the heightened
judicial scrutiny applied under equal protection analysis is to expose
governmental reliance on "archaic and overbroad" stereotypes lurking
behind a scrim of purportedly legitimate policy concerns. 3 Under-
lying those principles are strong moral and political objec-
tions-consistent with relationalist values-to the use of characteristics
such as race or gender as proxies for stereotypic generalizations in the
allocation of rights and benefits (even if some correlation exists
between characteristic and stereotype). First, such "[sex- or] race-
based decisions that are rational and purport to be based solely on
legitimate considerations are likely in fact to rest on assumptions of
the differential worth of [sex-based and] racial groups or on the
related phenomenon of [sexually or] racially selective sympathy and
indifference."'94 That stigmatic phenomenon is the "unconscious
failure to extend to [the disfavored group] the same recognition of
humanity, and hence the same sympathy and care, given as a matter
of course to one's own group."95  Second, the distortions of the
political process that result when one group is excluded because of
morally irrelevant or suspect characteristics are at odds with
93. E.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1426-27 (1994) ("We shall not
accept as a defense to gender-based peremptory challenges 'the very stereotype the law
condemns.' " (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991))); Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 642-43 (1975) (finding that Social Security Act's distinction
between men and women in award of survivor's benefits rested on "archaic and
overbroad" stereotypes about the male role as breadwinner); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 684-88 (1973) (plurality) (reaching similar conclusion with respect to armed
services' "dependent" allowance).
94. Paul Brest, Foreword. In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1976).
95. Id. at 7-8.
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relationalism's emphasis on connection and inclusion.
These observations also suggest how relationalists must them-
selves be careful that their concern with sexual difference does not
degenerate into stereotyping that violates relationalism's own ethical
precepts. First, stereotypes are antithetical to true care and relation.
They encourage us to encounter another person not as a unique
individual, but as the abstract construction that the stereotype depicts
him or her as being.' According to relational theory, caring and
connection arise in actual interpersonal relations rather than through
intellectualized ideal.98 We care about a person for himself or
herself not for his or her membership in a class alleged to possess
qualities we might value.'
Second, stereotypes can hurt anyone. The problem is more than
descriptive accuracy: The attributes described by relational feminism
are, by relationalism's own lights, morally significant and can have
profound policy implications that immediately impact people's
lives.'0°  Stereotypes are the first long step down the path of
dehumanizing self and others, a process that, experience teaches, all
too easily facilitates the infliction of group-based harms that we might
otherwise consider morally repugnant if done individually to someone
about whom we personally cared. Stereotypes promote the infliction
of harm by increasing both intra- and extra-psychic distance, and thus
diminishing connection, care, and a sense of moral responsibility
between individuals. °1 Indeed, it has been argued that this very
96. For an overview of the antidiscrimination principle and an application of it in
terms that bridge the polarities of individualism and collectivism, see Donald P. Judges,
Light Beams and Particle Dreams: Rethinking the Individual vs. Group Rights Paradigm
in Affirnative Action, 44 ARK. L. REV. 1007, 1022-27, 1054-61 (1991).
97. This problem is one risk of affirmative action programs, which often are justified
in collectivist terms. See id. at 1036-39.
98. See infra notes 191-219 and accompanying text.
99. See Lawrence A. Blum, Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory, 98
ETmcs 472, 474-75 (1988) ("The moral agent must understand the other person as the
specific individual that he or she is, not merely as someone instantiating general moral
categories such as friend or person in need."); Hardwig, supra note 1, at 442.
100. Implicit in In a Different Voice is the reverse-Kohlbergian judgment that men are
morally inadequate when judged by Gilligan's standards. See GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at
19-23. This theme also emerges in Noddings's writings. See NODDINGS, CARING, supra
note 20, at 40-46; Noddings, Ethics, supra note 20, at 166-73; infra note 195.
101. Social psychologists have suggested a differential self-awareness theory that
describes two alternative ways in which group orientation can facilitate the disinhibition
of harmful behaviors toward others. Stereotyping (i.e., exaggeration or fabrication of in-
group versus out-group differences) can foster (1)-the process of deindividuation (i.e., the
"loss of self consciousness and submergence in collective activity"), as well as (2) diffusion
of responsibility. Steven Prentice-Dunn & Ronald Rogers, Deindividuation and the Self-
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same process helps to fuel the fires of anti-abortion violence."m
The "sameness/difference" approach also risks obscuring the basic
systemic problem of women's subjugation: "By taking difference as
a given, traditional approaches deflect attention from broader issues
surrounding its social construction and consequences. Part of the
problem has been focus; legal analysis has been too much concerned
with gender difference, too little with gender disadvantage."' 3 The
anti-relationalists appear to have identified a particular risk of
difference theory for feminist goals: that it can be invoked in defense
of oppressive stereotypes (in particular concerning childbearing and
childrearing). Further, if, as some feminists have contended,
portraying women in subordinated roles contributes to their oppres-
sion (including through identification with the oppressor's construction
Regulation of Behavior, in PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUP INFLUENCE 87,90-91 (Paul B. Paulus
ed., 2d ed. 1989). Arousal of group cohesiveness (for example by focusing on racial or
sexual stereotypes) has been found to cause deindividuation by reducing private self-
awareness (i.e., one's awareness of thoughts, feelings, and perceptions), thus disabling the
psychological behavior-regulating mechanisms of either natural care or internalized norms
of social propriety. In other words, "uninhibited acts may result from decreased cognitive
[and affective] mediation of behavior." Id. at 94.
102. DALLAS BLANCHARD & TERRY J. PREwrIr, RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE AND
ABORTION: THE GIDEON PROJECr 13-15, 214-15 (1993). Only 10 days before the killing
of Dr. David Gunn in Pensacola, Blanchard predicted that anti-abortion activists would
soon resort to such extreme violence. John Balzar, Abortion Foes Test the Limits, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at Al, A8.
103. Rhode, supra note 81, at 197. Catharine MacKinnon's criticism has been more
forceful:
According to this approach [to sex equality], which has dominated politics, law,
and social perception, equality is an equivalence not a distinction, and gender is
a distinction not an equivalence. The legal mandate of equal treatment-both
a systemic norm and a specific legal doctrine-becomes a matter of treating likes
alike and unlikes unlike, while the sexes are socially defined as such by their
mutual unlikeness. That is, gender is socially constructed as difference
epistemologically, and sex discrimination law bounds gender equality by
difference doctrinally.... A built-in tension thus exists between this concept of
equality, which presupposes sameness, and this concept of sex, which presupposes
difference.... Sex equality becomes a contradiction in terms, something of an
oxymoron.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 216 (1989).
In her view, the traditional approach to equality has left women looking as though they
want to have it both ways-"the specialness of the pedestal and an even chance at the
race, the ability to be a woman and a person too"-but getting little benefit from either.
Id. at 233. Men, on the other hand, get to be the same when it suits them (e.g., by taking
advantage of sex discrimination laws) and different when they want to be (e.g., when
seizing some advantage). Her alternative approach is not to formulate abstract standards
that will produce determinate outcomes in particular cases or to clarify difference, but
instead to reallocate power wherever necessary to end men's domination of women-as
she defines it. Id.
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of reality), perhaps stereotypically portraying men as at best
relationally irresponsible and at worst innately evil abusers also has
adverse consequences."° An additional problem is that difference
theory's dualistic justice-versus-care paradigm tends to exclude the
possibility that there are "persons who are both very fair and very
caring and who, in addition, have finely honed sensitivities for
perceiving moral saliencies and seeing particular problems as
problems of certain multifarious kinds."1 5
In a larger sense, preoccupation with sexual difference in the
distribution of values and behaviors can preempt consideration of the
values and behaviors themselves. For one thing,
[i]t is necessary for us to remember, as we think critically
about domination, that we all have the capacity to act in
ways that oppress, dominate, wound (whether or not that
power is institutionalized). . . . [I]t is first the potential
oppressor within that we must resist-the potential victim
within that we must rescue-otherwise we cannot hope for
an end to domination, for liberation. °6
104. See supra note 101. Thus, perhaps both the sugar-and-spice-and-everything-
nice/snips-and-snails-and-puppy-dog-tails approach to difference, and the more
ideologically violent accusation that men are incipient rapists and oppressors and women
are chronically powerless victims, can have destructive effects on the way men and women
view themselves and each other. For an example of the latter accusation, see SUSAN
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE 15 (1975) (contending
that rape "is nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which all
men keep all women in a state of fear"). For a somewhat strident objection to that
perspective, see Gerald Schoenewolf, The Feminist Myth About Sexual Abuse, 18 J.
PSYCHOHISTORY 331, 331-32 (1991).
A recent unfortunate example of the harm that can occur was an Issues in Feminist
Art class project at the University of Maryland, purportedly intended to highlight the issue
of sexual assault, which posted leaflets around campus warning that "these men are
potential rapists." The men's names listed on the leaflets were selected at random from
a student telephone directory. The nine women art students also erected a wall with the
names of 15,000 male students (almost every man in the phone book) under the heading
"these men could be rapists." See Lisa Leff, Kirwan Denounces Art Project; U-Md.
President Calls Listing of "Potential Rapists" Regrettable, WASH. POST, May 11, 1993, at
B4. Another example is the proposal that men be banned from working with children.
See, e.g., Angela Neustatter, Should Men Work With Children?, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), Apr. 25, 1993, at 22.
105. Owen Flanagan & Kathryn Jackson, Justice, Care, and Gender: The Kohlberg-
Gilligan Debate Revisited, 97 ETHIcS 622, 627 (1987).
106. Bell Hooks, Feminism: A Transformational Politic, in THEORETICAL PERSPEC-
TIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE, supra note 2, at 185, 186-87. Hooks recognizes that
whites, blacks, men, and women all oppress and are oppressed, but she also believes that
[fleminism as liberation struggle must exist apart from and as a part of the larger
struggle to eradicate domination in all its forms. We must understand that
patriarchical domination shares an ideological foundation with racism and other
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While the dialogue about difference has had the enormous value of
concentrating attention on care in the first place, real transformation
requires consideration of an ethic of care on its own terms. If caring
is a valuable trait, it may matter less how it is sexually distributed
than whether it is sufficiently actualized in the community as a whole.
In the context of abortion, this means that the solution is neither to
reject nor to dilute an ethic of care just because a gendered version
of it may contribute to the subordination of women, as the anti-
relationalists fear, but is instead to ask where a universalized, robust
ethic of care might lead.
HI. LuvIrs OF THE "MASCULINIST" PARADIGM
The relationalists' misplaced emphasis on difference is matched
by the anti-relationalists' mistake in testing a "feminine" ethic of care
in a legal landscape constructed along "masculine," rights-talk lines.
Both sides thus underestimate relational feminism's potential to
challenge the ideological status quo. The proper question is not
whether a feminine perspective can survive scrutiny in a masculine
legal world any more than it is whether women can show that they
can "take it like a man" and survive in a hostile, sexually harassing
work environment." Nor is the issue whether care can displace
forms of group oppression, that there is no hope that it can be eradicated while
these systems remain intact.
Id. at 188.
107. One of the reasons for applying a gender-conscious standard to harassment claims
is to avoid the tendency toward gender bias in the construction of the norms by which
conduct is evaluated. (I make an analogous point below in observing more generally that
relationalism argues for inclusion of a care focus along with the rationality norms
traditionally applied to evaluate the legitimacy of policy-making.) The reasonable person
standard "has a tendency to be male-biased, due to the tendency of courts and our society
in general to view the male perspective as the objective or normative one." Lehmann v.
Toys "R" Us Inc., 626 A.2d 445,459 (NJ. 1993) (adopting "reasonable person of the same
sex" test for state law sexual harassment/hostile work environment claims). The Lehmann
court recognized that "there is far from a uniform female perspective on sexual
harassment," but concluded that sex differences in attitudes and perceptions were
sufficiently well established to warrant legal recognition. Id. (citing Kathryn Abrams,
Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV.
1183, 1193 n.44 (1989)). For other cases adopting a similar position, see Ellison v. Brady,
924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991); King v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 898
F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990); Andrews v. Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485-86 (3d Cir.
1990). But see Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155, 167 (Mich. 1993) (rejecting gender-
specific test on the grounds, inter alia, that it tends to "pour into the standard stereotypic
assumptions of women which infer women are sensitive, fragile, and in need of a more
protective standard. Such paternalism degrades women and is repugnant to the very ideals
of equality that the act is intended to protect." (footnote omitted)). Citing Ellison v.
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rights. I shall suggest below that rights are a necessary substitute for
care in impersonal, disconnected relationships. The issue really is
what, if anything, care can add to consideration of legal questions
such as those concerning abortion rights.
By positing a polarized contest between autonomy and relational
theory (as do Karlan and Ortiz), or by insisting that liberalism already
includes most of what is worthwhile from relationalism (as does
McClain), those authors mention but fail to develop the possibility
that both perspectives can together enrich understanding of the
abortion problem. Moreover, their push to reinvigorate a "mas-
culinist" view of abortion rights seems oddly anachronistic, in view of
the fact that the law struck down in Roe was rooted in a period of
pervasive male domination." s  Some limits of that approach are
considered in this Part.
A. Critique of Thomson's defense of abortion
The autonomy premise of Thomson's argument is largely atomis-
tic:1" (1) no one, even if in extremis, has a right to demand much
if any care from anyone else; and (2) one's claim to autonomy is
largely insulated from any moral judgment about the uses to which it
is put. ° That premise forms the moral baseline of tort law's no-
duty-to-rescue rule, to which she refers in her equality premise to
Brady, the EEOC has proposed rules that would establish a "'reasonable person" standard
for hostile or abusive work environment claims. That standard would take into account
the perspective of persons of the claimant's race, color, religion, gender, national origin,
age, or disability. Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender,
National Origin, Age, or Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. 51266,51267 (1993) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. § 1609.1(c)).
To argue, as I do in the preceding section, that relationalism's overemphasis on
difference is problematic is not to suggest that the potential for difference ought to be
categorically ignored. A standard like that proposed by the EEOC allows a factfinder to
consider whether sexual difference really exists in a context in which taking difference (if
there is any) into account may lead to needed protection for women (or any other
victimized person). Furthermore, there may well be room for consideration of difference
in a relational account of abortion that also protects women from exploitation and hurt.
See infra notes 332-61 and accompanying text. My objection is to a categorical, wholesale
approach (either by rejection or adoption) to both difference and relationalism. They both
have something to offer at the retail level, in the proper context.
108. See JUDGES, supra note 90, at 104, and sources cited therein.
109. McClain observes that relational feminists tend to conflate two distinct usages of
the term "autonomy," both pejorative, to mean atomistic self-interest and to mean self-
determination or personal sovereignty. McClain, supra note 14, at 1175-76.
110. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
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demonstrate the anomalous nature of abortion prohibitions."' It
also tracks Gilligan's description of the masculinist view of justice as
noninterference."2  Relational feminism, however, implicitly ques-
tions the sufficiency of Thomson's syllogism, standing alone, as a
defense of abortion rights. Her argument depends on the validity of
(1) her autonomy premise that there is no general moral duty to aid
strangers, and (2) her equality premise that abortion raises cognate
moral questions and therefore should receive a similar answer if
women are not to be discriminated against. Neither premise is self-
evident, and the syllogism ultimately proves on scrutiny to be circular
as a defense of abortion rights.
This circularity emerges in McClain's objection that Bender's
relational critique of the no-duty-to-rescue rule, taken to its logical
conclusion, would compromise abortion rights. McClain counters
Bender's implicit relational challenge to Thomson's autonomy premise
by pointing to that challenge's impact on abortion rights."' Thus,
McClain's anti-relational response is that no one owes much duty to
anyone else because otherwise abortion would be difficult to defend;
abortion is justified because no one owes much duty to 'anyone else.
Archimedes, searching in vain for a place to stand, reaches for his
own sandalstraps.
While McClain's objection to Bender's conception of duty
between strangers may be sensible as tort policy, her conclusion about
relationalism and abortion does not follow. McClain describes how
more modest tort reform proposals, based on liberal conceptions of
personhood, argue for a "duty of easy rescue" that does not impose
"a significant disruption of [the rescuer's] own projects.""' By
111. Thomson, supra note 71, at 61-64; see also supra notes 73-75 and accompanying
text.
112. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
113. McClain, supra note 14, at 1258. Recall that Thomson's premise also serves as the
foundation for Karlan and Ortiz's autonomy-based defense of abortion. See supra notes
61-76 and accompanying text.
114. McClain, supra note 14, at 1237-38 (discussing Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a
Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE LJ. 247, 292 (1980)). For example, as McClain observes,
Weinrib has argued for a "duty of easy rescue" based in part on a Kantian morality in
which each individual "concede[s] to others the right to physical integrity that he implicitly
and inevitably claims for himself." Weinrib, supra, at 288, quoted in McClain, supra note
14, at 1237. Liberalism's concern with autonomy is sheltered in Weinrib's proposal by his
recognition that conditions of helplessness and dependency may preclude contractarian
arrangements that liberalism normally assumes govern obligations to others, and by
hypothesizing an ex ante consent to a mutual right (and reciprocal duty) to physical
security (and aid). For an analogous justification of the tort system generally and a
purported account of the autonomy interests it affects, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
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contrast, Bender's Good Neighbor proposal threatens to require Very
Good Samaritanism," 5  undervalues individual self-deter-
mination,"6 and disregards other responsibilities the potential
rescuer might have." 7
McClain's warning that Bender's approach might undermine
ECONOMICS OF JusTIcE 60-87 (1981). Weinrib responds to the traditional objections to
a duty to aid strangers-its indeterminacy and potential voraciousness-by limiting the
duty to cases sufficiently specific to be capable of enforcement and that do not impose
much burden on the rescuer. Weinrib, supra, at 292. McClain suggests that such limited
"[p]roposals for reform of the [no-duty-to-rescue] doctrine and its erosion through
recognition of special relationships giving rise to a duty to rescue, illustrate the extent to
which concerns about care and connection not explicitly identified as feminist are already
or could be present in law." McClain, supra note 14, at 1232. McClain thus concludes:
If connection connotes only our immediate web of relationships, then viewing the
stranger as a neighbor to others, whom we should treat as we would treat our
neighbors, might be a necessary step in order to attempt to expand the circle of
care. But if an ethic of care can recognize a web of connection based on our
common humanity, then it shares with liberalism the notion of duties arising out
of personhood. Such duties could, and perhaps should, provide a basis for a legal
duty to aid when there is no significant risk or burden to oneself.
Id. at 1242 (citations omitted). This duty of "easy rescue" resembles Thomson's Minimally
Decent Samaritanism. See Thomson, supra note 71, at 61-63; supra notes 73-75 and
accompanying text.
115. McClain pragmatically argues that Bender's reliance on a good neighbor standard
of care "is flawed because one cannot, however regrettably, assume a certain level of care
among neighbors" and because of the problems of indeterminacy flowing from a standard
that varies from neighborhood to neighborhood. McClain, supra note 14, at 1240-41. She
also points out that Bender's resort to a good neighbor standard is unnecessary, because
a model based on notions of equal citizenship described by Weinrib (and by John Rawls)
would also impose a duty of care. Id. at 1241.
116. Id. at 1239-40. This extreme result is not mandated by a more moderate form of
relational feminism. As McClain observes, Carol Gilligan's relational feminism
warns against equating an ethic of care with female self-sacrifice, urging instead
that the final stage of moral development is recognizing the need for personal
integrity through focusing on the self as well as on others, what she calls bringing
justice to the care perspective, or the integration of rights and responsibilities.
Id. at 1240 (footnote omitted); see also supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text. This
aspect of Gilligan is not, as Karlan and Ortiz assert, simply a disguised form of liberalism
(in the extreme sense used by Thomson). See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
Instead, as McClain has explained, Gilligan's recognition of this notion of integrity and
rejection of the ethic of self-sacrifice shows that relational feminism in this sense and
liberalism in the Rawlsian and Dworkinian sense have something in common-but that
thing is not what Karlan and Ortiz think it is. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying
text. The problem with McClain's approach, and ultimately with Gilligan's, is the absence
of careful consideration of what care might constructively mean in real life. Gilligan is too
worried about difference, and McClain is too worried about defending her vision of
abortion rights. Bender's contribution here is to get us thinking about what care means,
even if she might take it in an unworkable direction in the context of tort law.
117. McClain, supra note 14, at 1239.
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abortion rights parallels Karlan's and Ortiz's fear of Gilligan:"' If
people with whom we have no prior relation are not "strangers"
because of the basic interconnectedness of all people, and if duty is
a function of propinquity, then "the pregnant woman-fetus relation-
ship presumably would be at the highest level of duty, because of the
high degree of 'intersubjectivity' and 'connection.' "I"n Bender's
relation-talk thus "may unwittingly describe (for some) the pregnant
woman-fetus relationship.... Could a caring woman ignore the
interest of the fetus, a potential human being, in a sense a part of her,
in becoming a person?""'
I argue below that it is possible to answer "probably not," but
nevertheless to conclude that a caring person would not force
someone unwillingly to continue pregnancy.12 1 From the anti-
relationalists' perspective, however, the intolerable implication of
Bender's position is that it questions the assumptions underlying
Thomson's claim that a woman has no moral obligation to meet
pregnancy's demands of Good (indeed Most Excellent)
Samaritanism." Because that result might raise a moral objection
to abortion, McClain reasons, Bender must be wrong in her relational
account of moral duty."2
Perhaps McClain has it backwards. Bender's relationalism would
indeed take pregnancy out of the Samaritan analogy.24 Whatever
118. It must be noted that Bender's analysis of the no-duty-to-rescue rule does not
consider its impact on abortion rights and gives no indication of being intended to produce
the result McClain fears. Indeed, the anti-relationalist critique usually characterizes such
results as unintended.
119. McClain, supra note 14, at 1257.
120. Id. at 1256-57.
121. See infra notes 263-331 and accompanying text.
122. Bender's relationalism thus implicitly challenges the not-too-much-trouble
constraint of the "easy rescue" duty in the abortion context because "if the fetus is the
stranger in peril, we must include the fetus's life-sustaining connection to the pregnant
woman in the woman's web of relationships" (as well as the fetus's connection to others,
such as the father). McClain, supra note 14, at 1258. Keep in mind that, as McClain
notes, "Thomson's argument does not contradict recognition of either a natural or legal
duty of mutual aid," because Thomson is concerned with a burden much greater than
Weinrib's minimal duty of" 'easy' rescue." Id. at 1259.
123. Id. at 1239-42.
124. Bender's fundamental point with respect to the no-duty-to-rescue rule is an
important one that she and other relational feminists have made in a variety of contexts:
Viewed from a more "relational" perspective, we simply are not strangers to each other.
"In defining duty, what matters is that someone, a human being, a part of us, is drowning
and will die without some affirmative action." Bender, Lawyer's Primer, supra note 54,
at 34.
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the limits of Bender's tort proposal, that outcome may make
sense."2 It is strained and artificial to describe the conceptus126 as
a stranger-in-peril and the pregnant woman as a bystander. While
lawyers may query "And who is my neighbor?," few mothers wonder
"And who is my child?" Likening the conceptus to a burglar is even
more bizarre. Those moves, so central to Thomson's argument, rely
on the kinds of abstractions from real life that relational feminists
properly decry. 27
Thomson's assumptions beg what she herself identifies as the key
question: Does the conceptus-pregnant woman relationship impose
a duty of care? Her argument that the conceptus has no "right" to
"expect" any sustenance from the woman requires Thomson to
redefine that relationship into something alien to maternity, in which
the conceptus and woman are at best atomistic strangers and the
conceptus resembles a hostile intruder (the kind of person whom, in
125. Recall the context of the Good Samaritan parable: "And, behold, a certain lawyer
stood up, and tempted him, saying, 'Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?' " Luke
10:25 (King James). Jesus instructed the lawyer to love God, and also to love " 'thy
neighbor as thyself.' " Id. at 27. He related the parable of the Good Samaritan in answer
to the lawyer's question, " 'And who is my neighbor?' " Id. at 29-37.
126. According to a generally accepted medical text, the term "conceptus" refers "to
all products of conception, i.e., embryo (fetus), fetal membranes, and placenta. In
particular, the conceptus includes all tissues that develop from the zygote, both embryonic
and extraembryonic." F GARY CUNNINGHAM, M.D., ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 40
(18th ed. 1989). I use the term "conceptus," which covers all stages of gestation from
fertilization to parturition, rather than the more commonly used term "fetus," which
actually does not apply until the eighth week after fertilization, to avoid obscuring the fact
that most abortions performed in the United States technically "are not abortions of
fetuses but rather of embryos in the last stages of embryonic development." JUDGES,
supra note 90, at 52. In view of gestational development's central place in the abortion
conflict (legally, politically, and emotionally), technical accuracy would appear to be
indicated.
127. Those moves also could be countered with other, perhaps no less artificial, thought
experiments. Implicit in Thomson's argument is the contractarian assumption that the
famous violinist, who has been hooked to the woman's circulatory system, would not have
any reasonable expectations (as opposed to fervent unilateral hopes) unfairly frustrated
if the woman turned around and unplugged him. After all, if she has no moral duty to
make large sacrifices of health and life plans for his benefit, it should hardly come as a
disappointment that she declines to volunteer. Imagine, though (fantastically), that the
conceptus is capable of forming "expectations." How can we say that the conceptus has
no reasonable expectations of continued care? Indeed, infants seem to be filled with
nothing but the unrelenting expectation that they will be cared for immediately,
completely, and endlessly. Does Thomson seriously mean to imply that a baby crying at




other circumstances, the law allows one to shoot on sight)." Her
reference to the no-duty rule could be inverted to demonstrate how
special that relationship is. The law already recognizes numerous
"special relationships" in which duties of care arise. A characteristic
feature of such relationships is the care-claimant's dependence on the
person from whom care is claimed. 129
128. For similar criticism, see LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1356 (2d ed. 1988):
The underlying problem with both approaches is that they seek to fit the
relationship between a pregnant woman and the fetus she carries into the
pigeonholes framed to deal with other problems in the law. We do not get much
farther by comparing abortion to a nonculpable omission or a justifiable homicide
than we would by analogies to property law that might try to place the fetus
within the framework of uterine invitees, licensees, and trespassers. The
relationship of woman and fetus is unique; it requires a unique legal analysis.
129. As one treatise explains:
During the last century, liability for "nonfeasance" has been extended still further
to a limited group of relations, in which custom, public sentiment and views of
social policy have led the courts to find a duty of affirmative action. In such
relationships the plaintiff is typically in some respect particularly vulnerable and
dependent upon the defendant who, correspondingly, holds considerable power
over the plaintiff's welfare.
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 373-74 (5th ed.
1984). Examples of such special relations (which seem at least no less analogous to
pregnancy than Thomson's violinist hypothetical) include common carriers and their
passengers; innkeepers and their guests; ships and their sailors who fall overboard;
employers and their employees; businesses and their invitees; jailers and their prisoners;
schools and their pupils. Id. at 376-77. Indeed, Prosser's treatise includes among "other
relations calling for the same conclusion" the relationship between "parent and child,
where the duty to aid has been established in the criminal law." Id. at 377 (footnotes
omitted). For recognition of a constitutional duty arising out of a custodial relation, see
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-19 (1982) (finding Fourteenth Amendment duty
to protect liberty interests of mentally retarded individual subject to involuntary custody);
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,102-03 (1976) (recognizing duty to prisoners required both
as a matter of procedural due process and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment). Furthermore, duties of reasonable care to secure the safety of
another while in the actor's charge and not to leave the other in a worse condition than
when the actor took charge arise when one, under no duty to do so, "takes charge of
another who is helpless adequately to act to protect himself." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 324 (1977). Comment g of the RESTATEMENT provides:
The fact that the actor gives another gratuitous assistance does not require him
to continue his services until the recipient of them gets all of the benefit which
the actor is capable of bestowing.... Thus, while A, who has taken B from a
trench filled with poisonous gas, does not thereby obligate himself to pay for B's
treatment in a hospital, he cannot throw B back into the same trench, or leave
him lying in the street where he may be run over.
Id. cmt. g. Thomson's argument implies that terminating pregnancy is equivalent to
refusing to pay for the helpless person's hospitalization, rather than to throwing the
conceptus back into the trench or leaving him or her lying in the street. The per-
suasiveness of that implicit assumption is open to question.
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More fundamentally, it is doubtful whether pregnancy can
coherently be considered through tort and property law's generally
individualistic lens of rights and duties.130  What if pregnancy and
parenthood really are unique? The law and social mores already
impose substantial obligations of care on parents. Child abuse and
neglect are grounds for state intervention"' and are increasingly
regarded as a moral outrage." Thomson's assertion that "nobody
is morally required to make large sacrifices, of health, of all other
interests and concerns, of all other duties and commitments, for nine
years, or even for nine months, in order to keep another person
alive"'' surely would surprise responsible parents, who do precisely
that for more than twice nine years to raise their own children.' 34
To be sure, childrearing does not involve the direct biological link of
pregnancy, but it routinely entails significant, protracted, and
sometimes prodigious, sacrifices of health and life projects. 135
130. See supra note 128. Indeed, one wonders why Thomson did not also rely on a
property owner's privilege to use reasonable force to defend her right of exclusive
possession. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 77 (1977).
131. See, e.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY AND
STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 381 (2d ed. 1989).
132. No "deadbeat parent" will be heard to object, for example, that he or she owes
no duty to his or her offspring beyond that which causes the parent no inconvenience. See,
e.g., Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-521, 106 Stat. 3403 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 228, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796-97, 12301 (Supp. V 1992)).
133. Thomson, supra note 71, at 61-62.
134. This argument, like Thomson's, assumes that the prenatal-postnatal distinction is
irrelevant to the question of moral duty. As discussed below, on one view the loving
parents' motivation to care for their children arises naturally out of the caring relation and
not out of abstract moral principle. See infra notes 193-219 and accompanying text. It is
the application of this perspective to abortion that anti-relationalists fear will ground a
moral duty to bring a pregnancy to term.
135. Cass Sunstein focused on the biological distinction to argue, Thomson-like, that
neither conventional morality nor law requires a parent to donate a kidney to his or her
child. Sunstein, supra note 71, at 34. It is not clear that his analogy is apt either.
Arguably, organ transfer is such an exceptional experience that it lies outside normal
realms of care, whereas the burden of pregnancy-however substantial it may be-is one
virtually every single one of us has "imposed" on a woman and is the quintessence of the
commonplace.
Sunstein's analysis apparently would regard such an observation as a nonneutral,
"undefended and reflexive" political act. With respect to abortion, he argues that abortion
can be "seen as a killing rather than a failure to allow conscription only because of the
perceived naturalness of the role of women as childbearers." Id. at 35. Such assumptions,
in his view, rest on "constitutionally unacceptable stereotypes about women's natural or
appropriate role." Id. The problem raised by abortion restrictions thus is that not only
do they burden women, but they effectively prescribe by law different roles for men and
women that contribute to women's second-class citizenship.
I agree that abortion restrictions can have that effect, and attempt to elaborate that
relationship infra notes 332-61 and accompanying text. And I find exciting his insight that
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Perhaps it is simply not sensible to speak of gestation in the adver-
sarial or transactional terms of "claims," "rights," and "burdens";
maybe no relationship is analogous, and abortion may well exceed the
capacity of analogical analysis. Thomson's argument thus rests on a
faulty foundational assumption-that the conceptus-pregnant woman
relationship is like any other, to be tested by the same norms of
expectations, reciprocity, and individuality that we apply to relation-
ships between post-natal people.'36
The point here is certainly not that abortion rights are morally
indefensible from a relational perspective. To the contrary, an ethic
of care that also extends to care for the unwanting pregnant woman
would tolerate and protect (even while regretting and mourning)
abortion rights.37 Nor is the point that equality and autonomy
arguments are inapplicable. Such arguments can be substantially
enriched by the addition of relationalism's concern with exclusion and
harm.' Rather, the point is that Thomson's defense is inadequate
standing by itself.
As McClain observes, any workable resolution of the duty-to-aid
problem-including its application to abortion-surely involves a
balancing formula that weighs both autonomy and equality interests.
While even Thomson recognizes that abortion in some circumstances
might be morally unacceptable, she provides no guide for distin-
guishing the more typical early-term abortion scenario-apart from
the circular assertions that pregnancy imposes more than minimal
demands and that people generally owe nothing more (if anything)
we must not confuse an assumption about the way things are with a choice about the way
things ought to be. (Others have made this general observation in different contexts. See,
e.g., Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1363, 1363-65, 1372 (1984); see
also infra notes 164-78 and accompanying text). But I approach the problem from a
different direction for at least two reasons: First, my broader project is to explore whether
and how the value of care might be manifested in legal policy. While equality is part of
that project, it is not its total. Second, an intuitive preference for parsimony inclines me
to resist an argument that seems to require one to regard human reproduction, which has
been going on for millennia and is arguably a singularly natural human event, as socially
constructed or as the normative equivalent of organ transplant, which is, relatively
speaking, a very recent technological advance and is arguably an extreme example of
heroic and artificial prolongation of life.
136. Goldstein's contribution to the abortion debate, ROBERT GOLDSTEIN, MOTHER-
LOVE AND ABORTION: A LEGAL INTERPRETATION (1988), raises serious questions about
that assumption. See infra part V.C.
137. See infra part V.B.
138. See infra part V.D.
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than Minimally Decent Samaritanism to one another.'39 However,
pregnancy unavoidably imposes enormous and unequal burdens on
the pregnant woman in any imaginable circumstances-from abortions
that Thomson apparently would find no more morally exceptional
than walking away from a boring guest at a cocktail party to those
abortions that even she would find morally intolerable.
An essential ingredient of an intelligible balancing approach is an
ethic of care." Thomson's enterprise, like many defenses of
abortion, tries to argue away the uneasiness and ambivalence abortion
causes by erecting an unassailable deductive fortress around the
decision.4 Whatever its merits as logical analysis, and despite its
sensitivity to some exploitative aspects of abortion prohibitions,42
Thomson's Defense presents an unlikely image of the conceptus-
pregnant woman relationship. The next section of this Article will
offer additional grounds for doubting that the best approach to
abortion rights is "masculinist" and will raise some questions about
the limits of this dualistic, labelling approach to jurisprudence.
B. Limits of masculinist focus in constitutional analysis
The anti-relational reaction is silent on Roe's place in a general
theory of constitutional interpretation. That omission is puzzling
because a court's willingness even to consider recognizing a right to
abortion in the first place-whether articulated in individualistic or
more collective terms-will depend on the court's interpretive
model. 43 The masculinist-feminist distinction may shed little light
139. Thomson, supra note 71, at 65-66 ("It would be indecent in the woman to request
an abortion, and indecent in a doctor to perform it, if she is in her seventh month, and
wants the abortion just to avoid the nuisance of postponing a trip abroad.").
140. See infra part V.D.
141. See generally JUDGES, supra note 90, at 4-6 (recognizing the heated moral and
social debate associated with abortion); Stephen L. Carter, Books: Strife's Dominion, NEW
YORKER, Aug. 9, 1993, at 86. Carter notes that
[w]hat is remarkable about the recent spate of serious pro-choice tomes is the
consistency with which their authors underestimate the commitment of their
opponents. They seem unwilling to accept the idea that pro-life activists are as
sincere and as thoughtful in striking the balance in favor of the fetus as abortion-
rights activists are in striking the balance the other way.
Id.
142. For discussion of this problem and of the feelings of women facing unwanted
pregnancy, see infra notes 287-89, 308-18, 332-53 and accompanying text.
143. I am placing to one side for a moment the Critical Legal Studies objection that
interpretive-theory-talk follows and paints, rather than produces, the result in a given case.
See generally MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES. As discussed
below, however, this problem of the indeterminacy of rights is another reason to be wary
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on the basic interpretive problems presented by the abortion question,
and it may not lead ineluctably to the pro-choice result Karlan, Ortiz,
and McClain advocate. This is so for at least two reasons. First,
"masculinist" thinking arguably is more consistent with strict
constitutional interpretivism, under which theory a court would regard
the tough value choices presented by a claim to abortion rights as
outside the judicial ken. Second, judicial willingness to undertake
noninterpretive review-which as described below is arguably a more
"feminine" approach to constitutional interpretation-is no guarantee
of a pro-choice result. Reliance on difference dualism thus may prove
less helpful than careful attention to the particular implications of the
constitutional question at hand.
1. Interpretivism
A "masculinist" approach to problem solving has been described
as less flexible, more rule-like and categorical, and insensitive to the
particulars of a given context; it strives for certainty and consistency.
It also has been characterized as more deferential to formal hierar-
chical authority and more willing to sacrifice people's interests to
abstract principles. Feminine problem solving, by contrast, has been
described as more flexible, particularistic, and contextual; in a sense,
it is more standard-like, tolerant of ambiguity, and prone to sacrifice
principle to avoid harm to people.'" This distinction sifts not only
autonomy- and privacy-based rights from communitarian respon-
sibility, but also separates interpretive from some forms of
noninterpretive review. 45  Thus, a masculinist (i.e., pure
interpretivist) approach to constitutional interpretation might wel
leave an issue like abortion to legislative resolution.
The sitting Justice most closely associated with the interpretivist
perspective is Antonin Scalia. 4 6  He eschews close judicial
engagement with what claims of autonomy, privacy, spheres of
intimacy, and bodily integrity might mean to people living at the close
of the position of Karlan and Ortiz. See infra notes 163-79 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 20-50 and accompanying text; infra notes 194-219 and accompany-
ing text.
145. As one self-described "defender of noninterpretive review" put it, "constitutional
theory.. . must be sensitive to context-the context of our time." MICHAEL J. PERRY,
THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 119 (1982).
146. According to Kathleen Sullivan, he favors rules at both the interpretive and
operative levels. He has, however, taken a standard-like approach to stare decisis,
presumably to preserve the primacy of rules at the other two levels. Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Foreword- The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 112-13 (1992).
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of the twentieth century.'47 He apparently seeks safety from the
"minority tyranny" of judicial aggression in clear boundaries.' For
him, those boundaries are formed by categorical interpretive rules
that reduce many constitutional questions to a purportedly objective
search for the most narrowly defined, specific "tradition. 14 1
147. In Justice Scalia's view, expressed in Casey, the Court was exercising raw power
rather than "reasoned judgment" in Roe. In his view, the only defense of Roe that some
of the best legal minds in the country have been able to offer is to "rattle off a collection
of adjectives [about privacy, intimacy, and personal choice] that simply decorate a value
judgment and conceal a political choice." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2875 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). But, he
continues, "[tihose adjectives might be applied, for example, to homosexual sodomy,
polygamy, adult incest, and suicide, all of which are equally 'intimate' and 'deeply
personal' decisions involving 'personal autonomy and bodily integrity,' and all of which can
constitutionally be proscribed because it is our unquestionable constitutional tradition that
they are proscribable." Id. at 2874-76 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). For another example of Scalia's approach to such problems, see
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,293 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(arguing that federal courts have "no business" entertaining Nancy Beth Cruzan's claim
to a right to commit "suicide").
148. One theorist whose approach also fits this description is Robert Bork, who believes
that courts lack the authority to develop flexible constitutional standards that reflect
evolving social norms. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.. 1, 2 (1971). His interpretivism resembles the masculine perspective
described by Gilligan: Negative rules are necessary to constrain aggression, to limit
interference with others, and thereby to make life in the community safe. GILLIGAN,
supra note 5, at 35-38. To Bork, danger lies in an unconstrained judiciary. "Where
constitutional materials-[the text and the history, and their fair implications]-do not
clearly specify the value to be preferred, there is no principled way to prefer any claimed
human value to any other." Bork, supra, at 2. In other words, the only way to protect
against judicial aggression-to avoid "minority tyranny" by the courts-is to insist that
judicial review be exercised within the confines of interpretivism. I am using the term
"rules" here to refer to rules of interpretation. Kathleen Sullivan refers to this usage as
"interpretive rules," as distinguished from "operative rules" (or standards) that might
result from application of interpretive rules. Sullivan, supra note 146, at 76-94. Bork
identifies Roe as the archetype of unchained judicial aggression. "The years of the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts also saw the 'right of privacy' invented by the Warren Court mature
into a judicial power to dictate moral codes of sexual conduct and procreation for the
entire nation." ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 110 (1990). His objection to Roe thus is that it lacks any clear
basis in the text apart from the open-ended term "liberty," which the framers and ratifiers
of the Fourteenth Amendment plainly did not contemplate would include abortion rights.
Ironically, Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court was defeated through the same
political process that he believes should determine matters like a woman's right to
abortion, in part because of his very views on that subject. The further irony is that he
complained-albeit not in constitutional terms-about the political process that produced
that result. Id. at 282-321.
149. This discussion gives Justice Scalia the benefit of the doubt with respect to the
internal coherence of his interpretive theory. Others have suggested that Justice Scalia has
been somewhat less consistent than his professed fondness for rules might lead one to
expect. See Sullivan, supra note 146, at 88 ("In other words, if the rule doesn't work, take
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Under those rules, the more abstract, remote, and hierarchical
the sources of authority the better; constitutional interpretation is
governed by the value preferences expressed by individuals in power
in past centuries. 50 Whether this view of the Constitution is driven
by historicist nostalgia for those particular value preferences, an
anxious desire to find some anchoring transgenerational normative
structure, a sincere concern about the hazards of unchecked judicial
power, or faith in an originalist contractarian political legitimacy,'
the end result is to situate the important constitutional work as far as
possible -from any intersubjective relation between the courts and
contemporary life. Safety, for both the community and the courts, lies
in maximizing judicial distance from the kind of messy, intimate
involvement with real contemporary life that inheres in the value-
laden work of substantive due process.
Scalia's interpretive approach thus parallels that of the male
respondents in Gilligan's studies: She could have been talking about
Scalia's approach when she described Jake's view of responsibility.
Scalia's desire for the safety of judicial distance, and fear of judicial
involvement with the painful flesh-and-blood dilemmas raised by
issues like abortion, is evident from his opinion in Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey. 3  Justice Scalia often invokes categorical rules to
two aspirin and try the nearest standard."). For a telling example of the facility with which
an historical record can be disregarded in the context of religious exemptions from
generally applicable laws, compare Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990), with Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understan-
ding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. RnV. 1409 (1990). Justice Scalia's opinion
for the Court in Smith virtually ignored the historical record. It relied instead on two
discredited cases and "parade-of-horribles" policy arguments in declining to apply the
usual First Amendment balancing approach to a Free Exercise Clause claim for an
exemption from Oregon's controlled substances law for the sacramental use of peyote.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 1601-02. Professor McConnell's detailed review shows that Justice
Scalia's central, undefended premise-that the free exercise clause does not provide First
Amendment protection for religiously motivated conduct from generally applicable
laws-is contradicted by the historical record. See McConnell, supra.
150. This theme is evident, for example, in Scalia's recourse to positivist sources of
authority for his interpretation of the "discontinuous historical past." Sullivan, supra note
146, at 114. It further emerges in his positivist epistemology, as Sullivan observes: "Texts
and traditions are facts to study, not convictions to demonstrate about." Id. (citing Casey,
112 S. Ct. at 2884 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
151. For a description of originalism in these terms, see KELMAN, supra note 143, at
214.
152. Recall that in Jake's view, responsibility is "a limitation of action, a restraint of
aggression.... Thus rules, by limiting interference, make life in a community safe ....
GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at 37-38- see also supra notes 30-43 and accompanying text.
153. In Casey, Justice Scalia concluded that
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keep the constitutional question of abortion at a reassuringly
"objective" distance."' Abortion, like bigamy, is not constitutional-
ly protected in his view because "(1) the Constitution says absolutely
nothing about it, and (2) the longstanding traditions of American
society have permitted it to be legally proscribed.""5
The portion of the Court's opinion in Casey that explicitly
reaffirmed a general commitment to substantive due process, by
contrast, more closely resembles Gilligan's description of feminine
problem solving."6 Although the Court's reference to individual
liberty at first glance appears to follow a masculinist model, at a
higher level of abstraction we see a more "feminine" interpretive
theory that strives for flexibility, is responsive to context, and is
willing to live with a measure of uncertainty and ambiguity-all of
which characterize noninterpretive review."7 Furthermore, although
the Court also invokes "tradition" as an interpretive guide, its
[a]s long as this Court thought (and the people thought) that we Justices were
doing essentially lawyers' work up here-reading text and discerning our society's
traditional understanding of that text-the public pretty much left us alone.
Texts and traditions are facts to study, not convictions to demonstrate about. But
if in reality our process of constitutional adjudication consists primarily of making
value judgments; if we can ignore a long and clear tradition clarifying an
ambiguous text, as we did, for example, five days ago in declaring un-
constitutional invocations and benedictions at public-high-school graduation
ceremonies; if, as I say, our pronouncement of constitutional law rests primarily
on value judgments, then a free and intelligent people's attitude towards us can
be expected to be (ought to be) quite different.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2884-85 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part) (citation omitted). Justice Scalla's reference to Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting), illustrates the distinction. For him, the only important fact
in that case was the historical practice of religious invocations at public events. He derided
the majority's "test of psychological coercion" as a "bulldozer of its social engineering."
Id. at 2679. For the majority, the crucial fact was indeed how the nonadherent might feel
in the particular circumstances-coerced to attend a state-sponsored religious exercise and
pressured once there "to pray in a manner her conscience will not allow." Id. at 2658.
154. Scalia's opinion in Casey suggests that he sees a threat not only to society from an
aggressive judiciary, but also to the judiciary from a rebellious populace. See Casey, 112
S. Ct. at 2884-85 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part);
supra note 153. In this way, his view even more completely tracks the masculine model
described by Gilligan, for he sees engagement as dangerous to all concerned.
155. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2874 (Scalia, J. concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
156. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816-17. The Court's disposition of the various provisions
of the Pennsylvania law is another matter. See discussion infra parts VI.B-C.
157. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816, 2818. Moreover, Gilligan's higher level of moral




conception of tradition is more a vehicle for engagement with, rather
than a device for separation from, real-life, fluid circumstance.158
In this way, the opinion resembles the female response in
Gilligan's study.'59 The Court views the judicial role in developing
substantive due process as mediated through an on-going process of
communication between the courts and society-in contrast to Justice
Scalia's process of categorization and judicial isolation. These
characteristics, again at a very high level of interpretive generality
(the more concrete operative level is quite another matter and will be
discussed below), are evident in the majority opinion in Casey:
[A]djudication of substantive due process claims may call
upon the Court in interpreting the Constitution to exercise
that same capacity which by tradition courts always have
exercised: reasoned judgment. Its boundaries are not
susceptible of expression as a simple rule. That does not
mean we are free to invalidate state policy choices with
which we disagree; yet neither does it permit us to shrink
from the duties of our office.'
60
The Court thus sees engagement with substantive due process claims
as a judicial responsibility calling for flexibility and sensitivity, not as
a form of aggression to be contained by isolating the courts through
rigid categorical rules. Danger inheres in separation from, not in
engagement with, the complexities of substantive due process.161
158. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2797, 2801. Balancing tests "incline a judge to be
'contextual,' 'reconciliatory,' and 'dialogic,'-to 'confront the parties in the flesh' rather
than 'take refuge [in supposed] objective determinacy lodged in some force other than
herself,' as rules-based adjudication might encourage her to do." Sullivan, supra note 146,
at 68-69 (alteration in original) (quoting Frank R. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985
Term-Foreword Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 34-35 (1986)).
159. GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at 38. ("To the question about conflicting responsibilities,
Amy again responds contextually rather than categorically by saying, 'it depends' and
indicating how choice would be affected by variations in character and circumstance.").
160. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2806 (1992).
161. The Court went on to quote from Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be
determined by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that through
the course of this Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our
Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has
struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society. If the
supplying of content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a
rational process, it certainly has not been one where judges have felt free to roam
where unguided speculation might take them. The balance-of which I speak is
the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the
traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke.
That tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs
from it could not long survive, while a decision which builds on what has survived
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If the anti-relationalists' preference for masculinist approaches to
problem solving were applied to the threshold issue of general
interpretive theory, therefore, the courts very well might isolate
themselves from abortion's conflicts by largely abandoning the
substantive due process enterprise. 62 That was where Justice Scalia
and his dissenting colleagues parted ways with the majority in Casey.
The Court was willing (indeed felt responsible) to get close to the
problem and to respond in a continuing dialogue about national
values; the Court saw greater risks in severing that communication.
Justice Scalia wanted to separate the Court as far as possible from
that dialogue; he feared the consequences, of such connection.
2. Limits of rights-talk and autonomy-talk
The anti-relationalists are also mistaken in two other as-
sumptions. First, just as endorsement of "masculinist" thinking
generally is no guarantee that a court will even reach (much less
answer affirmatively) the question of abortion rights, "rights-talk"
likewise provides no sure answer.6 3 Second, the simple privileging
of autonomy claims over other-directedness fails to address fully
abortion's relational complexities.
Deconstructionist challenges to rights-talk show that the anti-
relationalists' strategic reliance on it is no substitute for critical
is likely to be sound. No formula could serve as a substitute, in this area, for
judgment and restraint.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2805 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting
from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds)).
162. This point may be implicit in McClain's argument that liberalism is relational, but
she does not explore the interpretive implications of her critique.
163. At least one feminist has warned that liberalism, at least in its atomistic sense,
threatens the feminist project. Writing from an historical perspective, Karen Offen has
emphasized that "[f]eminism is a political project" in which the central question raised by
a particular theoretical model is: "Will it help us to eradicate the subordination of women
as a group by men as a group?" Offen, supra note 21, at 15. Offen observes that women's
solidarity has always been foundational to effective political action, and she warns that the
"fragmentation of identities... threatens the historical feminist project." Id. She argues
that America's "atomistic focus on the liberation of the human individual-a sort of
Hobbesian or Leibnitzian monad devoid of distinguishing characteristics"-is an
"exceptional" phenomenon (compared to other cultures) that contributes to the
fragmentation and isolation of identities. Id. at 16. She concludes: "What some take to
be our 'cultural assumptions' are the result of once radical assertions that were deployed
as weapons in a unique, successful attack on hierarchical religious and political authority
in a society where men have systematically subordinated women since at least the
thirteenth century." Id.
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examination of underlying values.'64  Mark Tushnet, for example,
has argued that claims to abortion rights"5 are inherently unstable
because incremental, nonrevolutionary societal changes 16 6 could
produce a social context "in which it would be impossible for a
woman's situation to implicate the kind of right to reproductive choice
that is the focus of current concern."'67 Suppose, for example, that
medical technology allowed early-term removal of the conceptug
without causing its destruction." s  Such a medical breakthrough,
while currently unlikely, would hardly render our society unrecog-
nizable;69 but it would nullify Thomson's arguments for abortion
164. The incoherence critique in Mark Tushnet's Essay on Rights, for example, has two
branches: (1) that rights are inherently unstable because the recognition of specific rights
themselves is both contingent on and constitutive of a specific culture, whereby small
plausible changes in social settings undermine the coherence of a particular rights claim;
and (2) rights-talk is indeterminate and therefore "can provide only momentary advantages
in ongoing political struggles." Tushnet, supra note 135, at 1363-65, 1372. His other
critique warns that: (1) "[t]he concept of rights falsely converts into an empty abstraction
(reifies) real experiences that we ought to value for their own sake"; and (2) contemporary
rights-talk "impedes advances by progressive social forces." Id. at 1364.
165. His explanation of this choice describes moves in the debate between leftists and
"rights-ists" that resemble the anti-relationalist response:
Because leftists have developed the critique of rights in the contemporary United
States, a favorite countertactic is to identify a leftish sort of right which, it is said,
leftists must recognize as not relative lest they lose their political credentials. The
usual example is the right to reproductive choice.
Id. at 1365.
166. His point is to demonstrate the relative and socially contingent nature of rights by
examining a particular rights claim in a society not very different from our own and
continuing to possess what John Rawls characterized as the " 'circumstances of
justice'-moderate scarcity in material goods and pervasive differences among people over
what constitutes the good for people." Id. at 1364-65 (quoting John Rawls, Kantian
Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PIlL. 515, 536, 539 (1980) (quoting JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 126-28 (1971)).
167. Id. at 1366.
168. In other words, suppose the point of viability were pushed back very early in
pregnancy. Abortion today involves both removing and destroying the conceptus. By
definition, "abortion" always means the destruction of the conceptus. See JUDGES, supra
note 90, at 66. Post-viability removal of the living conceptus is a premature delivery.
169. When Tushnet wrote in 1984, this hypothetical scenario was believed by some to
be not so hypothetical. Cf John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of
Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405,420-36 (1983) (analyzing the
consequences of various types of collaboratve conception, including artificial insemination,
ovum donation, womb donation, and surrogate mothering). At one time Justice
O'Connor, extrapolating from substantial gains in neonatology, predicted that medical
technology would move the point of viability "further back toward conception" and
proclaimed that "[t]he Roe framework, then, clearly is on a collision course with itself."
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,458 (1983). Her
analysis, however, overlooked the matter of fetal lung development, which mainstream
medical opinion today recognizes as establishing an "anatomic threshold" for fetal survival
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rights, which implicate only removal of the conceptus171 Any
remaining right to destroy the conceptus would have to depend on
other, similarly contingent arguments.17 ' Because other, nontech-
nological changes might also undermine the coherence of reproductive
rights claims, such rights are as contingent on prevailing attitudes as
they are on extant technology.72
Furthermore, one could recognize the "essential aspects of the
debate over the morality of abortion-the large sacrifices imposed by
compulsory pregnancy, the interference with self-definition, and the
importance of choice and control over oneself"'7 -- and yet
conclude, on balance, that Roe was wrongly decided. 74 First,
neither ad hoc nor categorical balancing produces determinate results:
"a balancer who wants to 'recognize' a right can choose the necessary
measure of value, the necessary consequences, and the necessary level
of generality."' 75 Second, cases can often be presented as a conflict
at about 23-24 weeks. See JUDGES, supra note 90, at 62-65.
170. Thomson, drawing a distinction between refusing to sustain and killing, recognizes
that the right to be disconnected from the violinist does not include the right to turn
around and slit his throat if by some miracle he survives being unplugged. See supra notes
71-75 and accompanying text.
171. For example, such a right might rest on a variety of psychological claims such as
uncertainty about her offspring's identity or a desire to control one's genetic heritage.
Tushnet shows the weakness of these claims and their lack of resemblance to what we
currently understand abortion rights to be about. For instance, such claims presumably
could just as legitimately be advanced by putative fathers, and thus are "entirely
independent of the issues of gender that shape our current understanding of the right to
reproductive choice." Tushnet, supra note 135, at 1367-68. For one court's treatment of
the claim to control one's genetic legacy, in the context of a dispute over the disposition
of "frozen pre-embryos," see Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992).
172. Suppose the following: (1) widespread availability of and education about
contraceptive devices; (2) de-stigmatization of bearing illegitimate children; (3) acceptance
of a view of health and illness that made pain and discomfort a natural part of life not to
be treated unless threatening to life or long-term health; and (4) acceptance of pregnancy
as "a disfiguring and moderately painful condition that some people choose to have and
that others have visited upon them." Tushnet, supra note 135 at 1369. In such a society,
which would not require violent upheaval to attain, "asking whether a woman has a right
to an abortion would be like asking our contemporaries whether we have a right not to
get the flu." Id.
173. Karlan & Ortiz, supra note 13, at 876.
174. Indeed, Michael Perry and John Hart- Ely do just that-albeit from different
premises. See infra notes 178-86, 330-31 and accompanying text.
175. Tushnet, supra note 135, at 1373. First, a balancing of interests requires some
substantive theory through which to assign common measures of value. The Supreme
Court has failed to provide one, however, and many interests seem to be incommensura-
ble. One of the criticisms of Roe is that the Court failed to explain how it assigned values
in balancing the respective interests of "potential life" and the woman's autonomy. See
JUDGES, supra note 90, at 158-65. Those difficulties recently have become more apparent
as the Court substantially reduced Roe's scope while professing allegiance to its principles
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between selections from a catalogue of protected rights and
interests-such as abortion's "clash of absolutes" between personal
autonomy and "life"-and in "any particular case a court can draw
items from that catalogue and balance them as it chooses."'76 Third,
much depends on one's assumptions about what is foreground and
what is background-such as the atomistic assumptions underlying a
privacy defense of abortion.' Fourth, it may be "impossible to
connect [an] abstract right-'autonomy' or 'equal concern and
in Casey; see infra notes 410-54 and accompanying text.
Second, meaningful balancing must account for all relevant interests, yet accurate
identification of affected interests is far from certain. Tushnet suggests as an example the
possibility that Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), led to the election of
Ronald Reagan through a complex chain of factors includingwhite backlash and a general
rightward trend. Tushnet, supra note 135, at 1372. An at least equally (and perhaps
more) plausible example would be the connection between Roe v. Wade and Reagan's
election. See LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 16-18 (1990).
Third, balancing competing interests also involves identification of the level of
generality at which the interests are defined. Tushnet gives the example of Justice
Frankfurter's balance of the detailed, scary risks of communist subversion versus the
general interest of free speech in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517-56 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Tushnet, supra note 135, at 1372-73. Although Tushnet does
not put the problem in precisely these terms, his argument intuitively recognizes that
outcomes can be determined by judgmental biases that influence decisionmaking.
Research in cognitive psychology has identified several related "mental shortcuts" that
can affect judgment: (1) the "vividness bias," under which the decision maker tends "to
place more weight on concrete, emotionally interesting information than on more
probative abstract data"; (2) the "availability bias," under which people "judge the
probability of an event not by the actual likelihood of its happening, but by the ease with
which they can recall particular instances of the event's occurrence"; and (3) the "saliency
bias," which is "the tendency of 'colorful, dynamic, or other distinctive stimuli [to]
disproportionately engage attention and accordingly affect judgments.' " Harry S. Gerla,
The "Reasonableness" Standard in the Law of Negligence: Can Abstract Values Receive
Their Due?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REv. 199,210-11 (1990) (alteration made but not noted in
original) (quoting Shelley E. Taylor, The Availability Bias in Social Perception and
Interaction, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 190, 192
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)). To be sure, Gerla's description of the problem of
biases reflects skepticism about the reliability of balancing by tort juries and not appellate
judges. But judges are human too and not immune from such errors.
Roe itself arguably reflects this problem. On one side of the balance the Court
described the pallid abstraction of "potential life." On the other, the Court recognized a
much more vivid and detailed account of unwanted pregnancy's impact on the pregnant
woman. See JUDGES, supra note 90, at 142-45; see also infra note 329 and accompanying
text.
176. Tushnet, supra note 135, at 1373.
177. See supra notes 62-76. Indeed, Karlan and Ortiz's reliance on both privacy-based
defenses of abortion and MacKinnon as the correct feminist voice seems incongruent in
view of MacKinnon's position that the "privacy" concept conceals a host of sins of male
domination-particularly in the abortion context. See Catharine MacKinnon, Roe v.
Wade: A Study in Male Ideology, in ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 45,
46-54 (J. Garfield & P. Hennessey eds., 1984).
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respect'-to any particular outcome without fully specifying a wide
range of social arrangements that the proponents of the right take for
granted but that another person who believes in 'autonomy' might
reject."'' Indeed, these observations find some confirmation in the
shifting fortunes of abortion rights in the Supreme Court where,
contrary to the impression created by the Karlan and Ortiz article, a
rights-based approach has predominated.
Just as "masculinist" rights- and autonomy-talk are no guarantee
of reproductive freedom, conversely it also is insufficient simply to
endorse a "feminine" perspective on constitutional interpretation.
What is more, not all "feminist" objections to Roe are based on (1)
the conclusion that altruistic moral obligations arise from the pregnant
woman-conceptus relationship, or (2) devaluation of individual self-
definition. There ultimately is no substitute for coming to terms with
what real care means for abortion rights.
Michael Perry's richly textured position on Roe illustrates the
limitations of feminist-masculinist dualism. In his view, the Court
properly reached the question of abortion rights but gave the wrong
answer."s He objects to Roe not because it permitted violation of
a woman's moral obligation to the life within her or lacked an
adequate textual or historical basis, but because it cut off productive
moral discourse, preempted the possibility of deliberative, transfor-
mative politics with respect to the deeply divisive issue of abortion,
178. Tushnet, supra note 135, at 1375. Sunstein's analysis of nonneutral assumptions
recognizes this point. See supra note 135.
179. Another example of the limitations of the labelling game is Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905). At the level of interpretive approach, it does reflect an active judicial
engagement rather than isolation. At the level of the operative result, however, it could
hardly be described as feminist because of its insensitivity to the real-world conditions
facing the bakery workers and the actual impact of the law on their lives. Indeed, the kind
of measures invalidated in that case were then being vigorously advocated by reform-
minded women's groups. See generally Rhode, supra note 81, at 204-07 (describing the
tension between feminists over the value of sex-based protective legislation passed in the
early part of this century).
180. Explaining his view, Perry asserts:
[To conclude that, contrary both to the originalist critique and to Ely's
nonoriginalist critique, abortion is indeed a proper part of the Court's business,
is not to conclude that the Court gave the right answer to the question it set for
itself in Roe. It is to conclude merely that the Court was not wrong to set the
question for itself. In my view-my nonoriginalist view-the Court gave the
wrong answer to the question it set for itself.
MICHAEL J. PERRY, MoRALITY, PoLmcs & LAW 174 (1988).
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some extent defied norms of the American constitutional com-
munity. 181
Perry's conception of the judicial role also shows that not all
notions of judicial restraint are based in an abstraction-seeking,
distance-creating, disengagement model. To the contrary, the court
Perry envisions-like the facilitative feminine response sketched by
some writersl8L--engages by listening as well as by speaking, by its
receptivity as well as by its response, and by a search for common
ground rather than an attempt at domination.' Amy-like, he
constructs the constitutional dimension of the abortion conflict as a
181. Perry readily acknowledges a constitutional principle recognizing "the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child." Id. (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169-70 (1973) (Stewart, J. concurring)
(quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1971))). While abortion clearly implicates
that principle, however, Perry doubts that "sensitive application" of such a constitutional
principle supports the result in Roe:
Such a conclusion seems to me to require a premise-that the protection of fetal
life is not a good of sufficient importance-obviously not entailed by that
principle. Moreover, because the issue the premise addresses-the value of fetal
life-is so widely contested in American society, and further, because the issue
is one as to which people of good will and high intelligence (among others) seem
irresolvably to disagree, it is not at all clear that the premise is an appropriate
basis for constitutional judgment. To the contrary, reliance on the premise as a
basis for constitutional judgment seems plainly imperial.
PERRY, supra note 180, at 175.
Perry nevertheless believes that the Court should have held the Texas statute
unconstitutional in Roe because it failed to except cases of significant threat of serious
damage to the mother's health (under the statute it was a crime to procure an abortion
except "by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother," Roe, 410 U.S.
at 117-18 & n.1 (citation omitted)), abortions to terminate a pregnancy caused by rape or
incest, and abortions to terminate "a pregnancy that would result in the birth of a
genetically defective child whose life would be short and painful." Id. In effect, Perry's
position would approximate the modest liberalization of abortion laws proposed by the
American Law Institute in 1962 and subsequently adopted in one form or another in more
than a dozen states. See generally JUDGES, supra note 90, at 107-08 (discussing 1962
proposed Model Penal Code revisions to state abortion laws).
182. See, e.g., supra note 85 and accompanying text.
183. Indeed, in the conclusion immediately following his analysis of Roe, Perry points
to the emergence of feminist jurisprudence as a "bright spot" on the horizon of political-
moral theory. "Feminist thought is an important discursive space where the question of
the human is not invariably marginalized-where, indeed, that question is often the central
concern. At its best and at its root, feminist theory is perhaps best understood as an effort
to struggle with the question of what it means to be authentically human." PERRY, supra
note 180, at 183.
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problem in communication and relation between members of the
political community." 4
Perry's position does not rest on a stereotypic model of feminine
self-sacrifice or disregard for autonomy,"s however, but derives
instead from his recognition of our society's deeply pluralistic
nature.'86 Of course, some advocates might argue that preventing
the harm that restrictive abortion laws cause to women outweighs the
value of a broader societal discourse, and that women do not have an
equal voice anyway. Such arguments consider, however, what care
and relation actually mean in the abortion context-which is where
critique should aim-rather than suggest that Perry somehow has a
screw loose for viewing Roe in his own relational terms.
184. Perry writes:
[Tihe constitutional dialogue between the judiciary and the political community
as a whole will proceed more productively if the judiciary acts cautiously and
incrementally rather than radically or imperially.... No conversation is likely
to be productive if one of the interlocutors assumes an arrogant stance, pon-
tificating rather than listening patiently and patiently searching for common
ground.
The question of what public policy regarding abortion should be is surely an
unusually difficult one, and the Supreme Court is an obviously fallible institution.
The Court should not have tried to preempt discourse about the question.
Rather, it should have acted so as to enhance such discourse.... And the Court
should have acted that way not simply because that would have been the more
"democratic" thing to do, but also, and more fundamentally, because the Court,
like the rest of us, might have learned something useful from the ensuing
discourse-a discourse hopefully informed by the Court's insistence that the
constitutional principles of due process and equal protection were at stake.
Id. at 177.
185. With respect to altruism, Perry concludes that "[i]t is an open question, then,
whether a sound naturalist moral theory must be altruistic." Id. at 21-22. Legal outcomes
premised on an affirmative answer to Perry's question are, in essence, what the anti-
relationalists fear. With respect to individual self-definition, Perry believes that moral
knowledge is knowledge of how to live so as to flourish, to achieve well-being. "More
precisely, it is knowledge about how particular human beings-the particular human
being(s) I am, or we are, or you are, or she (or he) is, or they are-must live if they are
to live the most deeply satisfying lives of which they are capable, or at least lives as deeply
satisfying as any of which they are capable." Id. at 11.
186. Id. at 55. "Different moral communities within the society adhere to differ-
ent-sometimes very different-conceptions of human good, of how it is good for (some
or all) human beings to live their lives, of how they must live their lives if they are to
flourish, to achieve well-being." Id. He rejects the liberal vision's "ambition to achieve
a [value-neutral] politics that transcends the deep, pervasive, persistent differences among
us." Id. He places his faith instead, particularly in the context of constitutional
adjudication, in "productive moral discourse and of the sort of politics of which moral
discourse is a prime constituent: a deliberative, transformative politics, as distinct from a
politics that is merely manipulative and self-serving." Id. at 76.
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The purpose here is neither to join the assault on rights-talk nor
to suggest that a "feminine" perspective is necessarily bad for
abortion rights. The suggestion instead is that merely asserting the
primacy'of rights-talk and reducing care- and connection-based theory
to "care-talk" is no substitute for coming to grips with the real-life
complexities of the abortion debate, including the feminist effort-as
Perry put it, "to struggle with the question of what it means to be
authentically human."'"
IV. ETHIC OF CARE REVISITED
A. What's love got to do with it? Care versus rights
What can relational feminism tell us about what it means to be
"authentically human," especially in the face of abortion's terrible
moral dilemmas? The risk that relational feminism can be deployed
to justify anti-feminist policies derives in part from preoccupation with
difference and the concomitant problem of stereotype. If relational
feminism is mainly about perpetuating stereotypic differences between
men and women, the anti-relationalist worry that policy decisions
derived from it will likely confine women to their stereotypic role as
caregiver-in this connection as childbearer-is understandable. It
would be a shame, though, to sacrifice needlessly relational feminism's
insights on moral judgment, relation, and care: "[A]lthough an ethic
of care could be an important intellectual concern for feminists, the
debate around this concern should be centered not in discussions of
gender difference but in discourse about the ethic's adequacy as a
moral theory."'"
Relationalism offers a moral perspective that differs from the
dominant "impartialist," rights-based conception of morality. 9 As
187. Id. at 183. In Tushnet's view, "the indeterminacy of rights-claims means that the
debate is always about what the society is and what it ought to be." Tushnet, supra note
135, at 1370. Even if one does not accept all of the moves in Tushnet's analysis or his
deconstructionist goals, his critique of rights does counsel against taking rights-talk too
seriously and mistaking claims about how power relationships ought to be different for
claims about how power relationships are. For a critique of Tushnet's critique, see
Michael Perry, Taking Neither Rights-Talk Nor the "Critique of Rights" Too Seriously, 62
TEx. L. REv. 1405, 1411-16 (1984).
188. Joan Tronto, Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care, 12 SIGNs 644, 646
(1987). Tronto further observes that "[i]f the ethic of care is separated from a concern
with gender, a much broader range of options emerges." Id. at 647.
189. The latter view is premised on universal, rational, and impersonal principle-which
"has been the dominant conception of morality in contemporary Anglo-American moral
philosophy, forming the core of both a Kantian conception of morality and important
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Lawrence Blum has noted, "care and responsibility within personal
relationships constitute an important element of morality itself,
genuinely distinct from impersonality."'" The task is to map these
two ethical categories of impartialist rights and particularistic care
onto the two moral domains of relatively impersonal relations, on the
one hand, and close personal relationships such as friendship and
family on the other. 9'
The resulting cartography illustrates what care might offer to the
interpretation of rights. First, healthy close personal relations are
mediated mostly by particularistic care; one is motivated to act or
refrain from acting by care for the particular other person. Impar-
tialist rights help to constrain power and to prevent oppression when
care is diminished, unreliable, or absent in relations that are relatively
impersonal. One is motivated to act or to refrain from acting in such
relations by moral obligation or legal compulsion based on impartially
derived norms. Rights are thus care's substitute in impersonal
relations, and reliance on rights evidences care's absence. 192 Second,
the endogenous particularistic motivational aspects of personal
relation mean that care, in this relational sense, is not something that
the state can mandate. As we shall see below, this observation has
special relevance to abortion rights."9 Third, the realm of imper-
sonal relations might better serve everyone if rights were interpreted
to resemble more closely what they are a substitute for. In other
strands in utilitarian (and, more generally, consequentialist) thinking as well." Blum, supra
note 99, at 472-73.
190. Id. at 473. Blum observes that the criticisms of impartialism by Bernard Williams
(as inadequately considering personal integrity and purely personal concerns) and Thomas
Nagel (as undervaluing personal concerns as reason-generating considerations) "do not
capture or encompass ... the phenomena of care and responsibility within personal
relationships and do not explain why care and responsibility in relationships are
distinctively moral phenomena." Id. (citing Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism,
in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINsT 135-50 (Bernard Williams & J.J.C. Smart eds.,
1973); THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 171-75 (1986)).
191. I am using the terms "personal" and "impersonal" rather than "private" and
"public" because the former distinction focuses on proximity of relation while the latter
sometimes reflects a conclusion-premised on nonneutral baseline assumptions-about the
grounds for legal intervention. See Sunstein, supra note 71, at 30-36. Some feminists have
criticized the public/private distinction as hiding oppression behind closed bedroom doors,
see, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 177, at 51-54 ("In feminist terms, I am arguing that the
logic of Roe consummated in Harris translates the ideology of the private sphere into the
individual woman's legal right to privacy as a means of subordinating women's collective
needs to the imperatives of male supremacy."), and closed boardroom doors, see Bender,
Feminist (Re)torts, supra note 54, at 885-88.
192. Hardwig, supra note 1, at 443-45.
193. See infra part V.C.
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words, by asserting the independent moral worth of care, relational
feminism is best regarded as urging inclusion of a generalized caring
perspective-that is, care-like considerations-in the interpretation of
rights (including abortion rights), but it need not be understood to
require abandonment of the necessary protection that rights offer in
a less-than-caring world.
Personal, caring relations are characterized principally by (1) the
kind and degree of one's receptivity to the other's circumstances and
(2) the motivation of one's conduct toward the other. 94 An ethic
of care thus is defined by motivation and attitude, rather than a
predetermined set of behaviors or operative principles, 95 and
therefore must be understood "from the inside."'96  Relationalist
Nel Noddings has referred to this first element as "constitutive
engrossment"-an especially receptive, transformative orientation
toward "receiv[ing] the other into mysel and . . . see[ing] and
feel[ing] with the other."'" One who cares sees through the eyes
of the other and is directly and personally, not instrumentally and
abstractly, affected by the ebb and flow of the other's well-being.'98
194. My usage of the term "care" is by definition in the relational sense. Of course,
the word also connotes "to like" or "to prefer," "to provide for," or "to attend to," and
to be instrumentally "concerned" with an outcome. One can also care negatively in these
various senses. For description of these usages and their distinction from care in the
interpersonal sense, see BLUSTEIN, supra note 90, at 28-31.
195. Noddings' rejection of the ethics of principles overlaps some of the criticisms
directed at rights as contingent, unstable, and incoherent. NODDINGS, CARING, supra note
20, at 5; see also supra notes 162-76 and accompanying text. She further objects that "too
often, principles function to separate us from each other. We may become dangerously
self-righteous when we perceive ourselves as holding a precious principle not held by the
other. The other may then be devalued and treated 'differently.' Our ethic of caring will
not permit this to happen." NODDINGS, CARING, supra note 20, at 5.
196. NODDINGS, CARING, supra note 20, at 14, 28.
197. Id. at 30. The fullest development of the content of an ethic of care in the
relational literature is not to be found in Gilligan, who is primarily concerned with
difference, but instead in Nel Noddings' writing. Although she too has taken up the
difference banner, see Noddings, Ethics, supra note 20, at 160, 166, her most complete
work on the ethic of care, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL
EDUCATION, supra note 20, concentrates on the question of what a caring morality might
mean.
198. See generally BLUSTEIN, supra note 90, at 30 (noting that one who cares about
another is deeply invested in the other's well being-so that a set-back to the other is a
direct set-back to the one who cares).
To care for another person, I must be able to understand him and his world as
if I were inside it. I must be able to see, as it were, with his eyes what his world
is like to him and how he sees himself. Instead of merely looking at him in a
detached way from outside, as if he were a specimen, I must be able to be with
him in his world ....
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A caring person wants to know about the other's welfare: "[A]
reliable sign of real caring is the intolerance of ignorance about the
current state of what we care about.... [N]o news is not good
enough."'99
The motivational element of a caring relationship involves
commitment to the other's flourishing. "When we see the other's
reality as a possibility for us, we must act [or refrain from acting, as
appropriate] to eliminate the intolerable, to reduce the pain, to fill the
need, to actualize the dream.' ,200 Caring is motivated by a natural
selfless desire to advance the other's welfare, rather than to achieve
advantage.2"' In other words, in a caring relationship, "you can be
one of my ends."2' This commitment endures over time, as the one
who cares becomes a trustee for the well-being of the other.03
This motivational element distinguishes care-oriented from rights-
oriented behavior.2 4 We are naturally motivated in close personal
relationships by love for the particular other, not by the impartial
obligations or desire for reciprocal advantage involved in respecting
MILTON MAYEROFF, ON CARING 30 (1971). A caring person "identifies himself with what
he cares about in the sense that he makes himself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to
benefits depending upon whether what he cares about is diminished or enhanced." Harry
Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, 53 SYNTHESE 257, 260 (1982).
199. Annette C. Baier, Caring About Caring: A Reply to Frankfurt, 53 SYNTHESE 273,
274 (1982). Blustein has qualified Baier's assertion by noting that the psychological need
for denial may arise at times even in a caring relation. See BLUSTEIN, supra note 90, at
33. Baier herself actually explicitly recognizes the utility of denial at a later portion of her
article. See Baier, supra, at 288.
200. NODDINGS, CARING, supra note 20, at 14. Despite her emphasis on the affective
foundation of morality, Noddings points out that the ethic of care is neither panglossian
nor misty-eyed sentimentality. Objective, analytical thinking is usually necessary to solve
life's problems, but Noddings urges that such thinking must remain tied to the relational
connection lest we get carried away in abstraction and lose sight of the person who is
cared for as attention shifts from the person to the problem. Id. at 33-34. Neither does
she assume that all people are disposed toward goodness. While Noddings urges gentle
moral education to heighten the moral sensitivity of others, she recognizes that some
people do not and probably will not feel pain in response to the pain of others-they
simply don't care-and may have to be restrained from inflicting harm. Id. at 90-92.
201. BLUSTEIN, supra note 90, at 188.
202. John Hardwig, In Search of an Ethics Of Personal Relationships, in PERSON TO
PERSON, 63, 70 (George Graham & Hugh La Follette eds., 1989).
203. See MAYERHOFF, supra note 198, at 6; see also BLUSTEIN, supra note 90, at 188
(noting that "friends are mainly concerned about each other, not their relationship,"
though changing' the caring nature of the relationship may undermine this primary
concern).
204. Thus, "[t]he motivation for doing good things for those who are close to us or for
not harming them must be different from the motivation involved in respecting rights."
Hardwig, supra note 1, at 442-43.
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rights.' 5 By contrast, "[tihinking in terms of fights rests on a
picture, first sketched by Hobbes and then made more palatable by
Locke, of the person as atomistic, primarily egoistic, and asocial-only
accidentally and externally related to others."2' In that impersonal
adversarial world, relationships are defined primarily by power,
and we have need to talk in terms of rights, to make claims
against each other, to define obligations that limit the
pursuit of independent self-interest-all in the hope that, if
we do so and these fights are respected, no one will get
trampled in our pursuits of our independent and [sometimes]
conflicting interests.'
Of course, there are degrees of relation (and hence caring) and
relations can change over time.208 Therefore, "the structure of
rights is not constitutive of social life, but instead [can] be understood
as a position of fall-back and security in case other constituent
elements of social life ever come apart."2' Rules and customs do
help to sustain "gentle and pleasant interpersonal relations" and to
titrate caring's endless demands even among intimates.210 Neverthe-
less, the extent of actual insistence on rights is inversely proportional
205. Indeed, "my responsibilities in personal relationships cannot be fulfilled out of a
sense of obligation without seriously undermining the whole relationship or revealing
thereby that it is not what we had hoped and wanted it to be." Id. at 443. Hardwig
continues:
I remember a student bringing my lecture on Kant's ethics to a grinding halt by
asking, "Is Kant saying that I should sleep with my boyfriend out of a sense of
duty?" And if a faithful husband of thirty-seven years were, on his deathbed, to
turn to his wife and say, "My conscience is clear, Helen, I have always respected
your rights," her whole marriage would turn to ashes.
Id.
206. Id. at 446. Rights derive from universal impersonal moral imperatives, such as the
Kantian imperative to respect others as ends-in-themselves rather than as means to one's
own ends. In a personal relationship with me, however, you do not want impartiality in
the sense that anyone in a similar position could successfully assert the same claims; you
want instead personal particularistic affirmation in the sense of my relation to you. "If the
dying husband or my dutiful ethics student were to add, 'And I would have done the same
for anyone in your situation,' that would only make matters worse." Id. at 443-44.
207. Id. at 446.
208. "While I care for my children throughout our mutual lifetimes, I may care only
momentarily for a stranger in need. The intensity varies. I care deeply for those in my
inner circles and more lightly for those farther removed from my personal life."
NODDINGS, CARING, supra note 20, at 16.
209. Jeremy Waldron, When Justice Replaces Affection: The Need for Rights, 11 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 625, 629 (1988).
210. NODDINGS, CARING, supra note 20, at 51. Although many of the "demands" of
natural caring are not felt as demands at all but as sources of joy, the energies of one who
cares-and the circle of care-are, after all, finite. Id. at 51-52.
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to the parties' confidence in each other's care. At some point,
centrifugal emphasis on rights becomes incompatible with intimacy in
personal relations: "It teaches us to think of 'P and 'I versus you'
instead of 'we.' Through accepting this picture and living in it, we
become more like enemies, antagonists, or traders, at best-less like
brothers, sisters, lovers, and friends." '' This turning point is
particularly evident when the parties begin seeking resolution of their
differences in external sources of authority, such as legal principles
and their coercive application through an impartial tribunal.
This distinction traces a watershed in our legal system and the
measure of relation. For example, the law of commercial interaction
offers a system of rules, rights, and obligations to presumably
ontologically distinct parties pursuing a rational agreement to advance
211. Hardwig, supra note 1, at 448. It is painful to realize that your loved one or dear
friend has begun punctiliously respecting your rights: "I don't want you to respect my
separate interests; I want to mean enough to you that you will have an interest in those
interests. And if I care for you, I will want your well-being, and thus your well-being will
be essential to mine too." Id.
212. Consider a hypothetical marriage that disintegrates from a close caring relation to
adversarial separation. When the relationship was strong and intimate, the partners paid
relatively little attention to their "rights" against each other (beyond perhaps the creation
of informal "rules" about allocating chores and managing resources). Cf. James
Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept" Retreat From the Rule of Law, 51 IND.
L.J. 467, 468-70 (1976) (describing difference between legal claims and interpersonal
appeals for consideration). Their children were cared for in a natural flow of selfless
attention. Conflicts were resolved through a process of communicating needs, hurts, and
desires to a partner who was trusted basically to be receptive and committed to the other's
well-being-normal tears, anger, frustration, and disappointments notwithstanding. As
faith in that basic assumption crumbles and personal distance in the family widens,
however, the members' communication becomes increasingly dominated by assertions and
counter-assertions of rights. If matters deteriorate far enough, the parties will no longer
communicate directly with each other at all but will instead interact through lawyers,
whose decisions and actions will be dominated by reference to rights and whose
communication will be structured by the rules of discovery and evidence. All of the
family's major decisions-including allocation of financial assets and burdens, their support
for each other, and especially provision for the childrens' welfare-will be determined by
a process managed by "impartial" strangers who act in accordance with formalized (even
if sometimes highly discretionary) and impersonal standards and rules.
I do not mean to deny that serious problems might arise such as, for example, the
unequal distribution of caretaking responsibilities. Hardwig suggests, however, that the
first recourse for promoting equality in interpersonal relationships is to raise consciousness
and thereby to harness caring motivation rather than to create distance by insisting on
"rights." Hardwig, supra note 1, at 450-55. He does not mean that equality is a matter
of the good grace of the dominant class; instead, he suggests that we might try to preserve
the value of intimacy while effecting social change. Of course, if caring is not reciprocated
and if positive relation is rebuffed, or if the relation is abusive, then the other's
motivations cannot be trusted, the relation is not a personal caring one, and it will be time
to resort to less-than-caring remedies-including insistence on rights.
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their respective separate interests. 213 A central concern of family
law-especially the law of child abuse, neglect, support, and cus-
tody-is the determination of when caring can no longer be counted
on to prevent harm and to promote well-being 14 Couples begin to
think of their "rights" under domestic relations law as their relation-
ship and care for each other deteriorate.21 ' Tort law seeks to coerce
a minimal degree of attention to the safety of foreseeable others and
responsiveness when one's lapses cause them harm. By creating
"entitlements," the modern welfare state attempts to supply publicly
and generically concrete forms of care previously supplied privately
and particularly. Emerging legal protections against sexual
harassment and other forms of abusive conduct attempt to make up
for a perceived lack of even basic civility and common decency in a
range of non-intimate personal relations. Some individual
constitutional rights could be viewed from this perspective as
protecting persons particularly at risk-in ways that implicate
important impersonal values2 6-- from political factions that have
moved from not caring to collective antagonism.
These observations neither devalue rights nor suggest that
recourse to rights correlates with apathy. Rights sometimes are one's
only hope; many legal conflicts are contextual, multifaceted, and
involve considerable passion." Further, the availability of rights,
213. For example, one writer has developed "a theory of secured financing that posits
a debtor-creditor relationship much more complex and refractory than that conceived by
conventional analysis." Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 901, 903 (1986). Scott asserts that, because
the manifestations of self-interested behavior are difficult to anticipate, and their
interaction with other variables is often complex and unpredictable[,] . . . the
parties are frequently unable to achieve their mutually beneficial objectives
through conventional contractual arrangements. Thus the impetus for secured
financing derives from the financing relationship itself and from the parties'
desire to exploit it fully.
Id.
214. See generally MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 131, ch. 3 (explaining legal
implications of child abuse and neglect).
215. Waldron, supra note 209 passim.
216. For a discussion of the concept of impersonal value-i.e., an objective value which
inheres in something apart from one's caring about or desiring it-see BLUSTEIN, supra
note 90, at 43-44.
217. As Hardwig expresses it:
[R]ights are like the net underneath the tightrope act. The net keeps people and
their lives from being ruined if they fall off the wire. But the act is ruined if the
net actually comes into play. Maybe it would be foolish to get up on the wire if
we did not know there was a net underneath us, and yet the act would be even
better if we could have enough confidence in ourselves and each other to do it
1995] 1387
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in addition to securing traditional, extant relations, can also facilitate
the dynamic, evolutionary quality of relations: They "provide a basis
for new beginnings and for moral initiatives which challenge existing
affections, driving them in new directions or along lines that might
seem uncomfortable or challenging to well-worn traditional
folkways." '18 Nevertheless, reliance on rights indicates that motiva-
tion has originated not in the natural selflessness of care but instead
in concern with one's survival or the instrumental calculation of
reciprocal or unilateral advantage. 19
without thinking of the net at all.
Hardwig, supra note 1, at 453.
218. Waldron, supra note 209, at 631.
219. The case of Baby Jessica is an example of how complex the relationship between
rights and caring can be. The Schmidts cannot really be said to care for the DeBoers but
they apparently care about their relationship with Jessica, and readily resorted to legal
process to resolve their dispute. The DeBoers plainly care deeply for Jessica and were
forced to counter-assert rights to protect their relationship with her (and, they believed,
to look out for Jessica's welfare). See DeBoer v. DeBoer, 501 N.W.2d 193 (Mich. App.
1993), affd, In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993) (per curiam), stay
denied, 114 S. Ct. 11, 11 (1993). Whether the Schmidts care for Jessica herself-in the
sense of constitutive engrossment and displaced motivation-is problematic in view of the
likely relational harm that their custody battle will inflict on a little girl who apparently
was happy, well, and safe with the DeBoers. But they say they do and they back up that
claim with biological parenthood. Noddings's and Gilligan's reference to Solomon's
Judgment suggests that they might regard the Schmidts' conduct as inconsistent with an
ethic of care. See supra note 43. For a description of the factual background to the case,
see Lucinda Franks, The War for Baby Clausen, NEW YORKER, Mar. 22, 1993, at 56. For
Justice Blackmun's dissent from the Supreme Court's denial of application for a stay from
the Michigan Court of Appeals's decision, see DeBoer, 114 S. Ct. at 11-12 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("This is a case that touches the raw edges of life's relationships.").
While detailed consideration of the case is beyond the scope of this Article, I briefly
note some relational aspects of the matter. Apart from the jurisdictional questions, the
underlying issue in the Iowa proceedings really required a choice between two
relations-the already strongly formed bond between Jessica and the DeBoers, and the
relation asserted by the Schmidts. The odd thing is that of all the actors in this drama, the
person whose relational tie would seem the weakest is Dan Schmidt's, based as it is solely
on genetics. Yet it is his legal right as the biological father that decided the case. His
wife, Jessica's biological mother, had the additional deep tie of having carried and given
birth to Jessica (without Dan's involvement). In the realm of rights, though, she had
surrendered hers and subsequently asserted a derivative claim based only on Dan's not
having relinquished his. Note also how the Michigan court framed the issue-as though
the state were actually wrenching Jessica from her biological parents and giving custody
of her to complete strangers. Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 650-51. That is the picture painted
from the perspective of the rights at stake, but it could not be farther from reality as far
as Jessica's actual relations were concerned.
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B. Taking it impersonally: Care-informed rights
If a rights-based perspective stands in some tension with a care-
based one-so that something valuable is lost in human relations as
the question of how to behave toward others increasingly is answered
by reference to external, impersonal sources-what place, if any, is
there for care in the impersonal realm of rights? Relationalism
suggests that care is too important, both intrinsically and instrumental-
ly, to be confined to the personal reahm' It therefore is worth
considering whether and how interpretation of rights might be
informed by care-like considerations, even if the necessarily imper-
sonal nature of the relation and impartiality of the norms governing
it will preclude care in the personal sense. 2Y
1. Care, relation, and ethics
Relational feminism describes the intrinsic worth of care and its
ethical dimensions. Noddings argues that moral philosophy's reliance
on traditional Kantian criteria of universality and objectivity "has led
to a serious imbalance in moral discussion."' The universals of
Noddings's ethic are attitudinal and motivational rather than
220. For discussion of the objection that relational feminism would confine its ethic of
care to the private realm, see infra notes 281-83 and accompanying text.
221. Rights typically are associated with impartial ethical universalism. See supra part
IV.A. For a neo-Kantian argument that ethical universalism can in some circumstances
(e.g., voluntary and intimate associations) justify ethical particularism, see Alan Gewirth,
Ethical Universalism and Particularism, 85 J. PHIL. 283,294-96 (1988). Gewirth is careful,
however, to note that "the justification of the family and other particularistic groups with
their preferential relations cannot extend to violating the moral rights of other persons."
Id. at 295. Thus, while it may be ethical to prefer one's own family members' interests
over those of strangers in the disposition of one's time, treasure, and energy, such
particularism would be unethical, for example, when one holds some official institutional
position, such as a judge. Id. In that case, "It]he officials have accepted those duties and
the impartiality they involve as part of the roles they have undertaken in accordance with
the respective institutions." Id. Rather than sustaining the common understandings and
expectations for particularism of members of a voluntary association, particularism in the
latter case would infringe the rights and expectations of others to impartiality. Id.
222. NODDINGS, CARING, supra note 20, at 28.
One reason why, from the standpoint of an ethic of justice, care seems to be such
an inadequate moral position is that an ethic of care necessarily rests on a
different set of premises about what a good moral theory is. As Alasdair
MacIntyre [has] noted, the prevailing contemporary notion of what counts as a
moral theory is derived from Kant .... [I]t is universalizable, impartial, and con-
cerned with describing what is right.
Tronto, supra note 188, at 657 '(citing ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, A SHORT HISTORY OF
ETHIcS 190 (1966)).
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behavioral:' "[A]n ethic of caring locates morality primarily in the
pre-act consciousness" of the one who cares. 4 Caring and related-
ness thus are desirable ends in themselves; caring is not an obligation
that one must discharge to achieve morality.' To the contrary,
"[w]e want to be moral in order to remain in the caring relation and
to enhance the ideal of ourselves" as persons who care. 2 6 Morality
under this view derives from a natural desire to become and to
remain related, which gradually unfolds in a succession of caring
relations. 7  Such relations allow "identity-conferring commit-
ments," that: reveal personal integrity; provide the sense that one's
life has meaning, foundation, and a place in the community; and elicit
the values of patience, trust, and a moderation of manipulative striv-
ing.M
While the caring relation is the ethical ideal, even when the
empathic connection is strong and a motivation to act naturally arises
223. NODDINGS, CARING, supra note 20, at 92 ("The caring attitude that lies at the
heart of all ethical behavior is universal."). Noddings describes a young son (sophisticated
enough to intuit a theory of marginal utility) who asks his mother whether it would be
wrong to steal from a large chain store or a rich person to buy her a present. Id. at 93.
Rather than setting up an objective (and, as Heinz's dilemma illustrates, unstable) moral
principle that it is wrong to steal, his mother
[s]lowly, patiently.., explains the position of [one who cares]. Each one who
comes under our gaze must be met as [one who cares]. When I want to please
X and I turn toward Y as a means for satisfying my desire to please X, I must
now meet Y as [one who cares].... I may not cause him pain by taking or
destroying what he possesses. [So the son asks,] "But what if I steal from a bad
guy-someone who stole to get what he has?" Ms. A, [touched by her young
son's struggle with his] ethical responsibility, [replies]: "Unless he is an
immediate threat to you or someone else, you must meet him, too, as [one who
cares]."
Id.
224. Id at 28. Caring is not "that form of act-utilitarianism commonly labeled 'situation
ethics.' Its emphasis is not on the consequences of our acts, although these are not, of
course, irrelevant." Id. Consequences do matter because one who cares wants to avoid,
so far as possible, causing hurt. Id.
225. Id. at 5. To some extent, this distinction tracks one proffered conceptual
distinction between egoistic and altruistic motivation: "[E]goistically motivated helping is
directed toward increasing the end-state goal of increasing the helper's own welfare," for
example, by relieving guilt or shame, attaining praise or material rewards, enhancing self-
esteem, or. avoiding punishment. C. Daniel Batson et al., Is Emphatic Emotion a Source
of Altruistic Motivation?, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 290, 291 (1981).
"Altruistically motivated helping is directed toward the end-state goal of increasing the
other's welfare," even if one's own welfare is also increased (for example, because the
helping produces feelings of personal satisfaction) as a by-product. Id.
226. NODDINGS, CARING, supra note 20, at 5.
227. Id. at 83.
228. BLUSTEIN, supra note 90, at 47, 57; MAYEROFF, supra note 197, at 30-34.
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the individual can choose whether to accept and act upon or to reject
that feeling. 9  Furthermore, in some personal encounters such
sentiments either do not arise naturally at all or do so only faintly and
are displaced by other feelings such as hostility or revulsion. In such
cases an individual may summon motivation from remembrance of his
or her own natural caring and being cared for, to take care of his or
her ethical sel z0 Noddings refers to this process as "ethical
caring. ,)231
An ethic of care thus "is a natural derivative of the desire to be
related. It springs from our experience of caring and the inevitable
assessment of this relation as 'good.' What we seek in caring is not
payment or reciprocity in kind but the special reciprocity that
connotes completion." 2 This ethic of care leads to self-fulfillment;
it does not require self-sacrifice on the altar of abstract altruistic
ideal.z3  Moreover, the roles of caring and being cared for are
neither static nor predetermined, but shift over time and between
persons0z 4
229. NODDINGS, CARING, supra note 20, at 83.
230. This notion traces its roots to David Hume. See infra notes 248 and accompanying
text.
231. To Noddings, then, the "moral imperative" arises out of caring:
I am obliged, then, to accept the initial "I must" when it occurs and even to fetch
it out of recalcitrant slumber when it fails to awake spontaneously. The source
of my obligation is the value I place on the relatedness of caring. This value itself
arises as a product of actual caring and being cared-for and my reflection on the
goodness of these concrete caring situations.
NODDINGS, CARING, supra note 20, at 84 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). In this
sense, an ethic that involves striving to maintain a caring attitude is dependent on, and not
superior to, natural caring. Thus, interest in moral behavior, in the actualization of the
ethical self, arises in the first instance out of a natural impulse to care (or recollection of
an experience of care).
232. Id. at 151. Blustein objects that caring cannot be an adequate moral basis by
itself. He argues that because caring sometimes can be problematic, for example by
smothering the one who is cared for or distracting the caring person from others who
require care, moral judgments must be made about caring itself. BLUSTEIN, supra note 90,
at 40. Although Noddings might respond that such consequences indicate that something
else besides real care is happening, such a response assumes the existence of a metric with
which to distinguish "real" from "not-real" care. Noddings's assertion of an injunction to
avoid hurt if possible sounds like a return to a universal Kantian moral imperative. But
Blustein, while urging a measure of modesty in the claims made on behalf of an ethic of
care, does not call for abandonment of that ethic itself. In any event, because I am not
contending that care ought to displace rights, but only that rights ought to be interpreted
from a caring perspective, I need not resolve this dilemma.
233. NODDINGS, CARING, supra note 20, at 100.
234. Furthermore, completion of caring is not always possible. Care can indeed involve
conflict-especially as one moves outside the natural circles of caring-between the
demands of various others or between one's own needs and projects and the demands of
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A caring attitude is not enough, though; there must be connec-
tion. 5  Because personal caring requires engrossment, some
relationalists disclaim the notion of universal caring (i.e., caring for
everyone) "on the grounds that it is impossible to actualize and leads
us to substitute abstract problem solving and mere talk for genuine
caring."" Thus, while one can "care about" everyone and maintain
a readiness to greet others with care, "caring for" refers to actual
caring in relation and not its mere possibility. As discussed below,
this relational conclusion means that there are limits to the care that
the state can coerce, including care with respect to the unborn.2 3 7
2. Transposing an ethic of care to the impersonal realm
An important test of relationalism's practical power is the extent
to which it can transpose an ethic of care, with its origins and
orientation in the personal and the particular, to the impersonal
realm, with its requirements of universality and impartiality."8 If
difference theorists are correct that care focus is primarily (or
exclusively) a female phenomenon, then women's equality demands
its acknowledgment in public life; otherwise, women will be required
to sacrifice their moral integrity as the price for entering the male-
others. Resolution of such conflicts requires decisions and choices, including reasoned
analysis and argument, but ultimately one who cares will turn back to the persons and
concrete situations at hand. See id. at 51. "The ethical self does not live partitioned off
from the rest of the person." Id. at 100. Instead, "[t]he ethical responsibility of [one who
cares] is to look clear-eyed on what is happening to her ideal and how well she is meeting
it." Id. at 100 (emphasis added).
235. Just as Noddings describes ethical care by the person who cares-care that does
not arise naturally but must be summoned out of concern for the ethical self-she also
describes a kind of ethical or "magnanimous receptivity" to care by the person who is
cared for. Id. at 76. This response involves a willingness to take in the care that is
offered, a kind of tolerance for normal lapses of care, and an encouragement or
inducement to the other to resume care so that the other may fulfill his or her ethical ideal
of caring. Id Like caring itself, of course, this receptivity to care has its limits. At some
point the person who is ostensibly occupying the role of the one who cares (e.g., a parent)
may so fail to fulfill it that a caring relation is no longer possible-either because that
person is really the one who requires care or because caring (natural or ethical) simply
does not arise toward the other. Id.
236. Id. at 18.
237. See infra part V.C. (discussing Goldstein's views on abortion and mother-love).
238. As one writer explains:
If an ethic of care is to be taken seriously as a moral position, then its advocates
need to explore the assumptions on which such a moral position is founded.
Unless the full social and philosophical context for an ethic of care is specified,
the ethic of care can be dismissed as a parochial concern of some misguided
women.
Tronto, supra note 188, at 656.
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dominated public sphere and their distinctive voices will continue to
be undervaluedl 9  This difference-based view would criticize a
constitutional jurisprudence cast predominantly in terms of rights,
autonomy, and even equality as "inadequate to express what women
seek for themselves, let alone what they envision as the core values
of social life."2' If care is (or can become) a cross-gender
phenomenon, its inclusion is necessary to begin to unwind constricting
gender-role stereotypes.24' Finally, if relationalists are correct about
the intrinsic value of care, it would be a shame not to apply the
lessons learned from it as society struggles with relations between
people who do not care.242
The relationalist limitation of an ethic of care to specific interper-
sonal encounter with others is driven principally by two concerns.24
One is the practical constraints on the resources of the one who cares
and the potential voraciousness of strangers' demands.2' The other
239. NODDINGS, CARING, supra note 20, at 127-29.
240. Karst, supra note 51, at 504.
241. Cf supra note 81 (citing Alice Rossi's discussion of retraining fathers).
242. A striking example of a more caring approach to policy formulation can be seen
in Hillary Rodham Clinton's work on health care reform. Her foreword to the Clinton
administration's proposal expresses in relational terms the impact on her of others'
suffering and her commitment to do something about it:
As a mother, I can understand the feeling of helplessness that must come when
a parent cannot afford a vaccination or well-child exam. As a wife, I can imagine
the fear that grips a couple whose health insurance vanishes because of a lost job,
a layoff or an unexpected illness. As a sister, I can see the inequities and
inconsistencies of a health care system that offers widely varying coverage,
depending on where a family member lives or works. As a daughter, I can
appreciate the suffering that comes when a parent's treatment is determined as
much by bureaucratic rules and regulations as by doctors' expertise. And as a
woman who has spent many years in the workforce, I can empathize with those
who labor for a lifetime and still cannot be assured they will always have health
coverage.
Health Security, The President's Report to the American People: Full Text from President
Clinton's Health Reform Package, the "Health Security Act," and Summary of Key Changes
from Earlier Draft, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNWS File, at 1993 DER 207
dl01 (Oct. 28, 1993) (foreword by Hillary Rodham Clinton).
243. Despite her insistence that caring (whether natural or ethical) can be completed
only in a specific interpersonal relation, Noddings recognizes the need to live conser-
vatively to protect future generations and remote others. She also acknowledges that the
cries of help from remote others (too far removed for care to be activated and completed
with respect to those others) may eventually reach those within her circles of care to whom
she must respond. NODDINGS, CARING, supra note 20, at 152-53.
244. Strangers who cross the path of the one who cares are greeted with "wary
anticipation" and "rusty grace" because "I fear a request I cannot meet without hardship."
Id. at 47. As discussed above, this point is a weakness in Bender's tort duty. See supra
notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
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concern is the inverse of that animating the anti-relationalist
movement: While the anti-relationalists fear that recognition of an
ethic of care would force women into private relations that they do
not really want, some relationalists worry that construction of an ethic
not based on a personal encounter would tear women out of relations
that provide moral sustenance and would drag them into the
masculine wilderness of abstraction and loneliness.245 Noddings
warns that "[iln a deep sense, no institution or nation can be ethical.
It cannot meet the other as ...one trying to care. It can only
capture in general terms what particular [persons who care] would like
to have done in well-described situations."2 6
Considering care's intrinsic value, however, it would seem
misguided, and inconsistent with relationalism's aspirations toward
fostering a greater sense of interpersonal responsibility and moral
wholeness, to discount the importance of what a care-like approach
might mean in the impersonal sphere.247 Despite the relatively
recent vintage of relational feminism as a distinct theoretical
movement, the human capacity to perceive the suffering of others and
to feel motivated to act to relieve it has long been recognized.248 A
245. See supra notes 203-19 and accompanying text (noting that rights are inconsistent
with motivations of particular intimate personal relationships); NODDINGS, CARING, supra
note 20, at 94-103.
246. NODDINGS, CARING, supra note 20, at 103. Noddings adds:
Laws, manifestos, and proclamations are not, on this account, either empty or
useless; but they are limited, and they may support immoral as well as moral
actions. Only the individual can be truly called to ethical behavior, and the
individual can never give way to encapsulated moral guides, although she may
safely accept them in ordinary, untroubled times.
Id.
247. Indeed, Noddings, like other relational feminists, see supra part II.B., envisions a
world transformed by an ethic of care:
Today we are asked to believe that women's "lack of experience in the world"
keeps them at an inferior stage in moral development. I am suggesting, to the
contrary, that a powerful and coherent ethic and, indeed, a different sort of world
may be built on the natural caring so familiar to women.
NODDINGS, CARING, supra note 20, at 46.
248. David Hume, Arthur Schopenhaeur, and Adam Smith have commented on the
phenomenon, and Noddings draws heavily on more modem ethicists. Hume, for example,
described the capacity to convert the idea of another's emotions into the emotion
itself-the sympathetic capacity. LAUREN WisPIt, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SYMPATHY 7-8
(1991). Even Adam Smith-who once asserted that "society may exist... without any
mutual love or affection" given law, order, and justice-recognized the importance of
beneficence and sympathy. Id. at 11-12. Smith described sympathy in phenomenological
terms as the capacity to render emotionally meaningful the subjective feelings of
another--"changing places in fancy." Id. at 15. And Schopenhaeur described three basic
moral choices-to struggle for one's self without regard to harm to others (egoism), to
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recurrent theme is the central place of identification with others-the
awareness of a common human connection-in generating such
motivation.249 More recent theorists, building on David Hume's
insight that embedded in everyone's past is some experience of
nurturance and connection (to which Noddings's description of the
process of ethical caring bears some correspondence), have posited a
link between justice and care:"0
[T]he moral disposition to be just normally presupposes not
only that the agent is attached to certain abstract concepts
and ideals, but also, more fundamentally, that he is attached
to and cares for his community, and that he has a sense that
his own good and that of those he cares for most is as-
sociated with general adherence to these ideals3O'
If individuals are able to connect with the suffering of others
(even if only through imagination or cognition), to recall their own
inflict intentionally harm on others (malice), and to act with regard to the welfare of others
(compassion). Id. at 19-20. He divided compassion into two general categories: the virtue
of voluntary justice, which is essentially a negative avoidance of harm to others; and the
virtue of love, which is a positive encouragement of active help to others. Id. Hume's
moral theory, based on character traits or virtues exhibited in actual contextual relations
with others, has been described as largely consistent with Gilligan's views. Annette C.
Baier, Hume, the Woman's Moral Theorist?, in WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY 37 (Eva
Feder Kittay & Diana T. Meyers eds., 1987). John Stuart Mill suffered a crisis of spirit
when he realized that his education
had nurtured in him the capacity to reason abstractly about rules, but not, as he
came to see, to care about the people whose welfare was affected by his breach
or observance of them. And because he did not care about them, he could get
no joy or happiness from promoting their welfare.
BLUSTEIN, supra note 90, at 18.
249. Philosophers have offered a variety of descriptions of altruism. Schopenhaeur, for
example, drawing on the Shaivistic concept of "Maya," or the veil of the illusion of
individual separateness, spoke of people everywhere sharing the same fate in suffering.
WISP'A, supra note 248, at 21-23. By piercing the veil of Maya, one sees that one is not
separate from the other and thus understands that the other's suffering is also one's own.
Id. See generally JAIDEVA SINGH, 91VA SOTRAS: THE YOGA OF SUPREME IDENTITY
(1979) (presenting an overview of the concept of Maya). Hume posited that sympathy is
strongly affected by identification with the other. WISPA, supra note 248, at 7.
Identification in various forms also figures prominently in a neo-Darwinian/Freudian
account of altruism. CHRISTOPHER R. BADCOCK, THE PROBLEM OF ALTRUISM:
FRE DiAN-DARwINiAN SOLUTIONS 71-76 (1986).
250. See Owen Flanagan & Kathryn Jackson, Justice, Care, and Gender: The Kohlberg-
Gilligan Debate Revisited, 97 ETHIcS 622, 628 (1987) (describing Hume's point). Thus,
even a Hobbesian state of nature could not arise without some semblance of a family and
nurturance to carry the human race past a single generation.
251. Id. at 630. Flanagan and Jackson continue: "Without such cares and attachments,
first to those one loves and secondarily to some wider community to which one's projects
and prospects are intimately joined, the moral disposition to justice-as opposed to purely
prudential disposition to justice-has no place to take root." Id.
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experiences of care and connection, and to experience an urge to
relieve others' suffering and to promote well-being, it is difficult to
see why that capacity-no less than the capacity for abstraction and
reason-ought not to be engaged (to the extent possible) when
individuals make decisions for institutions and bodies politic as well
as for their own private lives. Inclusion of a caring perspective in the
impersonal sector will not be "care" in the sense described because it
will not entail particularistic personal relation. 2 We still can ask,
though, what a caring person "would like to have done" in a given
situation. After all, laws and policies are ultimately the manifestations
of the decisions of individuals, even if acting collegially or collectively.
Moreover, if a propensity to care is constitutive of the ethics of a
substantial segment of the population, whose claim to an equal voice
in public affairs is beyond dispute, then equality and justice require
inclusion of care-based values along with rationality in the norms used
to test the validity of policy choices and the means by which those
choices are implemented.53
In advocating the development of a care-based "contextual
metaethical theory" as an alternative to the Kantian model, some
252. We certainly do not want, for example, judges deciding cases as though only one
of the litigants were his or her close personal friend or relation. See Alan Gewirth, Ethical
Universalism and Particularism, 85 J. PHIL. 283 (1988).
253. One might object to an effort to map an ethic of care derived from interpersonal
relations onto the impersonal realms of political process and interbranch relations. This
kind of mapping, however, is implicit in relational feminist legal theory; it is defensible
(despite its limitations) because (1) institutions (courts) are made up of people (the
Supreme Court is a notably finite collection of individuals), and (2) operative problem-
solving paradigms are recognizable in courts' work (or at least that is a working
assumption of much legal scholarship outside the masculinist/feinist area). The
argument, advanced most prominently by Joseph Goldstein, that the Supreme Court has
an obligation to speak in terms "We the People" can understand ought not to overlook
the importance of including consideration of care-based values in constitutional
interpretation. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION: THE
SUPREME COURT'S OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN THE CONSTITUTION AS SOMETHING WE
THE PEOPLE CAN UNDERSTAND 1-20 (1992). Thus, an interpretation that focused
exclusively on rationality as the vehicle for expounding the Constitution would appear
incomplete to a substantial portion of "We the People." Id.
Second, my project is distinct from the communitarianism movement, which seems to
hold out the hope of "impersonal" caring and thereby suggests that rights are often not
needed. My view is somewhat different. The problems are that it is not always easy to
tell what the community is, not every voice gets heard, sometimes the community cannot
be trusted to care, and sometimes faith in its ability to meditate conflicting interests is not
well founded. The suggestion I am offering is less radical because it does not involve
doing away with rights and placing faith entirely in the community's care. Instead, my
argument would require the community to act as though it did care sometimes-rather
than simply trust it to do so.
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feminists have argued that "morality cannot be determined by posing
hypothetical moral dilemmas or by asserting moral principles. Rather,
one's moral imagination, character, and actions must respond to the
complexity of a given situation.""4  An ethic of care thus is best
built brick by brick out of specific context, rather than described in
the whole as a grand theory. To have public impact, however,
considerations of care must also arrive at some level of generality
across a range of cases. To bring the discussion both down to a more
specific context as well as to address a general legal problem, Part V
of this Article will apply these concepts in the context of abortion.
This approach need not ignore sexual difference. In developing
an ethic of care, it is useful to draw on the experience of care givers.
Traditionally, those persons have often been female and the mother-
infant relationship has been seen as the quintessence of care. But
even assuming that it is meaningful to speak of "thinking and feeling
like a woman," the real question is not, as the anti-relationalists fear,
how the law should treat pregnant women and abortion in view of the
way many women are stereotypically assumed to think and feel, but
instead how the law should address abortion if more "feminine"
thinking were globally included in society's approach. Even if the
engrossment and responsiveness of healthy motherhood approaches
the moral ideal under an ethic of care, it does not follow that it is
ethical for anyone else to coerce a woman into that relationship. To
the contrary, taking care seriously would constrain society's power to
restrict abortion. This position does not depend on assumptions
about the bimodal sexual distribution of relational styles. The
fundamental transformative challenge of relational feminism ul-
timately is not harmfully to coerce care from that portion of the
population stereotypically associated with greater care focus, but
rather to demand a more active and pervasive application of care.
254. Tronto, supra note 188, at 658.
255. Cf. Kari Waerness, The Rationality of Caring, 5 ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL
DEMOCRACY 185, 204-05 (1984). Waerness comments:
[T]o reorganize the public care system in such a way that practical experience in
caregiving work and personal knowledge of the individual client can be an
independent basis for greater influence, at the expense of professional and
bureaucratic control and authority, [it is necessary that m]ore decision-making
power [be given] to women on the basis of their personal experiences from
practical caregiving work in the private sphere and from working class jobs in the
public caregiving services.
Id.; see also NODDINGS, CARING, supra note 20, at 129 (arguing that women should
express their natural care-giving orientation in public life).
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V. CARE AND RECOGNITION OF ABORTION RIGHTS
A. Opening discourse to different voices
The dialectics of caricature evident in discourse about sexual
difference have a cousin in the twenty-year dominance of an "official
story" in the abortion debate, and in the anti-relationalists' invocation
of it to silence or at least to contain relationalism" 6 That story has
several distinctive features. It rigidly frames the abortion question as
a dualistic conflict between the woman's ethically neutral claim to
privacy and autonomy (as self-definition) and the state's claim to
protect prenatal life. It is uncomfortable with ambiguity or questions
about the morality of abortion, fearing a slippery slope to intrusive
regulation. It now worries that care-talk will erode abortion rights by
founding a legal duty of gestational care on the intimacy of the
pregnant woman-conceptus relation.
The existence of "feminist" opposition to abortion is hardly news.
The anti-abortion ranks and leadership include many women;2
7
256. Relational theory might suggest that this urge to monopolize the terms in which
the abortion debate is framed derives from anti-relationalists' fear that opening the floor
to different voices may result in a loss of control and annihilation of their position. This
dynamic would be consistent with what Gilligan and West have described as a typically
masculine pattern. Closeness is perceived as threatening betrayal, domination, and
annihilation by the other (in this case by alternative paradigms for considering abortion
rights). Chodorow might add that masculine fears typically identify women as the source
of such threats (in this case, the feminine voice of relation). Rules are required to
maintain distance (in this case distance from those alternative paradigms, maintained by
rule-like constructions that constrain what counts as legitimate argument about abortion
rights). The parties feeling threatened resort to a form of rhetorical aggression (in this
case by testing a hostile reading of "care-talk" by the standards of an atomistic morality).
While Gilligan and West may assign gender valence to this description, it also could
be applied to some feminist writing. See supra note 78. Once again, the point is not
sexual difference but whether we want to treat the issue in this fashion. Alternatively, and
perhaps more cynically, if relationalism is the official version of feminism and describes the
experience of many women, then the anti-relationalist attack on it arguably could be seen
as driven by the belief that the defense of abortion rights is too important to entrust to
women (or at least to "feminine" ones).
257. Paige Cunningham, for example, of Americans United for Life, testified in
opposition to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's confirmation. See Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg
Confirmation Hearings Conclude: Most Witnesses on Final Day Hail Court Nominee, But
a Handful Oppose 'Radical Feminist,' WASH. PosT, July 24, 1993, at A7. For discussion
of women's involvement in the anti-abortion rights movement, see generally Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993). Now, with Rachel Shannon's
alleged shooting of Dr. George Tiller, women apparently have also crossed the line from
anti-abortion protest to anti-abortionist violence. See infra note 260.
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many feminists have deplored abortion for over a centuryel8
Although, as discussed below, opposition to abortion is not necessarily
the same thing as opposition to abortion rights, some modem
opponents of abortion rights have explicitly raised relational objec-
tions to Roe 9 But the anti-relationalist conclusion-that relational
feminism is bad for abortion rights and therefore bad for
women-does not follow from the existence of female opponents to
abortion or the deployment of relation-talk against abortion rights.
Those facts establish only that one's position on abortion probably is
not biologically determined and that arguments from relational theory
are not themselves determinate.'
258. For example, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, during the formative
years of the era of restrictive abortion laws that was brought to a close by Roe, many
feminists spoke out against abortion as a degrading evil made necessary by men's sexual
dominance and advocated abstinence or contraception as alternatives. JAMES C. MOHR,
ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1800-
1900 111-13 (1978). Their position in some respects anticipated Catharine MacKinnon's
views. See supra note 191.
259. For a review of "pro-life feminism," see Karlan & Ortiz, supra note 13, at 880-82.
Indeed, several such groups, including one calling itself "Feminists for Life America," have
filed amicus briefs urging the Supreme Court to overrule Roe. E.g., Brief of Feminists for
Life America et al., as amici curiae in support of appellants, Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605), reprinted in 3 MERSKY & HARTMAN,
supra note 65, at 69; Brief of Feminists for Life America et al., as amici curiae in support
of respondents and cross-petitioners, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)
(Nos. 91-744 and 91-902).
260. As we have seen, however, the same could be said about pro-choice arguments
based on individualist liberal theory. See supra notes 164-78 and accompanying text. The
presence of many men on the pro-choice side also supports the conclusion that one's
position with respect to abortion is not gender-specific. For description of some of the
courageous and caring men who worked to help women facing unwanted pregnancy during
the pre-Roe era, see ELLEN MESSER & KATHRYN E. MAY, BACKROOMS: VOICES FROM
THE ILLEGAL ABORTION ERA 171-214 (1988). Indeed, some have taken enormous risks
and made large sacrifices in the cause of abortion rights. Dr. David Gunn, for example,
has become a kind of pro-choice martyr. See, e.g., William Bboth, At Abortion Clinic, A
Collision of Causes: Doctor, Accused Killer Both Impassioned, WASH. POST, Mar. 12,
1993, at Al; Bill Hewitt et al., In Life's Name: Dr. David Gunn's Unswerving Belief in a
Woman's Right to Choose Fired a Rage that Led to His Murder, PEOPLE, Mar. 29, 1993,
at 44; Eloise Salhol et al., The Death of Doctor Gunn: A Physician Becomes a Casualty
of the Abortion Wars as Pro-Life Militants Step Up Their Campaign, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 22,
1993, at 34. Dr. George Tiller, who was back in his Kansas City clinic the day after being
shot in both arms (allegedly by an anti-abortion activist), also has become even more of
a hero to the pro-abortion rights side than he was during the siege of his clinic by
Operation Rescue. See, e.g., Patricia Ireland, National Organization for Women Press
Conference: Abortion Shooting, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 20, 1993, Major Leader
Special Transcript, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newfed File. In Fayetteville,
Arkansas, Dr. William Harrison, who personally has delivered more than 6,000 babies, has
been demonstrating his enduring commitment to choice notwithstanding death threats,
harassment of his patients, vandalism and firebombing of his offices, and disruption of his
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The anti-relationalists' argument does suggest, however, how
overemphasis on difference can crystallize the organic, fluid concept
of relation-based care into an inflexible rule that can be used to hurt
pregnant women. The label "care-talk" thus counsels skepticism of
thin forms of relationalism that ignore the content and effect of
particular relations and that devote insufficient attention to real-world
harm. The anti-relationalists overshoot the mark, however, when they
insist that relationalism therefore must go.
Relationalism reveals several key points about the official story.
First, the official version conflates two moral issues: (1) the woman's
decision to abort; and (2) the state's decision to interfere,26'
Second, the official story tends to desiccate into lifeless abstraction
the moral questions it does recognize. Thomson's version sanitizes
the woman's decision into an abstract thought experiment that is
devoid of affective content. No wonder anti-abortion advocates wave
"bloody-fetus" images. 2 Conversely, by talking in abstract terms
about "state interests," the official story also downplays the fact that
abortion restrictions constitute actual decisions and actions by one
group of people that can seriously hurt others. Third, critical
examination of the anti-relationalist position reveals that "care-talk"
is not the same thing as actual care.
B. Abortion and an ethic of care
Relational accounts of abortion that expressly support abortion
rights offer a useful starting place for considering how to take care
seriously in the context of reproductive choice.263  Noddings
OBIGYN practice. See JUDGES, supra note 90, at 44-45.
261. As Gilligan observes: "In the absence of legal abortion, a morality of self-sacrifice
is necessary in order to ensure protection and care for the dependent child. However,
when such sacrifice becomes optional, the entire problem is recast." GILLIGAN, supra note
5, at 83.
262. See JUDGES, supra note 90, at 289-91.
263. Curiously, neither the Karlan and Ortiz nor the McClain articles discuss
Noddings's views on abortion, although both cite her book. Karlan & Ortiz, supra note
13, at 859 n.6; McClain, supra note 14, at 1200-01 n.144. Karlan and Ortiz do discuss
Goldstein in a footnote, but hardly do him justice, Karlan & Ortiz, supra note 13, at 873
n.70; and no one seems to have noted Gilligan's own comments about abortion, see supra
note 261.
With several important exceptions, those writers who embrace relational feminism
have generally devoted relatively little detailed attention to the specific application of the
ethic of care to the problem of abortion rights, but it is plain that they do not believe they
are campaigning against choice. For example, Karst's description of a reconstructed
"Woman's Constitution" does not come directly to terms with the abortion dilemma.
Instead, his focus is on discrimination generally and the application of doctrines that tend
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to rob such constitutional litigation of its context, such as the state action and intent
requirements. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 51, at 463-72. Elsewhere, however, Karst has
spoken of a constitutional protection "against the enforced intimate society of unwanted
children, against an unchosen commitment and a caring stained by reluctance, against a
compelled identification with the social role of parent." Kenneth Karst, The Freedom of
Intimate Association, 89 YALE LJ. 624, 641 (1980).
Sherry contrasts liberalism's recognition "only that the woman has a right to an
abortion (or that the fetus has a right to life), regardless of the circumstances," with a
feminine, contextual approach which would distinguish a "virtuous" decision to abort a
child whose life would be filled with pain from a "less virtuous" decision to abort based
on gender selection. Sherry, supra note 51, at 568. Elsewhere, Sherry has relied on
autonomy-like arguments, including Thomson's, in favor of abortion rights. Sherry, supra
note 71, at 1591. Menkel-Meadow has suggested that "a woman's concern over
reproduction [might] be seen as more her own and less the doctor's." Menkel-Meadow,
supra note 52, at 61.
West has offered several perspectives on abortion. As described below, she has
defended abortion rights as essential to preserve women's existential integrity while urging
that such rights be redefined to account for women's perspective on sexuality and
pregnancy. West, Jurisprudence & Gender, supra note 7, at 35-66; see also infra note 349.
More recently, however, West has described a "responsibility-centered" approach to
liberty, which shares themes with relational feminism (especially Gilligan's third phase of
moral development). Under this view, "the freedom most important to individuals is the
freedom to assume moral responsibility for the consequences of their actions and the
content of their beliefs through a life lived in truth, not the freedom to exercise rights,
indifferent to the effect of those acts on others." West, supra note 9, at 69. A key
contrast between this position and legal liberalism is that "[p]recisely because of its
insistence on insularity, liberal legalism demands of the citizen almost none of the so-called
Icivic virtues': mercy, compassion, public involvement, fellow-feeling, sympathy, or, simply,
love." Id. at 71.
Applying this vision to "reproductive responsibilities," West warns that liberal
legalism's insulation of the moral quality of the abortion decision from community
consideration may actually threaten the existence of the right. Id, at 81-82. But
by insisting that the "right" to an abortion, like all rights, is not contingent on the
morality of the right-holder or the moral quality of the conduct the right protects,
the liberal legalist understanding may inadvertently bolster rather than challenge
the pernicious and false claims that the decision to abort is more often than not
based on nothing more than a woman's "convenience," is generally necessitated
by her sexual promiscuity, and, at the extreme, is the moral equivalent of the
decision to commit a premeditated murder.
Id. at 81-82 (footnotes omitted). Yet West also recognizes that implementing a
"responsibility-based" approach risks subjecting the woman's decision to the dictates of a
state "morality monitor," whose good faith and understanding of women's needs not only
cannot be assumed, but is indeed unlikely. Id. at 83.
Ultimately West urges a shift in the focus of arguments about reproductive freedom,
not a complete abandonment of the concept of "rights." She suggests that
[b]y focusing on the moral quality of reproductive decisions rather than insulating
them from understanding, liberals could redirect societal attention toward this
web of shared responsibilities and societal failures. We might then begin to
recognize that we have a collective responsibility to address the variable causes
that result in unwanted pregnancies, from the pervasive acceptance of sexual
violence in our culture to our collective refusal to provide meaningful material
assistance for the nurturing of children and families.
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describes how an ethic of care might distinguish the moral question
of a woman's own decision to abort from the very different moral
question of others' response to her decision. To Noddings, the
important focus is not abstract debate about personhood but is instead
real-life relation: One who cares "is concerned not with human tissue
but with human consciousness-with pain, delight, hope, fear,
entreaty, and response.' '264 Speaking strictly for herself Noddings
would regard her own pregnancy not as simply a genetic "information
speck" but as a child-to-be who is "endowed with prior love and
current knowledge," is "joined to loved others through formal chains
of caring," and is "linked to the inner circle in a clearly defined
way."265 Even though she might wish she were not pregnant, she
"cannot destroy this known and potentially loved person-to-be" with
whom a relation (albeit indirect and only partly formed) is already
established.266 Her "decision is an ethical one born of natural
caring.
'267
Noddings has a very different reaction when the pregnant woman
is not Noddings herself but is another, say her daughter, for whom
pregnancy may be harmful (perhaps because of a disintegrating
marriage):
I might like to convey sanctity on this information speck; but
I am not God-only mother to this suffering [daughter]. It
is she who is conscious and in pain, and I as [one who cares]
move to relieve the pain. This information speck is an
information speck and that is all. There is no formal
relation, given the breakdown between the husband and
Id. at 85. Karlan and Ortiz thus mischaracterize West's position when they elide her
ultimate conclusion. See Karlan & Ortiz, supra note 13, at 873 n.70.
Most recently, West has argued that a strong version of abortion rights, as under Roe,
is necessary as a second-best alternative until our society learns how not to oppress women
(especially disadvantaged ones), not to devalue childrearing, and not to sexualize
dominance and violence. Robin L. West, The Nature of the Right to an Abortion: A
Commentary on Professor Brownstein's Analysis of Casey, 45 HAST. LJ. 961, 964-67
(1994).
264. NODDINGS, CARING, supra note 20, at 88. She regards an incipient embryo as an
"information speck-a set of controlling instructions for a future human being," and her
discussion is influenced by the fact that many "are created and flushed away without their
creators' awareness." Id. at 87. She is at least correct that many fertilized ova are
spontaneously aborted. See JUDGES, supra note 90, at 66 (noting that estimates range
from 20 to 60%). The implications of that fact for the morality of induced abortion,
especially late in the first or throughout the second trimester, are of course much in
dispute.





wife, and with the embryo, there is no present relation; the
possibility of a future relation-while not absent, surely-is
uncertain.m
Noddings also recognizes, however, that the relational potential is
dynamic. As the conceptus grows, it becomes more and more capable
of response as one who is cared for; the possibility of meeting it as
one who cares also increases in certainty (as does the likelihood that
the pregnant woman will do so). 9
Noddings's account dovetails somewhat with Ronald Dworkin's
recent "quasi-relational" positionY Both find abortion inherently
troublesome, and both see the problem primarily in terms of the
conceptus's growing connection with the rest of the world. Dworkin
regards abortion as morally problematic throughout pregnancy
because it wastes an exquisite-perhaps "divine"-natural creative
investment." Later-term abortion compounds that loss with the
additional waste of increased human investment, which is partly a
function of relation with others. 2  He argues that the liberal
position on abortion reflects a judgment that it is even more of a
shame to waste (through coerced continuation of an unwanted
pregnancy) the much more deeply textured human investment in an
adult woman's ambitions, talents, training, experience, and
relations.273 Dworkin thus includes relation as an important element
of life's sanctity on both sides of the abortion balance, and he
268. Id. Ironically, Noddings's response as she imagines her own daughter facing an
unwanted pregnancy resembles that of both former President Bush and former Vice
President Dan Quayle-which evidences the difference that real relation can make even
to ostensibly anti-choice advocates. Asked during a live interview, "What if your daughter
grew up and had a problem, came to you with that problem? How would you deal with
it?" Quayle replied: "I hope that I never do have to deal with it. But obviously... I
would counsel and talk to her and support her on whatever decision she made."
Interviewer Larry King pressed the point: "And if the decision was abortion, you'd
support her, as a parent?" Quayle replied, "I'd support my daughter." Later, George
Bush also stated that, while he would attempt to talk his granddaughter out of an abortion,
it would be her decision; if she so chose, he would stand by her. JUDGES, supra note 90,
at 19.
269. For a discussion of the likelihood that many women who carry even unwanted
pregnancies to term eventually will develop attachment and care, see infra part V.C.
270. In RONALD DwORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993), the author basically argues from a
liberal autonomy perspective, but one enriched substantially by an awareness of an
individual's connection to others.
271. Id. at 68-101.
272. See id. at 169-71.
273. Id.
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mentions that "reasons of beneficence" as well as "reasons of
autonomy" argue against state interference with choice.'
Like Dworkin, Noddings concludes that, translated into imper-
sonal legal terms, her position resembles the Court's decision in Roe.
As the embryo becomes a fetus, "our obligation grows from a nagging
uncertainty-an 'I must if I wish'-to an utter conviction that we must
meet this small other" with care.s She clearly hopes that the
pregnant woman will eventually form a caring relation with the
conceptus, but she also seems to believe that, if the woman does not
do so, then the conceptus's potential for relation with others will have
become sufficiently strong by viability to justify interference in the
pregnant woman's choice-to substitute the force of law for her
failure of care: "It is not a question of when life begins but of when
relation begins."276
Noddings's position with respect to pre-viability abortion seems
contradictory. One suspects that, if pressed, she would have to admit
that she regards at least some (if not most) pre-viability elective
abortions (especially later in the second trimester) as unethical-as a
failure by the pregnant woman to summon ethical care when care did
not arise naturally.2' . This inference sounds like the "different
voice" speaking against abortion .1 8  Yet Noddings's open endor-
sement of Roe speaks in favor of abortion rights. Some anti-
relationalists would criticize her position as making only moral and
not legal demands, ceding the public sector to masculinist values and
retreating into the private realm when the going gets tough. Anti-
relationalists argue that this kind of move recapitulates the in-
dividualistic value of autonomous choice, denies coercive power to the
feminist message of care (rendering it effectively voiceless in an
274. Id. at 213 (discussing state interference with euthanasia).
275. NODDINGS, CARING supra note 20, at 88.
276. See id. Once the infant
is capable of relation--of the sweetest and most unselfconscious reciprocity-one
who encounters the infant is obligated to meet it as [one who cares].... If the
mother does not care naturally, then she must summon ethical caring to support
her as [one who cares].... She may not ethically ignore the child's cry to live.
Id. at 89.
277. This assessment would be accurate if her position were tested by Kantian
principles of universality. Even by Noddings's own criteria, however, the unwanting
pregnant woman would have sacrificed her ethical ideal by rejecting a present, concrete
opportunity for the most intimate of relations.
278. See Karlan & Ortiz, supra note 13, at 881-82.
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uncaring masculine world), and threatens to revive the separate
spheres regime 79
That critique overlooks the possibility that abortion presents at
least two moral issues to which an ethic of care might provide distinct
responses.20 It also ignores relationalism's power to focus the law's
critical scrutiny on the practical effects of abortion restrictions. A
woman confronting an unwanted pregnancy and other persons
encounfering her both are in a position to respond with care (or its
impersonal counterpart). To Noddings, one who cares
in considering abortion as in all other matters, cares first for
the one in immediate pain or peril .... If the incipient child
has been sanctified by [relation with] its mother, every effort
must be made to help the two to achieve a stable and
hopeful life together; if it has not, it should be removed
swiftly and mercifully with all loving attention to the woman,
the conscious patient."'
Thus, the failure to respond with care to the needs and suffering of
the unwanting pregnant woman would be unethical because the
woman is present and in extant relation (at a minimum in the sense
described by Dworkin). Even less ethical would be the use of
coercive force to preclude from caring for herself the woman who has
made the painful choice of abortion. Sometimes caring means, at
least, not interfering.
Far from reflecting a retreat into purely private morality,
Noddings's endorsement of Roe implies that the case can be
understood as addressing both moral issues raised by abortion.
Before viability, Roe compels a minimally ethical care-like response
from the public at large by disabling its regulatory power to hurt the
pregnant woman-with whom it already has a "relation" through her
presence and substantial investment in society-by interfering with
her decision." This result reflects care's surrogate in the imper-
279. Id. at 891-92. To be sure, there are indications that Noddings herself tends in that
direction, see NODDINGS, CARING, supra note 20, at 89-90, but application of a caring
perspective in the public sphere suggests a different interpretation.
280. Noddings seems to be saying that the answer depends on context. The key factor
may be who is pregnant-me or thee.
281. NODDINGS, CARING supra note 20, at 89.
282. As discussed above, this argument extends an ethic of care beyond interpersonal
relations. Noddings's care is, after all, elicited by a hypothetical situation featuring her
daughter. Faced with the alternative of accepting the inevitability of a totally uncaring
public sphere, however, I would rather first attempt to preserve care-like considerations
and thereby protect the ethical ideal. This is the crucial step that Noddings has
overlooked. She says that the "public life [of one who cares] is limited by her insistence
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sonal sphere making legal demands on the political community in the
pregnant woman's behalf through the injunctive power of
constitutional law. After viability, Roe allows the state in turn
forcibly to extract a form of care from the pregnant woman by
coercing her into continuing to sustain, and potentially to develop a
relationship with, the conceptus.m
One who cares would recoil at the power of restrictive abortion
laws to hurt women. Most tangibly, such laws enormously increase
the physical risks to women who are seeking to care for themselves
(and for others with whom they have established relations) by
terminating pregnancy. Abortion rights substantially protect the
physical health of such women both by reducing the incidence of
illegal abortion and by allowing legal abortion to become much
safer.' Restrictive abortion laws also can inflict substantial
emotional harm. Abortion, of course, has psychological implications;
on meeting the other as [one who cares]." Id. at 89. Noddings also says that when public
life threatens to destroy her care or drastically to reduce it, the caring one retreats and
renews her contact with those who address her. "If her retreat becomes a flight, an
avoidance of the call to care, her ethical ideal is diminished." Id.
283. Karlan and Ortiz oddly ignore Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), and the fact
that law speaks in negative as well as positive commands. Brown's injunction, after all,
was enforced at the point of a bayonet in Little Rock.
284. See JUDGES, supra note 90, at 73-79. For example, according to the American
Medical Association, "85% of the decrease in abortion deaths between 1972 and 1974
reflected reductions in mortality from unlawful abortions." Brief of American Medical
Association, et al. as amici curiae in support of appellees at 12, Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605), reprinted in 5 MERSKY & HARTMAN,
supra note 65, at 341, 366. In attributing this protection to Roe, I am bypassing the
objection raised in GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 173-74 (1991), that the Court's role in producing such change
is minimal. My point is that liberal abortion laws, whether mandated by the judiciary or
the legislature, can be understood as embodying the impersonal version of care.
In countries with strict anti-abortion laws, the death rate from illegal abortion remains
shockingly high. For example, "[i]n Latin America, complications of illegal abortion are
thought to be the main cause of death in women between the ages of 15 and 39 years."
PREVENTING MATERNAL DEATHS 110 (Erica Royston & Sue Armstrong, eds., 1989); see
also Marlise Simons, Abortions Across Latin America Increase Despite Illegality and Risks,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1988, at Al (noting the high death rate in child-bearing age women
as a consequence of unsafe, illegal abortions). Illegal abortion accounted for as much as
86% of maternal deaths in Romania in 1984. Stanley K. Henshaw, Induced Abortion:
A World Review, 1990,22 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 76,82 (1990). The increased safety of legal
abortion has been attributed to several factors made possible by liberalization of abortion
laws: (1) the routine practice of legal abortion, like any surgical procedure, increases the
physician's manual skill; (2) the medical profession has developed much safer techniques,
such as suction curettage, as abortion has moved closer to the mainstream of legitimate
medical practice; and (3) legal abortions are increasingly being performed earlier in




nevertheless, according to the American Psychological Association,
evidence indicates that "for the overwhelming majority of women who
undergo abortion, there are no long-term negative emotional
effects."' Women are more likely to suffer psychological damage
from abortion when the decision is forced on them by medical
necessity or by someone else, as well as when their decision is not
supported by people important to them. 6
Relational feminism not only asserts a collective moral respon-
sibility for the harm that restrictive abortion laws inflict but also
illuminates the uniquely relational nature of that harm: Abortion
prohibitions operate to exclude or to separate the pregnant woman
from the community's circle of care when she acutely needs it. If the
difference theorists are correct that women especially value relation,
then such a tearing of connection hits unwanting pregnant women
where it hurts the most. Infliction of such harm is contrary to an
ethic of care transposed to the impersonal realm, which requires that
all of us, not just women experiencing unwanted pregnancies, increase
the level of care for, accept our responsibilities to, and recognize our
interrelatedness with others. Among other things, this means that not
only the unwanted conceptus, but also the unwanting pregnant
woman, must be included within our circle of care.
The anti-relationalists' failure to appreciate the implications of
this more complete ethic of care illustrates how easily real-life conse-
quences are lost in abstract debate about principles. This failure
follows directly from the reduction of an ethic of care to a rigid
285. Brief of American Psychological Association as amici curiae in support of
Appellees at 19-20, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (88-605),
reprinted in 5 MIERSKY & HARTMAN, supra note 65, at 419, 449-50. According to the
American Psychological Association, "the great majority of women who have had an
abortion express feelings of relief." While some anti-abortion activists have asserted that
overruling Roe is necessary to protect women from alleged adverse psychological effects
of abortion, the mainstream health care establishment strongly disagrees. See JUDGES,
supra note 90, at 79-80. Current research has tended to focus "on [identifying] the
variables that predict diverse emotional responses to abortion. Abortion does not take
place independently of a woman's intrapersonal and interpersonal context." Brief of
American Psychological Association, supra, at 21, reprinted in 5 MERSKY & HARTMAN,
supra note 65, at 450.
286. The APA argues that one can even find evidence of positive psychological changes
following abortion, including stress reduction, increased use of contraceptives, and
increased feelings of autonomy, self-directedness, and efficacy. Brief of American
Psychological Association as amici curiae in support of appellees, at 21, Webster, 492 U.S.
490 (No. 88-605), reprinted in 5 Mersky & Hartman, supra note 65, at 450. For an
anecdotal account of the positive aspects of abortion, see PATRICIA LUNNENBORG,
ABORTION: A POsrIvE DECISION (1992).
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formula. While any legal consideration of abortion perforce must
operate at a general and institutional, rather than a strictly interper-
sonal, level, the deafening effect of abstraction can be mitigated by
listening to the stories of persons who have actually experienced the
harm of such exclusion.,
Predictably, pre-Roe narratives describe hemorrhages, infections,
and bloody coathangers. They also tell of the emotional wounds
suffered by women: feelings of isolation, degradation, fear,
desperation, exploitation (including sexual abuse), helplessness, and
being trapped by a hostile, male-dominated system.2' One woman
compared the relational agony she felt at putting her daughter up for
adoption in 1962, when abortion was illegal, with the "great relief"
she felt after a "safe, legal abortion" in 1977: "There is no com-
parison between the loss of a fetus to an abortion and the loss of my
real baby girl to adoption."'  Other women describe covert
meetings in shabby hotel rooms, sleazy abortionists, and the constant
feeling of aloneness. One woman, Caroline, relates how, after a saline
injection administered in a seedy house by an abortionist who doubled
as a bookie, she later aborted all alone in her dormitory room, hemor-
rhaging "more blood than I ever imagined." Frightened and isolated,
she continued to bleed almost to death over the next
287. E.g., MESSER & MAY, supra note 260, at 31-37. One rape victim, for example, for
whom the abortion option was unavailable, tells of the rejection and hostility she endured,
as well as the pain caused by putting the child up for adoption. Id. In Webster, 2,887
women who had abortions joined a brief arguing that Roe v. Wade was "a wise and just"
decision necessary to the safety and well-being of women, that the abortion/childbirth
decision is a profound one for every woman that involves a weighing of numerous
responsibilities, and that the decision is therefore better left to each individual woman and
not to legislators. Attached to the brief were selected letters from those women detailing
their views and experiences. Brief of Women Who Have Had Abortions and Friends of
Amici Curiae as amici curiae in support of appellees, Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (88-605), reprinted in 8 MERSKY & HARTMAN, supra note
65, at 171 [hereinafter Brief of amici curiae Women Who Have Had Abortions].
288. Brief of amici curiae Women Who Have Had Abortions, supra note 287, at app.
B, letter 5, at B5, reprinted in 8 MERSKY & HARTMAN, supra note 65, at 285. One 58-
year-old grandmother related her two experiences with illegal abortion in the 1950s. One
of the men from whom she sought an abortion subjected her to a painful pelvic
examination (during which he sexually molested her), then exposed himself to her and
proposed various sexual encounters in exchange for the abortion service. Another man
invited her to participate in live sexual performances and pornographic productions as part
of the abortion procedure. Her first abortion resulted in a "crippling infection," the
second subjected her to a near-fatal injection of antibiotics. In addition to her physical
trauma, she also describes the "psychic scars" that she bears, and the resultant harm to her
children, as a consequence of the ordeal she was put through to obtain an abortion. Id.
at'app. B, letter 125, at B24-33, reprinted in 8 MERSKY & HARTMAN, supra note 65, at
304-13.
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month-"terrified of [obtaining urgently needed medical attention]
because I didn't want my parents to find out and I didn't want to be
arrested." 9
Consideration of women's welfare highlights the need for
skepticism about the conclusion that relationalism cannot be trusted
to participate meaningfully in the abortion debate. Just as some
abortion opponents, sailing under feminist colors, have invoked an
ethic purportedly based on care and connection to argue against
289. MESSER & MAY, supra note 260, at 10. She concluded:
I certainly wouldn't want anyone to have to live through the experience that I
lived through. There's no need for it. I did make choices: I considered and
chose not to choose marriage. I chose not to be an unwed mother. Abortion
was the option of last resort, but I chose it because it seemed the only option that
would allow me to go on with my life, even at the risk of losing it.
Id. Caroline's life was saved by the care of an Episcopal rector, "a gentle Christian man,"
who arranged for her to receive medical treatment-which involved hospitalization, a
dilation and curettage, a transfusion of five units of blood, and for the Church to pay her
hospital bill. Id. at 9. "He remarked that he had lots of parishioners who had money to
fly to Sweden to get an abortion, and it was really criminal that just because I didn't have
money I'd had to go through this kind of experience." Id at 10.
Refreshingly, one collection of narratives includes a young man's story. He speaks
eloquently of how frightening, confusing, and painful it was to be 15 with his 14-year-old
girlfriend pregnant. His story reveals the especially difficult plight of teens faced with
unwanted pregnancy under pre-Roe law, how abortion restrictions hurt others counected
to the pregnant woman, and the serious suffering of men with respect to relation:
It really wasn't a joke, even though there really wasn't any responsibility I could
bear except for guilt. I mean, what could I do? I couldn't give her money, I
-couldn't marry her. I couldn't do anything except say goodbye [when she was
forced to go away to have the baby and put it up for adoption].
Not that abortion is an easy way out, but it's easier than something that wasn't
her choice.... There was no option. No option whatsoever. A fifteen-year-old
kid at that time-it was hard enough to know what was going on, much less to
try and negotiate the criminal aspect of dealing with something like abortion.
How could a fifteen-year-old move into the crime world and make a deal and be
assured of her safety?
[After she went away] I was really grieving-it really was very hard. When she
came back, I couldn't handle my feelings, or the situation, and she couldn't
either. We had no knowledge, we didn't know what our emotions were, we
didn't know what we should feel, or why, or who was lying, which everybody was.
Nobody told us-useful information was not available to us, on an emotional
basis or a practical basis, there wasn't anything. Even my peers that knew about
it, who wanted to be supportive, had no idea either, so they were supportive by
saying things like, "Ha ha ha, you got away with it," which, of course, made me
want to puke.
Id. at 65-67. Messer and May also include stories from abortion providers and pro-choice
activist men. Id at 176-214. For other stories from this perspective, see ARTHUR B.
SHOSTAK & GARY MCLOUTH, MEN AND ABORTION: LESSONS, LOSsES, AND LOVE
(1984).
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abortion rights, some also have contended that abortion rights have
created a massive "public health disaster."2" While the practice of
legal abortion in the United States is not without its risks and
difficulties,29' the overwhelming weight of credible medical opinion
finds legal abortion to be an exceptionally and increasingly safe
procedure both physically and psychologically, and to be safer than
childbirth throughout pregnancy.2" Whatever the shortcomings of
some abortion practice, it is difficult to believe that women's physical
and psychological health would be improved by a return to pre-Roe
restrictive policies.
Just because groups calling themselves feminist have deployed
leaky argiments about abortion's impact on women's health in
opposition to abortion rights hardly means that Roe's supporters
should or will abandon the field of abortion rights arguments
premised on women's welfare. The response instead should be, and
has been, to expose the distortions and inaccuracies in those ar-
guments as well as to work for safer, more equally accessible legal
contraception and abortion. The place in the abortion debate of
accurate information about women's health is too crucial to relinquish
that issue simply because it is subject to adversarial exploitation.
The same is true of care and relation. Although the controversy
about relationalism concerns moral judgment and conceptual
coherence, rather than quantifiable medical facts, it is equally
necessary to test the anti-abortion application of relationalism for
completeness and fidelity. It would be an equally unfortunate mistake
for abortion rights advocates to turn their backs on care.29,
290. Brief of Feminists for Life America, et al. as amici curiae in support of appellants
at 3, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (88-605), reprinted in
3 MERSKY & HARTMAN, supra note 65, at 69, 77. Anti-abortion advocates also have
collected stories of women being harmed by legal abortion. E.g., id. at app., reprinted in
3 MERSKY & HARTMAN, supra note 65, at 107-34; DAVID C. REARDON, ABORTED
WOMEN: SILENT No MORE (1987).
291. Cf. Robert D. McFadden, Abortion Mills Thriving Behind Secrecy and Fear, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 1991, at Al (describing problem of unregulated, unlicensed abortion
"mills").
292. See supra notes 284-86 and accompanying text.
293. An analogy derives from Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). In that case, the
State of Virginia attempted to defend the policy of its anti-miscegenation law by quoting
at length from sources warning of the evils of mixed-race marriages on eugenic, social, and
psychological grounds (including the allegedly higher divorce rates and harmful effects on
the offspring of interracial unions). Appellee's Brief at 38-50, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967) (No. 395), reprinted in 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTnTONAL LAW 789, 831-43 (Philip B.
Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975). Some of those grounds could be interpreted as
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In particular, pro-life feminists have argued that liberal abortion
laws do not liberate women, denigrate women's status by depicting a
uniquely feminine process as a burden, and valorize the individualism
and domination inherent in male patterns of sexuality.294 Even if
there is something to all of that, it still does not mean that women
would be better off without Roe. Abortion may come at high cost to
at least some women, but history shows that repressive abortion laws
do so as well.295 The foregoing anti-abortion argument relies on an
idealistic vision to test a proposition that must live in the real
world.296 Abortion may sometimes reflect "expediency, inequality,
and violently destructive solutions to human problems,"2' 9 but
a "relational" defense of laws against interracial marriage. In a striking unmasking of the
advocate's role, however, Chief Justice Warren's questioning during oral argument forced
Virginia's Assistant Attorney General, R.D. McIlwaine, III, to distance himself personally
from the argument that he was offering in behalf of his client. See MAY IT PLEASE THE
COURT: THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ORAL ARGUMENTS MADE BEFORE THE SUPREME
COURT SINCE 1955, at 277, 281 (Peter Irons & Stephanie Guitton eds., 1993). In his
closing argument, the Lovings's counsel, Bernard Cohen, invoked a poignant image of
actual care and connection to focus the Court's attention on the personal, intensely
relational aspects of the constitutional question:
The enormity of the injustices involved under this statute merely serves as indicia
of how civil liabilities amount to a denial of due process to the individuals
involved.... [No matter how we articulate this, no matter which theory of the
due process clause, or which emphasis we attach to it, no one can articulate it
better than Richard Loving, when he said to me: "Mr. Cohen, tell the Court I
love my wife, and it is just unfair that I can't live with her in Virginia."
Id. at 285 (emphasis added).
294. In the foreword to ABORTED WOMEN: SILENT No MORE, supra note 290,
Nancyjo Mann, the self-proclaimed "victim of this Pandora's box" of legalized abortion
who founded Women Exploited By Abortion, asserts that "legalized abortion has become
a tool for the manipulation and exploitation of women" in four ways: (1) it frees men to
exploit women sexually, leaving women to face the risks and guilt of abortion alone; (2)
abortion separates women from "their reproductive potential" and erodes "the natural
pride which women enjoy in being able to conceive and bear children-a creative wonder
which no man can duplicate"; (3) legalized abortion reflects society's abandonment of
women facing unwanted pregnancy; and (4) "[i]nstead of helping women to be strong,
independent, and capable of handling their lives in spite of the social prejudices against
'problem' pregnancies, the expediency of abortion encourages women to be weak,
dependent, and incapable of dealing with unexpected challenges." Id. at x-xii.
295. See JUDGES, supra note 90, ch. 3-4.
296. Robin West has observed that abortion rights are a necessity, despite their
troublesome implications, in a society where women are pervasively oppressed and
exploited. See supra note 263. For a general criticism of the kind of move described in
the text-in which an advocate attacks an existing system (which must struggle with all the
complexities of real life) by comparing its obvious defects to the hypothetical advantages
of some ideal system--see Howard A. Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of
Tort Liability, 73 CAL. L. REv. 677, 73840 (1985).
297. Sidney Callahan, Context of the Abortion Debate, in 1 MERSKY & HARTMAN,
supra note 65, at 17, 19.
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women will not be better off if just that part of the perceived problem
is altered. In the real world, of course, women will continue to have
intercourse and become pregnant. For some, the desire not to have
children will be strong enough for them to seek abortion. Kicking
needy, distressed women out of the community's circle of care is a
peculiar way indeed to start redressing patterns of sexual domination.
Furthermore, as Gilligan has observed, moral maturity requires
women to have the opportunity to choose.2 8  A woman who
chooses abortion may be less free in the eyes of pro-life feminists than
one who chooses "life." '299 But the woman is surely not at all free
who, because of the coercive intervention of the state, has no choice
to make at all.
C. Abortion and mother-love
The other relationship centrally implicated by abortion rights, in
addition to the one between the pregnant woman and her community,
is of course the pregnant woman-conceptus relationship. Whereas the
anti-relationalists fear that consideration of that relationship will
undermine abortion rights, Robert Goldstein argues that a proper
understanding of it supports abortion rights."° His analysis offers
a richer conception of choice than Thomson's bodily autonomy
argument and shows how abortion restrictions make much greater
demands of care on the unwanting pregnant woman than Roe makes
on the community.
Relying on psychoanalytic concepts of symbiotic attachment,
Goldstein posits that "there is no such thing as a baby, there is only
a dyadic mother-infant unit." '' This dyadic unit is even more
inseparably intertwined in the case of the pregnant woman-conceptus
relationship. He defends Roe not as a matter simply of bodily
autonomy, but instead as allowing the woman a reasonable oppor-
tunity to decide "whether she will enter into a physical and emotional
symbiosis with the fetus-infant and, more generally, into a love
relationship of parenting."3" Focusing on the intensity and the
depth of commitment required by that relationship, he argues that
298. See infra notes 325-26 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
300. Goldstein's work is not self-consciously aligned with relational feminism, although
he does mention Gilligan. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 136, at 36.
301. Id. at 47.
302. Id. at 54.
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"[l]ove is generally thought to be outside the competence of the
state",:30
3
The commitment of psyche and soma of motherhood, the
inner strength and capacity that allows a woman to mother,
the grace required by a demanding child of gargantuan
loving (and subsequently, hating) proportions, all belong to
the realm of free will. Not the self-definitional aspect alone
but the givingness of intimate association requires freedom.
... [T]he extraordinary demands of primary love-to be
completely used as a taken-for-granted indestructible
maternal environment-are such that the consent of the
caregiver is necessary for her active participation.3 4
Goldstein explains that there are limits to what the state can
coerce. For example, although the state can compel a husband and
wife to remain together by prohibiting divorce, it cannot force them
to care for each other. While adults may be able to find alternative
sources of love and acceptance (for example, in children, friends,
community), infants (and a fortiori conceptuses) lack such capacity
and must depend on mother for care. Yet the state cannot command
mother-love. Assuming that human life requires more than mere
satisfaction of bodily needs and depends on some "concrete, rock-
bottom form of human interaction," Goldstein concludes that "[t]his
psychosoma need is a fact that sets an absolute limit to government
coercion.,
305
303. Id. at 55.
304. Id. at 55-56 (emphasis added). Goldstein points out that, in our society in which
kinship ties are generally weak and a woman's social status is not enhanced by
motherhood, "choice may be an important source of commitment, and privacy the
protection that may encourage personal involvement in wise family arrangements." Id.
He further argues that the motives to engage in intercourse hardly "include the kind of
deep, complex, and realistic wish for and commitment to a child on which society or a
child would want to rely. The claim of obligation from intercourse denigrates what a
mother gives and what a fetus-infant needs." Id at 57.
305. Id. at 57-58. Those infants whose enormous needs are met with "a degree of
intolerable ambivalence, hostility, or nonacceptance ... may grow ill in mind and body";
some may physically survive only to suffer deeply inside or "to inflict the lovelessness of
their origins on others," while some may simply wither and die. Id. at 58. According to
Noddings,
[m]any researchers-among them, Sanger, Montagu, and Wengraf-present
evidence that even the fetus is affected by the attitude of acceptance or rejection
by its mother. A review of the undesirable effects that may be induced in
children, both prenatal and postnatal, by maternal attitudes of rejection can be
found in Edward Pohiman's discussion on birth planning.
NODDINGS, CARING supra note 20, at 67-68 (citing M.F. ASHLEY MONTAGU, PRENATAL
INFLUENCES (1962); EDWARD POHLMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BIRTH PLANNING (1969);
4 THE SIXTH INTERNATIONAL NEo-MALTHUSIAN AND BIRTH CONTROL CONFERENCE:
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Goldstein therefore questions what it really means for the
government to assert that it is seeking to protect its interest in
potential life. He contends that the "state cannot assure the survival
and growth of infants any more than it can command good poetry.
There must be an intervening act of human grace and creativity."3,
Goldstein realizes, however, that not every child carried unwillingly
to term will be neglected, abused, and damaged-although there is
reason to believe that such children may be at greater fisk 3 -- for
many women will come to care for their infants in any event. Instead,
he argues that
[i]n using coercion to discourage abortion, governments do
not achieve their aim directly, but rather exploit the good
grace of many women to love their babies and to suffer and
transcend their ambivalence in procreative communities
whose existence, membership, or size is not of their own
choosing. But the power to exploit women who would
otherwise choose abortion should not be confused with the
power to protect potential human life. That is a "power"
THE RELIGIOUS AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF BIRTH CONTROL (Margaret Sanger ed., 1926);
FRITZ WENGRAF, PSYCHOSOMATIC APPROACH TO GYNECOLOGY AND OBSTETRICS
(1953)). Furthermore, the causal effects appear to derive more from attitude than from
observable behavior (in the form of childrearing practices). Id. at 68 (citing R.R. SEARS
ET AL., PATTERNS OF CHILD REARING (1957); E.S. Schaefer & R.Q. Bell, Patterns of
Attitudes Toward Child Rearing and the Family, 54 J. OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 391 (1957);
Gregory Zilboorg, The Clinical Issues of Postpartum Psychopathological Reactions, 73 AM.
J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 308 (1957)).
306. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 136, at 58.
307. JUDGES, supra note 90, at 81.
[Anti-abortion advocates have argued that] abortion has adverse effects on
surviving children-by weakening maternal ties, by fostering a societal attitude
that children are "expendable," and by leaving them with a profound sense of
insecurity about their own survival. Some... also contend that Roe has not
mitigated the problems of unwanted children, out-of-wedlock births, and child
neglect and abuse; to the contrary, each of those problems has become worse
since 1973.
The assumption underlying these arguments is open to question. While
liberal abortion policy may not solve the problems of unwed motherhood,
teenage pregnancy, child abuse, neglect, and abandonment (that abortion could
do so has never been at the heart of the pro-choice argument anyway), which
result from a combination of factors, it is difficult to see how prohibiting abortion
by itself would do so. It is especially hard to believe that restrictions on abortion
would notably improve parents' care and commitment for their children. To the
contrary, several European studies indicate that the children resulting from
unwanted pregnancies are at significantly higher risk for psychosocial problems
during their developmental years-delinquency, inferior school performance, and
treatment for nervous and psychosomatic disorders.
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that is confined to the one who makes a personal commit-
ment to the child.3"
According to Goldstein, Roe allows the "dyad's adult
constituent"-the only part of the dyadic unit able to make and
implement decisions-a reasonable period of time within which to
resolve her ambivalence and to decide whether to enter into the
symbiotic relationship of pregnancy and parenthood.) 9 He further
develops the relational aspects of abortion rights in responding to the
anti-abortion rights argument that adoption is the "nonviolent
alternative," and he emphasizes that the relational "fullness of
motherhood" (including the extreme intimacy of gestation) produces
an emotional fusion that strengthens upon birth."' A coercive
policy of substituting adoption for abortion, by contrast, would
institute as an accepted norm the tearing of the dyadic relation
formed during pregnancy.31
Goldstein also confronts the main liberal objection to com-
munitarianism, and, implicitly, the anti-relationalist's worry about
relational feminism: that it "strengthen[s] the state's claim for
imposing a particular vision of the good on the uncomprehending or
resisting citizen. . ,, Goldstein describes a more " 'liberal'
reading" of that position, which offers a citizen a richer self-descrip-
tion so "that [she] may deepen [her] self-comprehension and thereby
make possible an enlargement and fulfillment of [her] identity
308. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 136, at 59.
309. Id. at 71.
310. Id at 66. Goldstein writes:
The physical evolution of pregnancy points the way toward further intimacy with
the infant to be: the tender soreness of the breasts, enlarging for suckling; the
body's broadening, suggesting the offspring's passage through to the outside
world; the butterfly flutterings of the newly quickened fetus, drawing the inner
designs that only the woman knows.... The woman's experience of pregnancy
and anticipation of motherhood in the last trimester, as well as hormonal
changes, have typically led to a deep self-absorption that she can make available
to her newborn. Through this powerful identification with the fetus within and
then with the infant who "at first seems like a part of herself," women in health
achieve a very powerful sense "for what the infant needs." This "primary
maternal preoccupation" forms her predisposition for symbiotic attachment.
Id. at 66-67 (footnotes omitted). Goldstein also voices practical doubts about the adequacy
of adoption services (or the availability of communal care) in our society. Id. at 179 n.68.
311. As Goldstein explains, "[t]hat state policy would now arise within a cultural logic
of relationship that is premised on separation and not attachment, and would depend on
the alienation of a woman from her generative body, of her self from the offspring she
brings into being. Id. at 68 (footnote omitted).
312. Id. at 77.
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through greater participation with others in a common com-
munity. '
313
In contrast to the liberal model of a thin self, which purports
neutrally to protect women from unchosen ends (such as mother-
hood), however arbitrary such choice may be, Goldstein offers a
different model of a "woman of character, a thickly conceived
self' ' 314 She
has substantial reasons for choosing whether to parent,
reasons that relate deeply to her core self-in-relation and her
generative purposes, to her attachments and the procreative
community of which she may. already be a part-as well as
reasons that relate deeply to the potential person that would
develop out of a constitutive attachment to her.315
Research indicates that the abortion decision for most women is
indeed a complex one based on a constellation of factors.16
Women who choose abortion usually have weighed various aspects of
their ability to sustain a caring relationship with the infant-to-be and
the impact of motherhood on other relationships and responsibilities
in their lives. 317 Because abortion involves such an intricate web of
313. Id.
314. Id. at 78.
315. Id.
316. One study examined data from 1,900 abortion patients. Several results stand out.
First, for most women the decision to have an abortion is complex and rests on more than
one factor. Many women cited three to five reasons, and some listed up to nine. Among
even the small percentage of women whose pregnancy resulted from rape or incest, 95%
reported at least one additional reason for the decision to abort. Six factors were
mentioned most frequently: concern about how having a baby would change the woman's
life (76% gave this as a reason), inability to afford a child (68%), problems in the
relationship or not wanting to be a single parent (51%), not wanting others to know that
the woman was pregnant or sexually active (31%), and not being mature or old enough
for a child (30% of the sample, but most common among the youngest patients). One
quarter of the women said they had all the children they wanted or had grown-up children,
and 23% gave as a reason their partner's wishes that they have an abortion. When asked
to rank the reasons in order of importance to their ultimate decision, the women in the
sample most frequently cited not being able to afford a child and not being ready (equally
so). The study also found that race and poverty were not significantly related to any of
the reasons. See Aida Torres & Jacqueline Darroch Forrest, Why Do Women Have
Abortions?, 20 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 169, 170 (1988).
317. See supra note 316. Goldstein's model, however, is not drifting toward an
argument in favor of a state "choice monitor." No state official (or other third person, for
that matter) has access to or the capacity to integrate the "complex conscious and
unconscious motivations" bearing on the woman's abortion decision. Both Goldstein and
Noddings do express qualified support for some form of informed consent, but their
position bears little similarity to the coercive, hostile system upheld by the Supreme Court
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). See infra part VI.B.
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conscious and unconscious motivations, only the woman ultimately is
in a position to make decisions concerning the commitment of her
mother-love. The state cannot realistically perform that function any
more than it can reassure a baby crying in the night.318
D. Care and connection in constitutional right
I have discussed above how a noninterpretive approach to the
Constitution, which considers the problem of abortion as appropriate
for judicial consideration, can be regarded as consistent with relational
thinking. The Court has addressed the uncertainty inherent in
interpreting vaguely defined constitutional values in a changing world
"by increasingly relying on a balancing methodology that purportedly
accounts for the indeterminacy of the enterprise."3"' It therefore is
appropriate to examine the assumptions about the nature of moral
thinking that are embedded in the balance-in both the Court's
identification and its weighing of interests. This Article contends that
inclusion of a more relational, caring perspective in publicly recog-
nized norms would enrich the process of constitutional balancing.
Moreover, if the difference theorists are correct that a relational
orientation is exclusively or largely female, then it is appropriate to
consider its implications for that constitutional issue of singular
importance to women.
The foregoing accounts of care and relation can provide support
at several key points for constitutional claims to abortion rights.32
First, relationalism lends moral weight to claims based on
constitutional values of privacy and autonomy. Second, relationalism
reinforces and elaborates equality-based claims. In this way,
relationalism supplements rather than supplants the interests to be
318. The implications of state efforts to channel or to have an impact on the decision
making process, for example through informed consent and waiting period laws, are
considered below. See infra part VI.B.
319. David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional Ad-
judication, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 641, 642 (1994); see also id. at 645 ("In the twentieth
century, balancing has swiftly overtaken formalism as the preferred method of
constitutional adjudication across the entire constitutional spectrum."). The topic of
constitutional balancing has inspired several symposia. See, e.g., Conference on Compelling
Government Interests: The Mystery of Constitutional Analysis, 55 ALB. L. REV. 535, 535-
761 (1992).
320. Application of relationalism in this context is care-like, not true care, because it
must be impartial. I am not suggesting that the courts care about a particular woman for
the person that she is, the way one would care for a dear friend. The courts could,
however, interpret her rights as though they cared about someone in her position-i.e.,
impersonally. See supra part IV.B.
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weighed in the constitutional balance. This project thus does not try
to identify novel constitutional values; rather, it seeks to understand
familiar ones from a caring perspective so that they can better
represent the political community they serve. 2
1. Relationalism and autonomy
Relationalism in several important respects supports autonomy-
and privacy-based claims to constrain coercive state impositions on
liberty. Generally, it can help to fill the ethical gap that is a frequent
target of criticism of such claims by showing that preservation of
others' autonomy is a form of care. The stereotypical terms of both
difference theory and the abortion debate describe an abstract, inert,
and atomistic conception of privacy rights at one extreme and the
smothering interference of relation at the other.3' It is a mistake,
though, to assume that a caring relationship necessarily confines the
one who is cared for. To the contrary, one who really cares naturally
wants the other to pursue his or her own projects and to flourish. 3'
Under an ethic of care, individuals are not indifferently left to shift
for themselves like so many head of cattle on the range. Instead, the
one who is cared for "is free to be more fully himself in the caring
relation."'324 The ethic of care thus recognizes the positive value
inherent in a relation that allows the other to flourish on his or her
own terms. Autonomy is not seen negatively through caring eyes as
simply the absence of a justification for interference against a baseline
assumption of apathetic atomism. Nor is relation an excuse for
meddlesome, self-serving manipulation.
More specifically, relationalism supports privacy-based defenses
of abortion in several ways. First, its conception of the protection of
self-determination and self-fulfillment as a positive value-something
we ought to want for others-has special significance in the abortion
context. For example, Gilligan's abortion study describes how
reproductive choice is crucial to a woman's moral development as she
confronts the dilemma of unwanted pregnancy.321 Of course
321. This view reflects Gilligan's position that relational thinking does not supplant
Kohlbergian thinking, but rather helps to complete the picture. See GILLIGAN, supra note
5, at 18-22.
322. For a thorough description of this caricature in the difference debate, see McClain,
supra note 14.
323. See NODDINGS, CARING, supra note 20, at 72.
324. Id. at 73.
325. GILLIGAN, supra note 5, at 70-105. Gilligan explains:
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Gilligan is not recommending that women get themselves pregnant so
they can realize the personal growth potential of reproductive choice.
Rather, she is suggesting that unwanted pregnancy brings a woman
face-to-face with her responsibilities of care for self and others and
with society's expectations and role definitions for her.326
Second, the consistency between respect for another's decisional
autonomy and concern for his or her well-being has a strong empirical
basis. Bruce Winick, reviewing principles of cognitive and social
psychology, has demonstrated that
there is considerable psychological value in allowing people
to make choices for themselves.... Exercising choice and
experiencing a sense of control over important events in
their lives may be an essential ingredient in producing
mature, self-determining, well-adjusted, happy, and suc-
cessful members of society. In contrast, when government
forces people to act in certain ways, denying them the ability
to choose such conduct for themselves, the results may be
counterproductive. 27
These conclusions about "[a]llowing individuals to be self-determining
in important areas of their lives-for example, in the areas of health,
[T]he conflict precipitated by the pregnancy catches up issues that are critical to
psychological development. These issues pertain to the worth of the self in
relation to others, the claiming of the power to choose, and the acceptance of
responsibility for choice. By provoking a confrontation with choice, the abortion
crisis can become a "very auspicious time. You can use the pregnancy as a sort
of learning, a teeing-off point, which makes it useful in a way." The same sense
of a possibility for growth in this crisis is expressed by other women, who arrive
through this encounter with choice at a new understanding of relationships and
speak of their sense of "a new beginning," a chance "to take control of my life."
Id. at 94-95.
326. Id. at 95. In Gilligan's words:
The willingness to express and to take responsibility for judgment stems from a
recognition of the psychological costs of indirect action, to self and to others and
thus to relationships. Responsibility for care then includes both self and other,
and the injunction not to hurt, freed from conventional constraints, sustains the
ideal of care while focusing the reality of choice.
Id.
327. Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL.
L. REV. 1705,1755, 1767 (1992). For collections of essays on "therapeutic jurisprudence,"
that is, the study of law's impact on the psychological well-being of the individuals whom
it affects, see THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW As A THERAPEUTIC AGENT
(David B. Wexler ed., 1990); DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1991); Symposium, Therapeutic Jurisprudence:
Restructuring Mental Disability Law, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 623 (1993). For an
argument that the value of decisional autonomy with respect to risk ought to be taken into
account in formulation of tort policy, see Donald P. Judges, Of Rocks and Hard Places:
The Value of Risk Choice, 42 EMoRY L.J. 1 (1993).
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education, occupation, and family" 3 -- apply especially to abortion
rights.
Third, focus on relation supports the conclusion that the woman
is the appropriate decision maker. Goldstein's description of mother-
love argues that, in a very real sense, she is the only decision maker
(on behalf of the symbiotic dyad). He suggests that (1) the relevant
decision is whether to make the psychic and physical commitment of
motherhood, and (2) perforce only the woman is in a position to
make it. Furthermore, Gilligan's abortion study (as well as other
research) illustrates the deeply contextual nature of the abortion
decision-a decision which involves a complex web of responsibilities
and relationships, of hurt and of care, the strands of which all
converge on the pregnant woman. Only she is in a position to feel
and to balance the tug of each thread.
Fourth, relationalism's concern for the unwanting pregnant
woman as a suffering person in need of care supports a legal
injunction against interference with her choice. Care-like concern
means receptivity to the practical implications of restrictive abortion
laws. I have already touched on the actual, severe harm to unwanting
pregnant women that such laws inflict and how an ethic of care would
constrain the imposition of such harm. Justice Blackmun's opinion for
the Court in Roe demonstrates that sensitivity to the harm inflicted on
women by unwanted pregnancy and by restrictive abortion laws has
a place in the Court's constitutional balance.329
Anti-abortion legislation implicates an ethic of care in another
way as well. John Hart Ely has pointed. out that no fetuses sit in the
legislatures;3" he might have added that a conceptus is no one's
actual constituent and a member of no interest group. Ely argued
against abortion rights under his representation-reinforcing theory of
328. Winick, supra note 327, at 1766.
329. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying
this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable
even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may
force upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be
imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also
the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is
the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically and
otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties
and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.
IL at 155.
330. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.. 920, 933 (1973). For discussion of Ely's argument, see infra note 353.
1420 [Vol. 73
TAKING CARE SERIOUSLY
noninterpretive judicial review. I want to emphasize the relational
implications of the fact that all anti-abortion legislation is sponsored
and enacted by post-natal people. Whether sincerely well-intentioned
or not, such laws constitute the enactment into positive law of the
discomfort some people personally feel about abortion. Abortion
restrictions force the unwanting pregnant woman to bear the burden
of that discomfort by exploiting her capacity for mother-love.3 ' In
relational terms, those people have rejected motivational displacement
with respect to the pregnant woman, have failed to receive her
suffering, and therefore have ceased to care for her. Instead, they
have used the law to attempt to force the pregnant woman to take
care of them by relieving their pain at the thought of her abortion.
Roe steps in here. It firmly reminds such people that not they,
but the pregnant woman, requires care-at least within the limits of
Roe's compromise-if she is to be allowed to flourish on her own
terms (as one who cares would want her to do). As Noddings
explains, the caring person would greet the pregnant woman with
compassion, acceptance, and help in her distress-at least until the
relational potential of the conceptus to the community reaches a
compelling threshold of concreteness. Roe requires the minimally
ethical, care-like response of at least not making matters worse for the
woman up to that point. It thus protects the "privacy" and
"autonomy" of the pregnant woman in this situation-at least until
viability-by insulating her from being forced to become the caretaker
not only of the conceptus but also of people who are uncomfortable
with abortion.
2. Relation and equality
The inclusion of relation also provides much-needed support for
equality-based claims to abortion rights, which, like Thomson's,
typically argue that abortion prohibitions "impose upon women
burdens of unwanted pregnancy that men do not bear.""33  The
prevailing constitutional model of equality has had difficulty coming
to terms with pregnancy. That model requires identification of a
recognizable class, a showing of some kind of intent, and, in the
gender context, resolution of the sameness-difference conundrum. If
331. See supra part V.C. Restrictive abortion laws thus place on the woman greater
demands of caring--of the most intensely interpersonal kind-than Roe's generalized and
more abstract requirement of care-like restraint by the community.
332. Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955,1016
(1984).
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pregnancy is regarded as "unique" or "different" in a shallow way,
then the Court is inclined to reason as it did in Geduldig v. Aiello
when it upheld denial of benefits to pregnant women: "While it is
true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that
every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based
classification. 333
Almost twenty years later, the Court extended Geduldig's
reasoning from denial of a benefit to active and sometimes violent
harm. In Bray v. Alexandria Women's Clinic,31 the Court ruled that
a conspiracy to preclude women from obtaining abortions did not
involve discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1871. The Court
reasoned that
opposition to voluntary abortion cannot possibly be con-
sidered ...an irrational surrogate for opposition to (or
paternalism towards) women. Whatever one thinks of
abortion, it cannot be denied that there are common and
respectable reasons for opposing it, other than hatred of or
condescension toward (or indeed any view at all concerning)
women as a class-as is evident from the fact that men and
women are on both sides of the issue, just as men and
333. 417 U.S. 484,496 n.20 (1974). In that case, a state employee benefit plan covered
all medical conditions except pregnancy, id. at 489, including male-only procedures such
as prostatectomies, id at 499-500 (Brennan, L, dissenting). Relegating the issue to a mere
footnote, the Court concluded that the policy did not even involve a gender-based
classification because it simply distinguished between "pregnant women" and "non-
pregnant persons." Id. at 496 n.20. Presumably gender would have been at least
implicated had the policy drawn a distinction between pregnant women and pregnant men.
As Deborah Rhode has observed, "the Court's characterization assumed what should have
been at issue and made the assumption from a male reference point. Men's physiology
set the standard against which women's claims appeared merely 'additional.' " Rhode,
supra note 81, at 208.
Prevailing notions of equality also have failed to recognize the potentially disadvan-
taging effect of acts that attempt to treat pregnancy the "same" as other conditions. For
example, Deborah Rhode has described how modem maternity leave policies,
implemented following enactment of the sameness-based federal Pregnancy Discrimination
Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k) (1994), (which constituted the legislative response to
Geduldig, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)), have prompted a schism among feminists concerning
whether "special" treatment of pregnancy is appropriate. On the one hand, treating
pregnancy the same as other medical conditions (which could result in a no-leave policy,
additionally burdening pregnant women) ignores the reality that men and women are not
equally situated with respect to pregnancy: "Why require females' assimilation to a male
norm rather than fair recognition of their separate capacities?" Rhode, supra note 81, at
209. On the other hand, "[w]hile pregnancy is in some important sense unique, stressing
that uniqueness has often exacerbated women's economic disadvantage and the stereotypes
underlying it." Id.
334. 113 S. Ct. 753, 760 (1993).
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women are on both sides of petitioners' unlawful
demonstrations.
335
In this view, the relationship between pregnancy and gender is,
without more, purely coincidental and irrelevant (as is the
conspirators' deliberate choice of violent, intimidating, and unlawful
means). What matters is the irrationality of the actor's thoughts, not
the nature or context of the harm that the actor inflicts.
Something is missing from a model of equality that fails to
recognize the discrimination inherent in actions (especially violent
ones) that manifestly and inevitably hurt women based on their most
intrinsically female characteristic, even if some women are spared and
some are among the perpetrators, and even if reason can be deployed
to explain the harm done.336 The problem lies in the Court's focus
on an abstract conception of the intentions of the actor, which allows
the kind of formalistic moves evident in Geduldig and Bray.337
Inclusion of a relational perspective would shift that focus. In
general terms, relationalism's pragmatic concern with real-life harm
would demand more from an equality norm than good intentions: Its
observation that caring begins by receiving the other would emphasize
certain effects of the actor's conduct on that other. One effect of
particular concern to an equality norm that encompassed relation and
connection would be on the other's sense of being excluded from the
community.
The (albeit fitful) appearance of traces of these themes in the
school desegregation cases shows that the implications of a relational
or caring perspective for constitutional equality are generalizable
335. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)). Justice Scalia's
opinion overlooked, among many other things, the fact that Operation Rescue targets
clinics, not procedures; it prevents women from receiving a range of services in addition
to voluntary abortion. Furthermore, his imprecise terminology conceals a potential hole
in his logic. It is not clear what Justice Scalia means by "voluntary" abortion. He may
mean "elective" abortion (i.e., at the woman's request and not for reasons of impaired
maternal health or fetal disease) as opposed to "therapeutic abortion." See generally F.
GARY CUNNINGHAM ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 501 (18th ed. 1989) (explaining the
distinction between elective and therapeutic abortions). If so, he may well be mistaken
in his implicit assumption that many of the conspirators would find the distinction morally
relevant. Their actions at least raise the inference that they are quite prepared, for the
sake of their cause, to make large sacrifices of the health and well-being of pregnant
women. The willingness to write off the well-being of an entire class of persons at least
raises an inference of disdain for its members.
336. See infra part VI.D.
337. For a critique of the Court's intent test, see Donald P. Judges, Bayonets for the
Wounded- Constitutional Paradigms and Disadvantaged Neighborhoods, 19 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 599, 617-20 (1992).
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beyond problems centered around sex discrimination or pregnancy.
The doctrine of "separate but equal" is the apotheosis of heartless
(indeed, mean-spirited) formalism masquerading as equality. One of
the striking aspects of Brown was the Court's sensitivity to the very
real harm being done to the black school children and recognition
that their feeling of being excluded from the community was
constitutionally relevant: "To separate them from others of similar
age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling
of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." 38 The
Court's ensuing struggle with school desegregation, however, reflects
both the limits of an equality jurisprudence in which the Court loses
sight of such concerns and the Court's deep ambivalence about
making a constitutional commitment to a concept of equality that
does include them.339 Care involves not just a receiving of the
other, but also motivational displacement-an enduring commitment
to act (or not to act, as appropriate) to relieve the other's suf-
fering.3
40
Application of relationalism to the abortion context also would
go beyond a formal equality-in this case "different but equal"-to
focus on actual inclusion and harm. As discussed above, Thomson's
equality premise-that abortion prohibitions unjustifiably impose a
duty of care on women that they do not impose on anyone
else-founders on the Court's sameness-difference approach because
it fails to explain why pregnant women are not "different." A
338. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
339. The federal courts did not begin to make any real progress with school
desegregation until the Court made a commitment to act by repudiating the inertial
consequences of "all deliberate speed" and "freedom of choice" plans in favor of a range
of flexible affirmative remedial measures that "promises to work and to work now." See
generally Judges, supra note 337, at 623-27 (describing the succession of desegregation
cases). The Court further expanded its receptivity to the harm being done by recognizing
a prima facie case based on liberal presumptions tying the existence of segregation to
government policy. Id. Eventually, however, the Court's ambivalence came to dilute its
commitment. Although the Court extended desegregation to northern schools, and later
reaffirmed the availability of sweeping equitable powers in federal district courts, its
imposition of a district-specific intent requirement and its upholding of school financing
systems based on local:property taxes (which create large, often racially correlated
interdistrict disparities in funding) have substantially compromised the achievement of
equality. Id.
340. See supra part IV.B.1. Not surprisingly, the Court's opinions in this direction have
been characterized by an increased formalism and dedication to abstractions and a




relatively thin version of relationalism would undermine Thomson's
equality premise by contending that the supremely intimate pregnant
woman-conceptus relation imposes a singularly compelling moral
obligation of care and thus justifies the differential treatment of
pregnant women. Interference with abortion could be seen from this
perspective as not irrationally and invidiously directed at women and
therefore not to violate a rigid, intent-based equality norm.
Real care, however, would construct the problem not simply as
one of difference but also as one of exclusion and harm."4 I have
argued elsewhere that the Civil War Amendments collectively
describe a "caste-abolition principle," which would provide a remedy
for conditions or actions that tend to disadvantage one group sys-
tematically and severely enough to create or to perpetuate a kind of
second-class citizenship?"4 This principle would consider the context
of the group's real position in society, rather than simply the
members' most visible characteristics (skin color, sex). Moreover, it
would synthesize individualism and relationism into an autonomy-
respecting form of care that would recognize our intrinsic worth as
self-defined individuals, would respect our autonomy to find our own
meaning and fulfillment in life, and would also respond with care to
the social injustice of large and identifiable inequalities in the
distribution of power and opportunity.
This principle has its historical roots in America's revolution to
abolish an especially heinous and overt system of caste. The core
attributes of that social institution were the utter dehumanization of
its victims by the systematic domination of key aspects of their lives,
a crushing deprivation of their personal integrity and dignity, and
their effective exclusion from the remainder of society. Slavery
demonstrates that the central feature of such a system is its effect, not
the intentions of its authors; neither actual malice toward the victims
nor irrationality are necessary elements of such a system. Instead,
"[t]he dehumanization process was less a conscious and deliberate
attempt on the part of the slaveholders to deprive the slaves of their
341. With respect to equality, such a perspective would understand the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection to promise equal care-that is, equal receiving of the other
and commitment to act.
342. Judges, supra note 337, at 659-82. Other writers also have considered the
constitutional significance of caste. In addition to the works cited in Judges, supra note
337, see Paul R. Dimond, The Anti-Caste Principle-Toward a Constitutional Standard
Toward Review of Race Cases, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 5-16 (1983).
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humanity than it was a natural consequence of the system." 343 The
problem is not so much, as the Court's intent requirement assumes,
that such a system offers a vehicle for the expression of pre-existing
hatred (although at least a kind of malignant indifference may be a
necessary component of so ruthless a system). Rather, the key is the
systematic appropriation of the "self" of other human beings so that
they may be exploited to advance their oppressors' goals, whether
rational (such as economic advantage) or not.3 4
Relational application of this principle to abortion would involve
a deeper understanding of the implications of unwanted pregnancy for
the woman's relation to the community, herself, and the unwanted
conceptus. The important relational issue is not the reductionistic
syllogism portrayed by anti-relationalists and others: If relation is
good, then close relation must be better, and therefore the state is
343. STANLEY FELDSTEIN, ONCE A SLAVE: THE SLAVES' VIEW OF SLAVERY 41
(1971). Feldstein observed:
The basic purpose of the slave system was surely not a grand design to
perpetuate a horrendous crime on the black race. Notwithstanding the
psychological motivations that are the source of racial prejudice and, later on, the
fear of a black revolt against the masters, the system was designed primarily for
its economic advantages to the masters. Nevertheless, in order to perpetuate the
institution, and simply to make it work, it was essential that a strict code of rules,
regulations, punishments, and controls be established and followed. The
enforcement of these rules resulted in what I call the slave's dehumanization-his
eventual inability to fulfill his natural human desires, needs, instincts and to
maintain his integrity and dignity.
Id. at 41-42 (emphasis added).
344. For decades the received wisdom concerning American slavery included the beliefs
that it was economically inefficient and in steep economic decline on the eve of the Civil
War, and that slave agriculture was less efficient than freehold agriculture. One of the
stereotypic assumptions, sometimes expressed and sometimes not, has been that
agricultural slaves were typically averse to hard work and were unproductive. The work
of cliometricians, however, has challenged these propositions concerning the efficiency of
slavery. E.g., ROBERT W. FOGEL & STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS: THE
ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY 191-201 (1974). Fogel and Engerman
concluded:
Slavery was not a system irrationally kept in existence by plantation owners who
failed to perceive or were indifferent to their best economic interests. The
purchase of a slave was generally a highly profitable investment.... The slave
system was not economically moribund on the eve of the Civil War.... Slave
agriculture was not inefficient compared with free agriculture.... The typical
slave field hand was not lazy, inept, and unproductive. On the average he was
harder-working and more efficient than his white counterpart.
Id. at 4-5.
To account for some white supremacist attitudes, Nicholas Lemann has suggested that
"people can create social systems first and then invent ideas that will fulfill their need to
feel that the world as it exists makes sense." NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND:
THE GREAT BLACK MIORATION AND How IT CHANGED AMERICA 24 (1991).
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morally justified (and perhaps obligated) to use the law's force to
coerce the closest of all relations. Real care is not some mindless
connection-maximizing machine that is blind to the consequences of
a particular relation. Some relationships are quite destructive." 5
Care requires concern for the content, quality, and effect of the
relation.
Goldstein's analysis points toward one way that this real caring
concern translates into a constitutional objection based on the caste-
abolition principle, especially if the abortion restriction results in the
woman carrying the pregnancy to term.' He explains that when
the state prohibits abortion, it effectively exploits the likelihood that
the woman will form a relationship of mother-love with her off-
spring.' In effect, anti-abortion laws appropriate a woman's
quintessentially feminine characteristic-her capacity for mother-
love-into the means of her own exploitation. As Goldstein explains,
pregnancy involves nothing less than the transformation of the woman
into a somatically and psychically different entity-the pregnant
woman-conceptus dyad.' When the state coerces a woman to
enter that relationship, it effectively usurps her personal sovereignty
by making her very being, not only her body, an instrument of the
state's purposes.' 49 Society's willingness to coerce such a fundamen-
tal alteration in the woman's subjectivity, and concomitantly to
frustrate her ability to flourish on her own terms, not only violates her
autonomy but also effects a kind of existential domination that
345. After all, the master and slave in some respects shared a very close, albeit unequal
relation (as do a loving parent and child, as do an egregiously abusive parent and child).
346. For an argument that abortion prohibitions violate the Thirteenth Amendment,
see Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion,
84 Nw. U. L. REV. 480 (1990). Koppelman focuses primarily on abortion prohibitions as
forced labor and on their violation of the woman's physical sovereignty. Id. at 483-84. He
relies on the Thirteenth Amendment to establish a stronger textual basis than privacy-
based claims and to avoid the difference problem inherent in equality-based claims. Id.
at 493-511. In some respects Koppelman's effort to avoid reliance on the Fourteenth
Amendment resembles Akhil Amar's Thirteenth Amendment-based claim to minimal
subsistence. See Akhil R. Amar, Forty Acres and A Mule: A Republican Theory of
Minimal Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 37, 40 (1990). My emphasis here is
on the relational and intrapsychic implications of abortion prohibitions. I explain in
Bayonets why all three Civil War Amendments form the basis for the caste-abolition
principle. For one thing, much more can be involved in the creation and perpetuation of
a caste than involuntary labor-including "labor" in the sense of gestation and parturition.
Judges, supra note 337, at 677-700.
347. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 136, at 59.; see also supra part V.C.
348. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 136, at 47; see supra text accompanying note 301.
349. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 136, at 47-59; see supra notes 301-11 and accom-
panying text.
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amounts to a serious diminishment of her status as a complete human
being and an equal citizen." Coerced maternity is especially
insidious because it changes the woman from the inside out into a
different person, not of her own definition, who is more susceptible
to being used by the state to serve its ends.351
This process-dehumanization for the purposes of
exploitation-implicates the caste-abolition principle regardless of the
state's motives; the principle's focus on special kinds of effect
illustrates the shortcoming of the Court's preoccupation with
irrationality and animus. The caste system of slavery-and contem-
porary conditions and actions that tend to recreate or to perpetuate
analogous conditions of severe disadvantage, powerlessness, dis-
counted citizenship, and exclusion-violate the principle even if the
dominant party has entirely rational motives and sincerely believes
that such a system is in the oppressed party's best interests, and even
350. Slave narratives describe an analogous process. See Judges, supra note 337, at 677-
82.
351. Radical feminism's perspective on pregnancy and intercourse, although cast in
autonomy terms, supports and elaborates this theme. One need not believe that Andrea
Dworkin, for example, speaks for all women, or that she accurately captures all women's
experience of intercourse and pregnancy, to accept the value of her perspective with
respect to unwanted pregnancy. According to Robin West, the
danger an unwanted fetus poses is not to the body's security at all [as masculine
jurisprudence would construct the problem], but rather to the body's integrity.
Similarly, the woman's fear is not that.., she will die, but that she will cease to
be or never become a self. The danger of unwanted pregnancy is the danger of
invasion by the other, not of annihilation by the other.
West, Jurisprudence & Gender, supra note 7, at 60. According to the radical feminist view,
"[tjhe material, sporadic violation of woman's body occasioned by pregnancy and
intercourse implies an existential and pervasive violation of her privacy, integrity and life
projects." Id. at 35. Wanted and unwanted pregnancy, and consensual as well as
nonconsensual intercourse, irreparably invade and intrude, rendering impossible existential
wholeness. Id at 41. Men's autonomy claim is to be left alone to pursue one's own
projects. Women's autonomy claim under radical feminism is to be left alone "to be the
sort of creature who might have and then pursue one's 'own' ends." Id. at 42. It is really
a claim to individuation, which is an existential precondition to assertion of a claim to
autonomy.
West concludes that the feminist project is to explain
the harms and dangers of invasive pregnancy. We need to explain that this harm
has nothing to do with invading the privacy of the doctor-patient relationship, or
the privacy of the family, or the privacy of the marriage; but that rather, it has
to do with invading the physical boundaries of the body and the psychic
boundaries of a life.
Id. at 66. Masculine jurisprudence's misunderstanding of this perspective, and correspon-
ding effort to pose the problem as the kind of threat men understand, has as its practical
consequence "that women are objectified-regarded as creatures who can't be harmed."
Id. at 59-60.
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if both parties develop a close personal relationship.3 " It is objec-
tionable regardless of whether it fits into the Court's difference-based
notions of equality. Similarly, abortion restrictions violate the
principle even if they are motivated not by the kind of misogynist
malice required by the Court in Bray, but simply by discomfort (albeit
sometimes acutely and deeply felt) with abortion.3 3
The caste-abolition principle suggests another objection to
abortion restrictions. I have elsewhere argued that members of the
economically, politically, and socially marginalized group sometimes
referred to as the "underclass" are subjected to a distinct pattern of
such entrenched and severe disadvantage and exclusion that con-
ditions and actions tending to aggravate or to perpetuate their
352. Indeed, at one time slaves who ran away from their master were diagnosed as
having the mental disorder "drapetomania." Jerome C. Wakefield, The Concept of Mental
Disorder: On the Boundary Between Biological Facts and Social Values, 47 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIsT 373, 373 (1992). See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and
Segregation Before Brown, 1985 DUKE L.J. 624 (discussing science, social science, and the
use of scientific theories in race relations cases).
353. Care forms a necessary element of this equality analysis. The elements of
discreteness and immutability in the Court's equality formula might preclude recognition
of unwanting pregnant women as a "suspect class." John Hart Ely has endorsed
noninterpretive review in cases implicating "participational values" that reinforce
representative democracy, typically in the First Amendment and equal protection areas.
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEw 75
(1980). While expressing sensitivity to the burdens of unwanted pregnancy and women's
politically disadvantaged status, Ely nevertheless believes that the heightened judicial
scrutiny of state abortion laws mandated by Roe v. Wade is not warranted by the
representation-reinforcement principle's limits on noninterpretive review. Ely, supra note
330, at 923.
Ely's analysis is incomplete. For one thing, he fails to consider the possibility of
surrogate representation. Certainly post-natal people who are distressed by the practice
of abortion have an incentive to make fetal survival a political issue. Their representatives
sit in the legislatures and have little difficulty making themselves heard. If anything, the
amplitude of their voice has tended to exceed the proportion of their constituency. For
discussion of the principle of surrogate representation generally, see TRIBE, supra note 128,
at 410-13. For judicial acknowledgement of the principle, see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404-05, 427-29 (1819). For criticism of Ely's limitations on
noninterpretive review as artificial, see PERRY, supra note 145, at 119-22.
Care-based considerations would recognize that unwanting pregnant women are
uniquely vulnerable to the kind of hurt inflicted by abortion regulations. To be sure, they
have some access to the political process; but one might argue, with some force, that
prohibiting abortion might well compromise the ability of at least some of those women
to participate meaningfully in that process. Stopping there, though, would miss the deeper
point that there might be some values beyond representation reinforcement that are
constitutionally protected and some harms that are constitutionally forbidden. The
discussion in the text suggests that such values and harms might be defined by interpreting
the caste-abolition principle through an ethic of care.
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subordination implicate the caste-abolition principle."5 Abortion
restrictions have always hit this group especially hard, and have
simultaneously exploited and contributed to their disadvantage and
powerlessness. The highest abortion rates are among young,
nonwhite, unmarried, and poor women." Contraceptive failure and
teen pregnancy rates are much higher in this group.35 6 Unwanted
parenthood is an important ingredient in the underclass process, in
which single mothers are especially vulnerable to social and economic
disadvantage. 57 It adds more links to the forces that chain the
mother to her underclass status and compounds the disadvantages
confronting her offspring. 8  Moreover, as explained below, factors
that hinder and delay access to abortion disproportionately impact
minorities and economically disadvantaged classes-further ag-
gravating their already distressed health care circumstances.359 Anti-
abortion funding restrictions may effectively make abortion
unavailable to such groups. Finally, economically and socially
354. One example is gross inequality in the distribution of public educational
opportunity, which tends to perpetuate the plight of America's socioeconomic underclass.
See Judges, supra note 337, at 682-702.
355. See JUDGES, supra note 90, at 34-37.
356. See, e.g., Jonathan Crane, Effects of Neighborhoods on Dropping Out of School
and Teenage Childbearing, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 299, 311 (Christopher Jencks &
Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991) ("Childbearing probability is highest by far in the very worst
neighborhoods."); Dennis P. Hogan & Evelyn M. Kitagawa, The Impact of Social Status,
Family Structure, and Neighborhood on the Fertility of Black Adolescents, 90 AM. J. Soc.
825, 846 (1985) (noting that teen pregnancy rates are much higher in most disadvantaged
neighborhoods); Dennis P. Hogan et al., Social and Environmental Factors Influencing
Contraceptive Use Among Black Adolescents, 17 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 165, 167-68 (1985)
(finding contraceptive use much lower in worst neighborhoods).
357. Some indication of the chronic disadvantages facing single mothers can be found
in data on their staggeringly high and persistent over-representation among families below
the poverty line. For the twenty-year period between 1970 and 1990, the percentage of
single-mother families below the poverty line held steady at between 42 to 46%, compared
to a rate of 12 to 15% for all families, 11 to 16% for families with children, and 6 to 8%
for married couples. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED
STATES 1992 460, tbl. 727 (112th ed. 1992).
The picture is even more bleak from the children's perspective. For example, the
poverty rate for children under 18 years of age in a single-mother family was 54.6%
(compared to 10.2% for married couples). Id. at 457 tbl. 719. For children under six years
old the rate was 61% (compared to 12.1% for married couples). Id. The disparity is even
more drastic when race and ethnicity are considered. The poverty rate for children under
six years old in white, single-mother families was 49.9%; for blacks the rate jumped to
69.1%; for Hispanic persons the rate topped 72%. Id.
358. See, e.g., Elijah Anderson, Neighborhood Effects on Teenage Pregnancy, in THE
URBAN UNDERCLASS 375, 382-90 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991).
359. See infra part VI.D.
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disadvantaged women may be especially vulnerable to access-
inhibiting factors that prey on the unsophisticated and distressed.3 °
Cumulatively, these problems create a category of second-class
rights. Economically and socially disadvantaged women are at much
greater risk to choice-defeating governmental policies that the Court
is willing to tolerate. Because their circumstances make them more
dependent on constitutional rights to protect their choice from
interference by the state than are women of independent means (who
often can purchase ways to circumvent state-created obstacles to
abortion), the Court's demotion of the status of abortion rights means
that indigent women are at greater risk of becoming second-class
citizens in the exercise of those rights.
An additional equality-based objection to abortion prohibitions
from a relational perspective is their isolating effect on the pregnant
woman who, in what might be considered an act of existential
heroism, resists the state's efforts to appropriate her being and seeks
an illegal abortion. Abortion prohibitions can make an unwanting
pregnant woman an outsider in her own community by precluding her
from receiving even a basic level of care-the safe, legitimate, normal
medical treatment that she needs-and can force her into the
dangerous and marginal world of criminality. Such laws can turn an
experience that in the best of circumstances involves difficult conflicts
concerning attachment into a nightmare of exclusion and isolation that
can leave enduring scars. The harm may extend beyond the woman's
relationship with the community to her personal relations. If her
family and friends are not supportive, the fact that she must seek her
care covertly and illegally may further strain relations. If they are
supportive, she is forced to the added ethical dilemma of choosing
between involving them in the perilous experience of illegal abortion
and depriving herself of badly needed comfort.361
VI. CARE AND DEFINING THE SCOPE OF ABORTION RIGHTS
So far I have examined some problems in constructing the
question of whether to recognize a constitutional right to abortion as
a gendered conflict between care and justice. In particular I have
endeavored to respond to the anti-relationalist critique that relational
360. See infra notes 435-39 and accompanying text (noting the trial court findings in
Casey).
361. Furthermore, all of these problems are aggravated for disadvantaged women, who
must overcome even more formidable odds and take greater risks to protect their
subjective integrity.
1995] 1431
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
feminism proves to be its own worst enemy in the crucible of the
abortion conflict by suggesting that a richer account of relation and
care can supplement our conception of the constitutional values of
autonomy and equality in support of abortion rights.
The anti-relationalists have missed another important point.
While safe abortion obviously is more readily available now than
during the pre-Roe era, American abortion policy remains seriously
flawed. Those difficulties cannot defensibly be blamed on social
scientists' and legal theorists' study of an ethic of care. To the
contrary, they have arisen at least despite, and in some instances
directly because ot the dominance of a "masculinist," rights-based
approach to abortion. This Part will consider how the Court's
interpretation of abortion rights might be enhanced by inclusion of a
care perspective.
The most salient deficiencies involve inequalities in access to
abortion. Not surprisingly, the burden tends to fall disproportionately
on personally, socially, and economically disadvantaged women. A
woman is more likely to succeed in exercising her "right" to choose
abortion: if she lives in a metropolitan area; has money; has the
support of friends or family; can distinguish a real abortion clinic from
one that is a sham; can withstand personal abuse from the usual
demonstrators at the clinic; happens to have access to a clinic not
targeted for more extreme forms of violence; can afford to miss
several days from school, home, or work; and is self-reliant enough to
resist the state's efforts to enlist her doctor's assistance in dissuading
her. On the other hand, women who happen to: depend on
government-subsidized health care; live in remote or rural areas; are
unsophisticated, young, frightened, alone, or abused; tend to defer to
express and implied medical opinion; and have difficulty being away
from work or home may well wind up unwillingly carrying their
pregnancy to term, or at least suffering needless additional trauma not
endured by their more fortunate sisters.36
If abortion rights are mainly about protecting women's autonomy
to determine for themselves what is in their best interests in such an
intimate and momentous matter, then the Court's approach to
abortion rights is headed in the wrong direction. The foregoing
factors simply distinguish privileged women from disadvantaged
ones-not the right from the wrong but the financially, socially, and
personally weak from the strong. Indeed, considered in terms of their
362. See JUDGES, supra note 90, at 254-57.
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cumulative effect, government actions contributing to this state of
affairs arguably are not even rational in any but the most trivial sense,
and thus frustrate a basic requirement of just law-making. Nor are
these conditions acceptable from a perspective of care. The losers in
this lottery are not being cared for.
Much of this harm has been sanctioned under the "masculinist"
logic of justice that has dominated the Court's abortion-rights cases
for two decades, not a real ethic of care. Yet the Court's efforts to
maintain a facade of reasoned decision-making has become less and
less convincing as a badly divided Court in Casey overruled precedent,
announced and then inconsistently applied a hopelessly indeterminate
new standard, and substantially cut back on abortion rights-all while
extolling the virtues of consistency, certainty, and individual liberty.
An unfortunate side-effect of Casey's tortuous approach has been the
creation of a new, down-sized model of constitutional right, which the
state may deliberately seek to infringe provided it does not do so too
vigorously. The anti-relationalists' faith in rights-talk, considered in
light of their concern for practical results, thus seems curiously
misplaced.
The occasions for judicial involvement in determining the scope
of abortion rights can be grouped into four categories: (1) public
funding of abortion and abortion-related services; (2) measures that
seek directly to influence the abortion decision, such as informed-
consent procedures, waiting periods, and notice and consent re-
quirements; (3) regulation of the medical procedure itself; and (4) the
judicial response to private interference in access to abortion. Review
of several examples from these categories exposes the fallacy in the
suggestion that the problem with abortion policy in this country is too
much concern with care and not enough with autonomy.
Autonomy-based arguments tend to frame the issue, as appellants
argued in Roe, as an all-or-nothing contest between total noninter-
ference in the woman's decision and pursuit of the state's interest in
regulation.363 Once the Court determines, as it surely will, that on
at least some occasions the state's interest trumps the woman's
interest in being left alone, judicial review slides into a relatively
abstract assessment of the means-ends rationality of a particular
regulation. The constitutional force of the autonomy claim thus
largely spends itself in putting the state to the burden of justification
363. In Roe, for example, the appellant argued "that the woman's right is absolute and
that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for
whatever reasons she alone chooses." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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and in elevating the intensity of judicial scrutiny, but it does little to
help inform the content or scope of that examination. Adding a care
focus would remind the Court that real women are still very much
present and vulnerable to the adverse effects of the state's action, and
it would direct the Court's attention contextually to the real harm
done.
A. Abortion funding cases
Two prime examples of cases that are consistent with the kind of
"masculinist" logic endorsed by anti-relationalists, yet subject to
criticism under a robust ethic of care, are Harris v. McRae 64 and
Rust v. Sullivan.365 In upholding the Hyde Amendment's denial of
Medicaid funding for most abortions, the Court in Harris reasoned
that "[t]he financial' constraints that restrict an indigent woman's
ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of
choice are the product not of governmental restrictions on access to
abortions, but rather of her indigency.,3 66
In Rust, the Court upheld federal regulations prohibiting federally
funded family planning clinics from discussing abortion as an option
with their clients-even if the health-care provider believed that such
information would be in the woman's best medical interests.67 In
rejecting a free speech challenge to this "gag rule," the Court
reasoned that the regulations merely defined the scope of the Title X
program as limited to reproductive health and family planning issues
apart from abortion and did not censor disfavored ideas or mislead
women "into thinking that the doctor does not consider abortion an
appropriate option for her. 3 61 The Court pointed out that
government is free to spend its money promoting its chosen policies
without being obligated to pay for alternative viewpoints.3 69 In also
rejecting an abortion rights challenge to the gag rule, the Court
concluded that government is not constitutionally required to fund
364. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
365. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
366. Harris, 448 U.S. at 316.
367. Rust, 500 U.S. at 179-80, 203 (citing 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.8(a)(1), 59.8(b)(5) (1989)).
The regulation in question was subsequently suspended. See 58 Fed. Reg. 7462-63 (1993)
(suspending 42 C.F.R. § 59.8 (1993)).
368. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193-94, 200.
369. As Chief Justice Rehnquist observed, "[wihen Congress established a National
Endowment for Democracy to encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles,
... it was not constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing lines
of political philosophy such as Communism and Fascism." Id. at 194.
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abortion counseling any more than abortion itself The Court
reasoned that the regulations do not infringe a woman's reproductive
freedom because the gag rule "leaves her in no different position than
she would have been if the government had not enacted Title X."'37
As even some anti-relationalists have conceded, relationalism
plainly supports abortion rights by exposing the artificiality of the
Court's analysis in these cases.371 For example, the Court's assertion
in Harris that the state has done nothing to interfere with a woman's
choice is abstract logic, not real life. Surely poor women who are in
effect bribed to choose childbirth over abortion reasonably feel that
the state has done something tangible and substantial to them. 2
Rust's conclusion that the gag rule does not affect women's choices
about abortion in a constitutionally meaningful way is even more
doubtful. As a practical matter, women are not in the same position
they would have occupied had there been no Title X. The gag rule
would have distorted communication between women and their
doctors by providing ideologically slanted medical information for
Title X clients to rely upon.373 When a woman's state-subsidized
370. Id. at 202. The Court reasoned further that "a doctor's ability to provide, and a
woman's right to receive, information concerning abortion and abortion-related services
outside the context of the Title X project remains unfettered." Id.
371. Citing Harris, for example, Karlan and Ortiz recognize that "[i]f anything, some
of its conclusions reflect precisely the kind of abstract, out-of-this world, principled rigidity
that relational theorists squarely condemn." Karlan & Ortiz, supra note 13, at 882. They
go on to observe that "[o]nly a Court completely out of touch with the realities of poor
women's lives, for example, could conclude with a set of straight faces that paying for
maternity services but not for abortions would have no coercive effect on women's
decisionmaking about whether to have an abortion." Id.
372. See generally TRmE, supra note 128, at 1346-47 (arguing that the Court's position
is "neither as neutral nor as passive" as a majority of the Court supposes).
373. For many of these indigent women, their first visit to the Title X grantee is for
pregnancy testing rather than contraception. Title X clients, like anyone, necessarily
depend upon their health care providers to give them candid and complete advice in the
providers' best judgment-including referral for appropriate treatment. That expectation
is reinforced by physicians' ethical and legal obligations to do so, and the dependency that
everyone has on his or her health care provider is magnified for those women because of
their poverty. See Judges, supra note 337, at 610-11.
The Court's implicit distinction between acts and omissions, in the context of medical
treatment, is especially unconvincing. For example, some jurisdictions have extended a
physician's duty to provide informed consent to include warning of the risks of forgoing
procedures as well as undergoing them. In Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 906-07 (Cal.
1980), the California Supreme Court ruled that malpractice liability (under an informed
consent theory) could be based on a physician's failure to inform the patient of a pap
smear's purpose and the risks of forgoing it. At a minimum, a physician's duty to
recommend and to disclose procedures is controlled by the physician's duty of professional
care; and the doctor will have to answer in malpractice for breach of that duty. Id.; see
generally John H. Derrick, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: Liability for Failure of
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physician remains silent concerning abortion or recites the ad-
ministration's prescribed message, she very well may be misled into
thinking that the doctor does not consider abortion an appropriate
option for her. 4
There is another problem in Harris and Rust beyond simply that
they were decided by Justices who are out of touch with the realities
of life below the poverty line, a problem that derives from the very
same constitutional vision that the anti-relationalists would privilege.
The underlying issue is the Court's individualistic negative rights
paradigm, which regards individuals as existing in their own atomistic
spheres distinct from the state and which conceives of the Constitu-
tion as protecting a discrete set of rights from a limited range of
active, tangible intrusions by government. The Constitution thus
specifies (either implicitly or explicitly) a finite set of negative
rights-prohibitions against a defined range of government action.
This paradigm does not conceive of a positive constitutional obligation
to address social conditions; it operates on the level of rights rather
than responsibility and separation rather than connection.375  The
Court was speaking from this perspective when it concluded in Harris
that Roe "did not translate into a constitutional obligation ... to
subsidize abortions," '376 and when it took that analysis to its logical
conclusion in Rust by reasoning that if government is not
constitutionally required to fund abortion itself, it can scarcely be
obligated to fund speech about abortion.377
Physician to Inform Patient of Alternative Modes of Diagnosis or Treatment, 38 A.L.R.4TH
900 (1985) (discussing cases that consider physician liability for failure to obtain informed
consent of patient for procedures performed and others not offered).
.374. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 217 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun observed:
The undeniable message conveyed by this forced speech ... is that abortion is
nearly always an improper medical option. Although her physician's words, in
fact, are strictly controlled by the Government and wholly unrelated to her
particular medical situation, the Title X client will reasonably construe them as
professional advice to forgo her right to obtain an abortion. As would most
rational patients, many of these women will follow that perceived advice and
carry their pregnancy to term, despite their needs to the contrary and despite the
safety of the abortion procedure for the vast majority of them. Others, delayed
by the Regulations' mandatory prenatal referral, will be prevented from acquiring
abortions during the period in which the process is medically sound and
constitutionally protected.
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
375. Judges, supra note 337, at 606-13.
376. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314-15 (1980) (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
475-76 (1977)).
377. Rust, 500 U.S. at 192-200.
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This paradigm effectively denies the constitutional significance of
poverty and powerlessness as a social condition in many circumstan-
ces; and its concomitant formalistic view of the relationship between
the individual and the state ignores the pervasive and powerful ways
in which government does affect people's lives, especially those of the
poor and vulnerable.3 7 As Chief Justice Rehnquist put it, "the Due
Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental
aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or
property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the
individual." Instead, the Due Process Clause is "phrased as a
limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain
minimal levels of safety and security."379
The privacy model of abortion rights advocated by the anti-
relationalists is quite at home with the negative rights paradigm. That
model's primary concern is to keep abortion on the menu of
individual rights insulated from affirmative state action. It contributes
little to understanding the constitutional implications of the modem
activist welfare state.380 Its perspective resembles that of Jake in
Gilligan's study-constitutional responsibility consists of constraining
state aggression. By demanding nothing more than the right to be left
alone, the privacy model invites the Harris and Rust distinction
between direct encouragement of one choice and outright prohibition
of the other and the DeShaney distinction between Robert
378. Judges, supra note 337, at 606-13. For example, it underlies the Court's refusal to
recognize a constitutional claim to minimal subsistence, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 484-85 (1970), or to equal educational opportunity, San Antonio Independent Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1973), despite the close nexus between such benefits
and even minimal participation in citizenship and regardless of the claimants' desperation.
It led to the Court's conclusion that the Winnebago County Department of Social Services
could not be held constitutionally responsible for standing ineffectually by while Robert
DeShaney savagely beat his four-year-old son Joshua into a state of severe and permanent
brain damage-even though the county had positioned itself to be Joshua's only real hope
of protection. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,201-02
(1989). The Court reached that conclusion notwithstanding the fact that the county
maintained an administrative network that funnelled all child-abuse information into itself,
purported to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over such matters, and actively monitored and
dutifully recorded numerous indications that Joshua DeShaney was being badly abused.
Id. at 208-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In fact, on one occasion, the county actually
obtained temporary custody when Joshua was admitted to the hospital with multiple
bruises and abrasions, but the county shortly thereafter persuaded the juvenile court
system to dismiss the child protection case and return Joshua to his tormentor. Id at 192.
379. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
380. On the implications of the modem welfare state, see Paul Schwartz, Data
Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of the American Legal Response
to the Computer, 43 HASTINGs L.J. 1321, 1329-34 (1992).
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DeShaney's beating his son and the county's deplorable failure to stop
him. 8' The dark side of this paradigm is that, while it may help
Norma McCorvey (a.k.a. Jane Roe) tell Texas to mind its own
business, it also lets Winnebago County tell poor, helpless Joshua
DeShaney to mind his. This is a description of a Constitution that
does not care.
The negative rights paradigm and the related privacy model of
abortion rights expressed in Harris and Rust play a significant role in
the unequal and arbitrary allocation of abortion services. Although
the possession of money has nothing whatsoever to do with the moral
issues at stake in abortion, the Hyde Amendment in effect makes it
a criterion for obtaining safe abortion for a significant number of
women. The cost of abortion both limits its availability among the
poor and makes it more dangerous: Some women forgo abortion as
the result of the Hyde Amendment, while others delay.3" One
reason for delay in having an abortion is raising enough money:
"Women who obtain abortions usually must pay for them with cash
in advance."'' Yet delay substantially increases both the cost of
abortion and the risk of complication.384
Relationalism challenges the negative rights paradigm by showing
that Harris begs the key question. The assertion that poverty, and not
the Hyde Amendment, actually restricts a woman's choice simply
dresses in causation terms the normative judgment that government
bears no constitutional responsibility for her circumstances.
Relationalism, like Amy in Gilligan's study,"s  would see
381. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989),
discussed supra note 378.
382. One reason women delay is difficulty making arrangements, including raising the
money and locating a provider. See JUDGES, supra note 90, at 38.
383. Stanley K. Henshaw et al., Abortion Services in the United States, 1984 and 1985,
19 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 63, 69 (1987).
384. See infra note 438 and accompanying text. The average cost of first-trimester
abortion with local anesthetic is $250 (much higher in some locales); in the second
trimester the cost can increase from $400 to more than $1000 (not including ancillary costs
such as repeat visits, medication, transportation, etc.). See JUDGES, supra note 90, at 42-43.
Rust also could have had a sweeping impact, given the scope and demographic profile of
the Title X program, had the Clinton administration not intervened to rescind the gag rule.
The constitutional principle with all its implications, of course, remains on the books.
Although under 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b) (1993), participating states may not deny Medicaid
funds to a patient solely because of her pregnant condition, the Hyde Amendment restricts
Medicaid funding for abortion to the relatively few cases that involve either a threat to the
pregnant woman's life or promptly reported incest or rape. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
316 (1980) (citing Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (1979)).
385. See supra notes 30-43 and accompanying text.
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constitutional responsibility in more positive terms. An ethic of care
would examine the relationship created by Medicaid or Title X
between the woman and her government in the matter of her health-
care financing, the real-life impact of government's decisions, and the
obligations that might follow from that relationship.
Considering the vast inequality of that relationship and the state's
affirmative decision to provide generally for the indigent woman's
medical care, the Court's view of state responsibility seems cramped
and artificial. In other contexts, the law routinely intervenes (and
departs from an atomistic paradigm) to preclude private parties from
exploiting similar kinds of vulnerabilities, and to protect important
public policies in ways that are consistent with an ethic of care.386
If anything, the argument seems even stronger for constitutional
consideration of the unequal power relationship between Medicaid
recipients and the state. They are, after all, hardly strangers to one
another. The Court ought to be especially sensitive to the threat of
overreaching when one of the parties is the state and the interest at
stake is a constitutional right, and when judicial intervention would
enhance both autonomy and relational values."
To be sure, the Court's negative rights paradigm rests largely on
legitimate deference to legislative judgments about how to spend
society's money and the potential voraciousness of positive
constitutional claims to welfare benefits."  Yet Cora McRae did
not assert a right to state-subsidized health care in general or even
386. For example, recognizing that a deal between parties of extremely unequal
bargaining power may not reflect a real choice, courts will decline to enforce un-
conscionable contracts. E.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445,449
(D.C. Cir. 1965) ("[Wlhere the element of unconscionability is present at the time a
contract is made, the contract should not be enforced."). Furthermore, to shift the costs
of accidents to persons who can better bear and spread them, and to deter wrongful and
harmful conduct, courts sometimes will not enforce disclaimers of implied warranties or
liability waivers. E.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 95 (NJ. 1960)
("[A]ttempted disclaimer of an implied warranty of merchantability and of the obligations
arising therefrom is so inimical to the public good as to compel an adjudication of its
invalidity.") In such cases courts properly reject the argument that the more powerful
party is not responsible for the weaker party's vulnerability or for hurt that may result
from exploitation of that vulnerability. Instead, the relation between the parties gives rise
to minimal obligations of good faith, fair dealing, and due care. See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 447 (Cal. 1963) (en banc) (holding that although
hospital may be selective in admitting patients, it cannot contract to release itself from
negligence liability).
387. By contrast, the cases described supra note 385 can, depending on the context, be
seen as promoting or compromising personal autonomy, See Judges, supra note 327, at
111-13.
388. For a brief overview of these concerns, see Judges, supra note 337, at 660-64.
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reproductive health care in particular.38 9 The state had already
undertaken to enter a relationship of care with her that included such
benefits. Nor did Dr. Irving Rust and his patients really demand that
government set up an abortion information agency 9 The federal
government already had undertaken to involve itself quite intimately
in their reproductive health-care decision making. 1 Neither the
Hyde Amendment nor the gag rule was really about saving
money.392
By directing attention to the obligations that might flow from
relationships that government has already established, an ethic of care
shows what is fundamentally wrong in Harris and Rust beyond the
flimsiness of the Court's syllogism about state action. As discussed
above,3' relationalism would constrain the state's ability to exclude
an unwanting pregnant woman from its circle of care. Yet such
exclusion is precisely the effect (and purpose) of both the Hyde
Amendment, which excludes the woman in her need for abortion
services from a circle of care that the community had already defined
to consist of governmentally subsidized comprehensive health care,
and the gag rule, which excludes her in her need for abortion
information from a circle of care that consists of governmentally
assisted family planning and reproductive health clinics. This refusal
of needed care, in a relationship in which government has otherwise
taken responsibility to provide health care, is unethical.
Harris and Rust thus violate the relational account of abortion
rights described above in two ways. First, both cases are probably
better understood as resting more on judicial deference to a legislative
judgment not to fund a practice that some influential constituents find
abhorrent than on the Court's doubtful conclusions about the statute's
389. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); see also supra notes 364, 366 and
accompanying text.
390. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); see also supra notes 365, 367-74 and
accompanying text.
391. This observation reveals the flaw in the Chief Justice's analogy in Rust to the
National Endowment for Democracy. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991). The
problem is not that the government's advocacy of childbirth and adoption creates an
obligation to fund speech about abortion. Rather, the government's provision of medical
services creates a relation which gives rise to an obligation to provide services in a way that
does not mislead womeninto forgoing constitutional rights and their own medical needs.
392. Indeed, the voraciousness concern is misplaced in this context. Given the social
costs of unwanted pregnancy and the insignificant marginal cost to either program of the
services prohibited by either the Hyde Amendment or the gag rule, neither measure can
be rationally justified as necessary to conserve finite fiscal resources.
393. See supra notes 280-99 and accompanying text.
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or the regulations' impact on choice. Those provisions thus attempt
to shift the burden of that discomfort with abortion to the pregnant
woman by excluding her from the medical care that she requires and
otherwise would be entitled to receive. As discussed above, such a
rejection of motivational displacement with respect to the pregnant
woman and a refusal to receive her plight in the special circumstances
of abortion amounts to a failure of care's impersonal counterpart.
Second, those measures-like the others discussed below-can
realistically be seen as part of a broader anti-abortion camliaign to
interfere with the availability of abortion on as many fronts as
possible. This "incrementalist" approach counts as a victory each
abortion prevented by whatever legal impediment, however unprin-
cipled, and is driven by the hope that eventually a sufficient number
of barriers can be erected to make abortion effectively unavailable in
all but the most extreme cases.394 Official attempts to exploit a
woman's capacity for mother-love by interfering with abortion violate
a relational interpretation of the caste-abolition principle, and for
indigent women that principle is especially implicated by the
particular role that unwanted pregnancy plays in the underclass
process. The Hyde Amendment and the gag rule compound these
objections by preying on poor women's reliance on government,
which reliance is encouraged by government, for health care. Not
only do those provisions in practical effect make abortion more
difficult to obtain (and for a problematic reason), which would be bad
enough for women in general and poor women in particular, but they
do so by taking advantage of the women's dependent and vulnerable
position in what government affirmatively misled them to believe was
a care-like relationship.
394. See JUDGES, supra note 90, at 27-28. During the Reagan and Bush ad-
ministrations, this strategy produced a complex patchwork of obstacles to abortion in a
variety of realms touched by federal law. Additionally, as explained infra notes 409-54 and
accompanying text, the Supreme Court's Casey decision openly invites state legislatures
to continue their incrementalist efforts.
Among President Clinton's first orders, however, were directives "to separate our
national health and medical policy from the divisive conflict over abortion." 29 WEEKLY
CoMp. PREs. Doc. 57, 85 (Jan. 22, 1993). President Clinton's initial orders included:
lifting the moratorium on federal funding for fetal tissue research; suspending the Title X
"gag rule"; repealing the so-called "Mexico City" policy, which applied the gag rule to
organizations that received funds from the Agency for International Development; lifting
the ban on privately funded abortion at military facilities; and activating FDA review of
the health and safety risks of Mifepristine ("RU-486"). Id. at 85-86.
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B. Direct interference in choice
Anti-relationalists Karlan and Ortiz sift through various Justices'
opinions from recent cases in this category-including Hodgson v.
Minnesota395  and Casey396-- to unearth evidence of judicial
deployment of relation-talk in opposition to abortion rights. They do
indeed find some rhetorical artifacts in dissenting, plurality, and a few
majority opinions." Yet the keystone anti-relationalist conclusion
that they draw from this archeology-that the deployment of relation-
talk against abortion rights reveals fundamental flaws in
relationalism39-does not follow and fails to distinguish care-talk
from real care.
For one thing, the logic of this anti-relationalist syllogism is
defective. If the anti-relationalists really mean to adhere consistently
(in "masculinist" fashion) to the principle of their reasoning, then they
must be prepared to reject arguments based on liberty and autonomy
as well. After all, relationaism is hardly the first ideology to be stood
on its head: The Supreme Court has similarly invoked autonomy- and
liberty-talk much to the detriment of real autonomy and liberty. One
familiar example is Lochner v. New York, which is replete with
rhetoric about protecting the bakery workers' autonomy to decide
whether to overwork themselves for substandard wages.3 9 Under
the anti-relationalists' own reasoning, Lochner demonstrates that
liberty-as-autonomy is an inherently untrustworthy concept with little
395. 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
396. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). They also include Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive
Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990), discussed infra note 407.
397. See Karlan & Ortiz, supra note 13, at 883-85. Karlan and Ortiz note many
examples, including: the concern of Justices Stevens and O'Connor with "the family's
decisional power" rather than the minor's autonomy in Hodgson, see infra note 401; Justice
Kennedy's Hodgson dissent, see infra notes 402-08 and accompanying text; Justice
Kennedy's plurality opinion in Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, see infra note
407; and the joint opinion's observation in Casey that "[a]bortion is a unique act. It is
fraught with consequences for others," Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807.
398. Karlan and Ortiz argue:
The fact that an emphasis on communication and connection can so easily be
employed to limit a woman's freedom to choose for herself whether to have an
abortion, as well as how and to what extent to engage in communication with
others about that decision, should give us pause before we inject provisions based
on relationships and responsibilities into our legal policy.
Karlan & Ortiz, supra note 13, at 885.
399. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (striking down New York labor law




to offer constitutional discourse-a conclusion that bears a striking
resemblance to the objection that pure interpretivists frequently raise
against Roe and the other privacy cases.'
If they were to confront this dilemma, surely the anti-
relationalists would explain that Lochner's problem lay not in the
coherence of autonomy itself as a constitutional value, but in the
Court's assumptions about its content, application, and the conditions
predicate to its existence. But this explanation involves looking
behind the rhetoric at substance. The enlistment of relation-talk in
the service of anti-abortion goals in itself does not warrant the
peremptory abandonment of caring values in the consideration of
abortion rights, any more than the analogous inversion of liberty and
autonomy concepts justifies rejection of those values. Applying the
substance of care in the cases canvassed by Karlan and Ortiz shows
that concern with real care and relation generally supports, rather
than undermines, abortion rights.
1. Hodgson
In Hodgson, a badly fragmented Court held unconstitutional
Minnesota's requirement that both parents be provided forty-eight
hours notice before an abortion may be performed on a minor."'
The Court ruled that the statute was saved by its judicial bypass
provision, however, which became effective upon a court's striking the
notification requirement.' Karlan and Ortiz focus on Justice
Kennedy's opinion dissenting on the first point as "more explicit in
[its] privileging of relational values." 3  He invoked "our most
revered institutions" in concluding that the two-parent notification
requirement would be constitutional standing on its own because it
400. For a brief overview of this debate, see JUDGES, supra note 90, at 149-68.
401. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926,2937-41,2945-47 (1990). The statute made
no exception for a divorced parent, a noncustodial parent, or a biological father who never
lived with the pregnant minor's mother. It did except cases in which only one parent was
living or could be located, in which the minor's life was at risk, or in which the minor was
the victim of abuse (provided the abuse was reported promptly to the authorities, whose
ensuing investigation could involve the parents). Id. at 2931-32.
402. Id. at 2950-51, 2969-71. Karlan and Ortiz also complain that Justices Stevens and
O'Connor, who concluded that the two-parent requirement did not reasonably further any
legitimate state interest, in effect were more concerned with shielding the family's decision-
making rather than the minor's autonomy. Karlan & Ortiz, supra note 13, at 883.
403. Karlan & Ortiz, supra note 13, at 883. Justice Kennedy was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2961.
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merely attempted to enhance parents' ability to provide guidance and
support to their daughter.'
Justice Kennedy's Hodgson opinion is to real care and connection
what Justice Peckham's Lochner opinion is to real autonomy: all the
right words in all the wrong places. Kennedy's opinion privileges an
idealized, almost wistful, vision of the American family that bears
little resemblance to the actual life experience of many persons. The
problem inheres in his assumptions and commitments, not in the value
of care. While Kennedy is talking about connection, communication,
and responsibility, by applying a deferential standard of judicial
review he is actually avoiding connecting with the problem, com-
municating with the facts, and taking responsibility for recognizing
harm to pregnant minors and their families in the context of abortion
rights. His willingness to sacrifice real people to preserve the state's
(and apparently his own) almost mystical notion of family life-"our
revered institutions" and our "constitutional tradition"-is exactly the
sort of disconnected devotion to abstraction that relationalists
decry.'°  His conception of the judicial role-that the Court ought
to distance itself from the realities of individual misconduct, parental
failures, and social ills-is all Jake and no Amy.4"
A caring perspective would connect with the situation, face the
facts, and feel the hurt.' It would look with clear eyes at the
404. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2963-64 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy wrote:
Minnesota has done no more than act upon the common-sense proposition
that, in assisting their daughter in deciding whether to have an abortion, parents
can best fulfill their roles if they have the same information about their own
child's medical condition and medical choices as the child's doctor does; and that
to deny parents this knowledge is to risk, or perpetuate, estrangement or
alienation from the child when she is in the greatest need of parental guidance
and support. The Court does the State, and our constitutional tradition, sad
disservice by impugning the legitimacy of these elemental objectives.
Id. at 2964.
405. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
406. On other occasions, however, Justice Kennedy has exhibited sensitivity to the real
impact of government action on people. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649,2655-
61 (1992) (considering how a non-believer might feel when coerced to attend and to
participate in state-sponsored religious exercise).
407. In Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, another case discussed by Karlan
and Ortiz, Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion for the Court upholding Ohio's single-parent
notification statute which contained a complex judicial bypass provision. 110 S. Ct. 2972,
2977-78 (1990). Karlan and Ortiz find relation-talk in Part V of Kennedy's opinion, which
was joined only by the Chief Justice and Justices White and Scalia, in which Kennedy
commented on the need for society to require that "each of its members should attain a
clearer, more tolerant understanding of the profound philosophic choices confronted by
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a woman who is considering whether to seek an abortion." Korlan & Ortiz, supra note
13, at 884 (citing Akron Ctr., 110 S. Ct. at 2983). Justice Kennedy pointed out that the
woman's decision will affect not only her life, but also "the origins of the other human life
that lie within the embryo." Akron Ctr., 110 S. Ct. at 2983. And he concluded that the
state may assume that, "for most of its people, the beginnings of that understanding will
be within the family, society's most intimate association," and that "in most instances, the
family will strive to give a lonely or even terrified minor advice that is both compassionate
and mature." Id. at 2983-84.
Once again, a real care focus reveals a story quite different from Kennedy's abstract
and idealized portrait of family life and teen pregnancy. Such a focus would take a hard
look at the state procedures' practical impact on minors' welfare and would be skeptical
of state efforts to justify the harm. The Ohio statute required, subject to certain
exceptions, 24-hour notice to one parent (or guardian) before a physician could perform
an abortion on a minor. Id. at 2977 (citation omitted). The most important exception
concerned judicial bypass, which contained the standard provisions concerning the minor's
maturity or best interests but also included several provisions that are especially
troublesome from a caring perspective. See id. .
First, the bypass procedures' technical and complex pleading requirements, which
forced the minor to choose from among three pleading forms, were a trap for unwary and
uncounseled minors-especially when facing the stress of an unwanted pregnancy. Second,
the law required the minor to prove her allegations of maturity, pattern of abuse, or best
interest by the stringent standard of clear and convincing evidence. The practical effect
of elevating the standard of proof is to tilt the court's decision in favor of denying the
minor's request to bypass notification of her parents; in other words, the law simply made
it harder for young women to obtain abortions. In other contexts the Court has held that
the Constitution requires clear and convincing evidence before government may deprive
an individual of certain very important interests. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 752-57 (1982) (termination of parental rights); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-
33 (1979) (civil commitment proceedings). Akron Center is unusual in that the standard
is being applied by the state against the assertion of an individual's rights; a similar
criticism might be made against Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
The Court reasoned that it was proper to raise the minor's standard of proof because in
most cases she would be the only party, with no one else present to challenge her
testimony-as though, mirabile dictu, it was the state that needed protection from a single
frightened adolescent girl. Akron Ctr., 110 S. Ct. at 2981-82.
Third, the bypass requirement could involve significant delay and consequently could
increase the cost and risks of abortion. It appeared that the statutory five-day time period
for judicial decision could stretch out to 22 days in certain circumstances if business instead
of calendar days were used. Although the Court was able to dodge the question in this
facial challenge, it seemed to suggest that such a delay might pass constitutional muster.
Id. at 2980-81.
Justice Kennedy's relational rhetoric notwithstanding, it was the dissenters who
seemed genuinely concerned with the harm the law might actually inflict. Justices
Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall dissented largely on the basis that the Ohio statute
deliberately and unjustifiably placed a pattern of obstacles in the path of a minor seeking
an abortion. Id. at 2985 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Unlike the majority, the dissenters
considered the aggregate practical impact on the minor of the entire process in addition
to considering each provision of the Ohio law individually. Id (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The dissenters criticized the majority for failing to require the state to justify setting a
"procedural trap" for the minor, who is bound to be confused and upset at such a difficult
moment in her life. Id. at 2985-86 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun also was
particularly concerned about the adverse effects of the clear and convincing evidence
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district court's findings, largely undisputed on appeal, concerning the
statute's real purpose and effect. First, it is apparent that the state
was trying not only to encourage minors to consult with their parents
but also to deter them from choosing abortion.' I have discussed
above the general relationalist objections to the latter purpose. The
state's attempt to exploit both the vulnerability of the pregnant
minor's youth and any conflict in her relationship with her parents is
especially callous and unethical. Second, someone who really cared
would be appalled at the overwhelming evidence that the law not only
failed to promote the minor's welfare or to enhance her relationship
with her family but actively inflicted considerable harm on both.4
requirement on sexually or otherwise physically abused minors. Id. at 2990-91 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). He reasoned that a judicial bypass proceeding is traumatic enough without
the added stress of a heightened standard of proof, the chief effects of which would be to
turn the judge into an adversarial inquisitor about a quite painful subject and possibly to
force the minor to the cruel dilemma of carrying the pregnancy to term or confronting the
abusive parent or parents. Id. at 2984-93 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
408. See Akron Ctr., 110 S. Ct. at 2984-93 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
409. The trial court found that only half of the minors in Minnesota live with both
parents, and a third live with one parent. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2938. The two-parent
requirement had especially harmful effects on both the custodial parent and the pregnant
minor when parents were divorced or separated. Id. The requirement also had
detrimental effects in two-parent families, especially when domestic violence was a serious
problem. Id. at 2839. The exception for cases of sexual or other physical abuse was not
a practical alternative because of the authorities' involvement and the ensuing parental
contact. Id. Almost all bypass petitions were granted. Id. at 2940. "The judges who
adjudicated over 90% of these petitions testified; none of them identified any positive
effect of the law." Id. at 2938-40.
Not only would a caring perspective reveal Justice Kennedy's opinion for what it is,
but such an approach is needed to come to terms more generally with the special problem
of abortion and minors. To be at all helpful, analysis must do more than simply assert a
claim for the minor to be left alone. As Justice Powell observed in Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622 (1979), minors' constitutional rights are more limited than those of adults for
three reasons: "[1] the peculiar vulnerability of children; [2] their inability to make critical
decisions in an informed, mature manner, and [3] the importance of the parental role in
child rearing." Id. at 634-35. He viewed the Court's task therefore as to balance minors'
interest in autonomy against their special circumstances and needs, particularly "in the
making of important, affirmative choices with potentially serious consequences." Id.
Justice Powell observed, however, that abortion poses special problems: The abortion
decision, which is problematic for minors, cannot be simply postponed; and the burdens
of pregnancy and childbirth can be especially severe for minors. Id. at 642. Because some
parents might seek to obstruct both abortion and access to court, out of strongly held anti-
abortion beliefs, Justice Powell concluded that every minor must have an opportunity to
seek judicial approval without first notifying or consulting her parents. Id. at 647. He
went on to describe the criteria for so-called "judicial bypass" procedures, which eventually
became the point of departure for subsequent cases involving both consent and notice.
Id. at 647-48.
Justice Powell's thoughtful approach seems to reflect a genuine care and relational
focus in recognizing the need of some minors for parental guidance in confronting
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2. Casey
Karlan and Ortiz point to language shards in the Casey joint
opinion recognizing that abortion "is an act fraught with consequences
for others, 41" and they conclude that the opinion "carried this
relational perspective forward into its enunciation of a new, more
deferential test for reviewing state abortion regulations."4'' Beyond
this scrap of relation-talk, in the realm of what the joint opinion
actually does, lies a more complex picture. Casey is, if nothing else,
an object lesson in the need to look behind rhetoric to results, and
this is just as true for the joint opinion's extensive autonomy-talk as
it is for the opinion's occasional references to relation.
unwanted pregnancy. Simply asserting the involvement of the parent-child relationship is
not the end of the inquiry, however, real care also would consider the practical impact of
legislative attempts to coerce parental consultation and Court-mandated judicial bypass
procedures. There are reasons to be skeptical. For one thing, the kind of close personal
care required to withstand the strains on family relations imposed by unwanted teen
pregnancy is something the state is simply powerless to coerce. Thus, in a well-functioning
and supportive family, state-mandated parental consultation is likely to be unnecessary; in
an unsupportive or abusive one it is likely to do little good and much harm. Cf Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976), in which the Court noted:
It is difficult ... to conclude that providing a parent with absolute power to
overrule a determination, made by the physician and his minor patient, to
terminate the patient's pregnancy will serve to strengthen the family unit.
Neither is it likely that such veto power will enhance parental authority or control
where the minor and the nonconsenting parent are so fundamentally in conflict
and the very existence of the pregnancy already has fractured the family
structure.
Id.
Next, as Justice Stevens observed in his Bellotti concurrence, requiring a minor to
pursue judicial proceedings to obtain an abortion may well be at least as burdensome, if
not more so, than forcing her to confront her parents; Justice Powell's indeterminate "best
interests" and "maturity" standards leave the minor's autonomy interests vulnerable to the
judge's personal beliefs. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 655-56. What is more, most minors who seek
judicial authorization get it, so that in practice "these statutes force minors to bear the
emotional strain of going to court to receive judicial authorization that amounts to little
more than a rubber stamp." Gene Lindsey, The Viability of ParentalAbortion Notification
and Consent Statutes: Assessing Fact and Fiction, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 881, 884 (1989)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The consequence thus is that, once again, who obtains
an abortion is largely a function of chance and personal resources (here the ability to
negotiate the judicial environment) rather than legal, moral, or philosophical principle.
Finally, one might marvel at a constitutional rule which contemplates that a young woman
could be too immature to decide whether to terminate pregnancy but would nevertheless
be mature enough to be a mother. In any event, whatever difficulties are presented by
judicial bypass generally are aggravated by the additional onerous requirements involved
in the Minnesota and Ohio laws. See id.
410. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992).
411. Karlan & Ortiz, supra note 13, at 885.
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One of many striking things about Casey is the contrast between
the joint opinion's professions of fidelity to liberty and substantive
due process in the abstract and its actual appli6ation of its new stan-
dard.412 The Court's ringing defense of the underlying concept of
substantive due process and individual liberty in the realms of
intimate relations, family, marriage, and procreation, and its pas-
sionate plea that overruling Roe would seriously undermine the very
foundation of the Court's moral authority,43 lead one to expect a
forceful reaffirmation of Roe and a clear message to the states that
the Court will no longer tolerate their efforts to subvert that decision.
What follows in the joint opinion, however, is a substantial downsizing
of Roe, the overruling of important post-Roe case law, and an
invitation to legislatures to continue the cat-and-mouse game of
testing Roe's newly relaxed limits414 -all of which exacerbate the
arbitrary allocation of abortion rights. The contrast is, to borrow a
metaphor, "like a spectacularly successful football rally followed by
a lost game., 415 The result is objectionable from both an autonomy
and a care perspective.
The Casey joint opinion gives much more weight to the state's
pre-viability interest in preserving potential life, at the expense of the
woman's welfare, than did Roe and post-Roe cases.4" 6 Repudiating
Roe's command that the only legitimate basis for pre-viability state
intervention is the protection of maternal health, the joint opinion
expressly allows the state deliberately to make the woman's right
412. Another is the contrast between the joint opinion's extensive analysis of the
reasons why the principle of stare decisis requires preservation of Roe, 112 S. Ct. at 2808-
09, and the joint opinion's willingness both to redefine Roe and to overrule Roe's progeny,
id. at 2816-33. These inconsistencies are even more glaring in the light of the Court's
repeated invocation of the need for certainty, continuity, and steadfastness in the
protection of liberty. See id. at 2803, 2810, 2817. The Court's stare decisis analysis reflects
more rhetorical than substantive commitment. The only facts that have changed since Roe
are that abortion has become safer than childbirth throughout pregnancy, protests have
continued and escalated, and the Court's personnel has changed. None of those facts
warrant dilution of Roe or suggest a problem in Roe's analysis. The trimester framework
could have been adjusted simply to remove women's health as a state objective during the
second trimester, or to have increased judicial scrutiny of measures purporting to be
justified by that interest. The anguilliform compromise reflected in Casey hardly portrays
a Court steadfastly maintaining its commitment in the face of public criticism.
413. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2804-08.
414. Id. at 2808-33.
415. WILLIAM MANCHESTER, THE GLORY AND THE DREAM: A NARRATIVE HISTORY
OF AMERICA 1932-1972, at 87 (1973).
416. As discussed above, both Noddings and Goldstein have offered relational defenses
of the Court's use of viability as a legal threshold. See supra parts V.B-C.
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more difficult to exercise from the earliest moments of pregnancy.4 17
The abortion right under Casey thus is no longer "a right to decide
whether to have an abortion 'without interference from the
State' ";418 rather, it is now a right to seek an abortion in spite of
state interference.
The only substantive limit that Casey imposes on the state is that
its interference not constitute an "undue burden," defined as a
"substantial obstacle. ' 41  Although the joint opinion asserts that the
state may seek to inform, but not to hinder, the woman's choice,42
the joint opinion's application of its standard demonstrates that the
Justices cannot mean what they say. Instead, the state apparently
may interfere in the woman's decision, on grounds that not only are
unrelated to her health, but actually may be detrimental to it,
provided the state doesn't go too far.42 The locus of that boundary
is uncertain, but the joint opinion's disposition of the various
provisions of the Pennsylvania law suggests that the state may go
quite far indeed. This result clearly manifests a diminution in care for
the pregnant woman by expressly allowing states to shift some of the
burden of constituents' discomfort with abortion to her before
viability.
The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act challenged in Casey
contained both an informed consent and a twenty-four-hour waiting
417. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2818.
418. Id. at 2819 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 51, 61 (1976)).
419. Id. at 2820. The joint opinion explained that
[a] finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the purpose or effect of placing
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus. A statute with this purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the
State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the
woman's free choice, not hinder it. And a statute which, while furthering the
interest in potential life or some other valid state interest, has the effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's choice cannot be
considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.
Id.
420. Id.
421. The joint opinion thus inverts the Court's previous application of the "undue
burden" standard in other constitutional contexts. For example, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court stated that "[a] regulation neutral on its face may, in its
application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality
if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion." Id at 220. The Court there was using
the undue burden standard to protect constitutional rights against even unintentional
governmental interference. By contrast, the joint opinion in Casey invokes the phrase to
uphold deliberate governmental attempts to interfere with the exercise of a constitutional
right.
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period requirement, as well as a spousal notification requirement.4z
The Court previously had held that Roe barred the state from
mandating specific information to be given to the woman "designed
to influence the woman's informed choice between abortion or
childbirth."4' The Court previously had not been "convinced that
the State's legitimate concern that the woman's decision be informed
is reasonably served by requiring a 24-hour delay as a matter of
course."'424 Casey overruled those prior decisions.
One difference between the Court's earlier rulings and Casey is
a weakening of the Court's commitment to protect women from state
laws intended to pressure them not to have abortions even before
viability.4' Because the informed consent requirement mandated
communication of facially truthful information that was, in the joint
opinion's view, rationally related to the state's legitimate interests in
fostering informed decision making and preserving fetal life, the three
Justices concluded that it did not impose an undue burden.426 The
422. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205, 3209 (1990). The law requires a physician, as
opposed to a qualified assistant, to inform the woman of the nature of the abortion
procedure, the health risks of abortion and childbirth, and the probable gestational age of
the child. Id. § 3205(a)(1) (1990). The act further requires that the woman be informed,
by either the physician or a qualified assistant, of the availability of printed materials
published by the state describing the fetus and giving information about medical assistance
for childbirth, about child support from the father, and a list of agencies that provide
adoption services. Id § 3205(a)(2). Before having an abortion, the woman must certify
in writing that she was given the foregoing information. Id. § 3205(a)(4). The act also
requires the woman to wait 24 hours after receiving the prescribed information before
having an abortion. Id. § 3205(a)(1). Those requirements are subject to an exception for
"medical emergencies." Id. § 3205(b), 3209(c). The act also contains spousal notification,
id. § 3209, and parental consent provisions, id. § 3206, as well as recordkeeping and
reporting requirements, id. § 3214.
423. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,444,450
(1983).
424. Id. at 450.
425. The relational value of commitment is discussed supra part V.D.
426. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2823-24. The district court found, however, that in many cases
the prescribed litany may actually mislead or confuse the pregnant woman. Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1354 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), affd in part and rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
For example, the requirement that the physician inform the woman about the availability
of benefits or child support payments may mislead her into believing that meaningful
economic support will be at hand to provide for her and her baby. Id. at 1354-55. In
reality, most child support orders are not enforced (only one-quarter were enforced in
1988), and even when enforced are often insufficient. As the trial court concluded,
Pennsylvania's informed consent requirements had neither the purpose nor the effect of
helping women who are facing the difficult abortion decision, but instead "are poorly
veiled attempts by the Commonwealth to disguise elements of discouragement of the
abortion decision." Id. at 1355.
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joint opinion concluded that the waiting period, while undeniably
burdensome and plainly not in the woman's best medical interests,
also was rationally related to the state's interests and not "unduly"
burdensome.4'
The uncaring implications of the joint opinion's conclusions are
revealed by the district court's findings. First, the physician-only
requirement would needlessly increase the costs of the procedure by
placing additional demands on physicians' already full schedules.4
Second, the state's mandate of the content of the informed consent
dialogue, as opposed to allowing the health-care professional to tailor
the dialogue to the specific needs of the individual patient, is contrary
to standard medical practice and can be affirmatively harmful.429
Third, the informed consent requirement is unnecessary because most
women, before scheduling an abortion, decide that abortion is in their
best interest "only after a great deal of careful thought, consultation
with a family member or other trusted individual, or a medical
provider."'43 Finally, far from assisting women in their decision, the
requirement would actually "create undesirable and unnecessary
anxiety, anguish, and fear. 43'
The contrast between the trial court's findings with respect to the
twenty-four-hour waiting period and the joint opinion's treatment of
that issue further reveals Casey's compromise of Roe as a matter of
both autonomy and care for unwanting pregnant women. It also
shows how abstract relational concerns ought to yield to genuine care
in the face of findings of harm to real people.43 Both Noddings and
Goldstein have suggested a relational role for counseling and
deliberation as a woman contemplates abortion,433 but they en-
427. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2825-26.
428. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323,1353 (E.D. Pa. 1990), affd in part
and rev'd in part, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), affd in part and rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct.
2791 (1992). This burden results from the Act's requiring doctors to perform a task that




432. Indeed, autonomy-talk also could be used to defend burdensome informed consent
and waiting period requirements. The underlying policy served by the recognition of a tort
duty of informed consent is preservation of the patient's bodily sovereignty. KEETON,
supra note 129, at 190. This kind of argument has been deployed by states, including
Pennsylvania, to defend their informed consent provisions. See Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759 (1986), overruled in part by,
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2823 (1992).
433. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 136, at 82-89; NODDINGS, CARING, supra note 20, at 89
(suggesting that one who cares "might suggest a brief and direct form of counseling in
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visioned a much different set of circumstances than those created by
Pennsylvania's law. Noddings had in mind a preexisting, personal
caring relationship concerned with the pregnant woman's welfare-not
an adversarial, authoritarian one mandated and defined by the
state-and she explicitly warned that care requires "retreat[] when the
questions obviously have been considered and are now causing great
pain." '4 4 Goldstein was referring to the Court's pre-Casey "primary
reliance on the general legal obligation of health care professionals to
obtain informed consent, rather than on detailed state regulation of
what must be disclosed and how" when he endorsed a process of
interpersonal dialogue between pregnant women and their physicians
concerning abortion.435
The waiting period's arbitrarily harmful impact on women was
palpable. The trial court found that the waiting period served no
legitimate medical interest and would be "burdensome" to women in
a number of respects. Delays occasioned by the requirement could
stretch from" forty-eight hours to two weeks.436  The trial court
concluded that the requirement
will be particularly burdensome to those women who have
the least financial resources, such as the poor and the young,
those women that travel long distances, such as women
living in rural areas, and those women that have difficulty
explaining their whereabouts, such as battered women,
school age women, and working women without sick
leave.437
Moreover, delay in obtaining an abortion substantially increases the
risk of complications and mortality: "Beyond eight weeks gestation,
the risk of complications (by approximately 30%) and mortality (by
approximately 50%) increase with each additional week of ges-
tation.""43 For some women, the delay will push a first-trimester
abortion over to a second-trimester one, substantially increasing both
cost and risk.439 Finally, the court found that very few women are
which a young expectant mother could come to grips with her feelings").
434. NODDINGS, CARING, supra note 20, at 89.
435. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 136, at 82-83.
436. The court also noted that the repeat visits would subject women to the harassment
of anti-abortion protestors outside clinics. See infra notes 470-511 and accompanying text.
437. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323,1352 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), affd in part and rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct.
2791 (1992).
438. Id. For discussion of the increase in risk caused by delay of the abortion
procedure, see JUDGES, supra note 90, at 66-79.
439. See JUDGES, supra note 90, at 42-43, 66-77.
1452 [Vol. 73
TAKING CARE SERIOUSLY
undecided about having an abortion when they come to a clinic and
that, in addition to the increased medical risk and expense, the
waiting period would also adversely affect women's psychological
health.' 4
While acknowledging that the foregoing findings were troubling,
the joint opinion concluded that the waiting period did not create an
"undue" burden on its face." The joint opinion first suggested that
the exception for medical emergencies (discussed below) in most cases
would mitigate any increased medical risk. 2  Second, the joint
opinion understood the district court not to have found that the
waiting period imposed a "substantial obstacle" but rather to have
held the waiting period unconstitutional under Roe's trimester
framework, a view that the Court overruled. 3  Third, the joint
opinion did not read the district court's conclusion that the waiting
period was "particularly burdensome" as equivalent to a finding of
"undue burden."'"
The joint opinion scuttles carcinomorphically to avoid the plain
import of the district court's findings that, in at least some if not many
cases, the waiting period would impose serious economic, physical,
and psychological harm on women seeking abortion. The trial court's
phrase "particularly burdensome," read in context, obviously means
especially burdensome. In other words, the court clearly found that
the waiting period would have a very real negative impact on many
women seeking abortion, hnd inflict even worse harm on a vulnerable
class of women-the poor, the young, the battered, and those living
in remote areas. If a law that materially (in view of what is at stake)
increases the cost, stress, and risk of injury or death is not a "substan-
tial obstacle," it is difficult to imagine what is.'
440. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1351-52 (E.D. Pa. 1990), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), affjd in part and rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct.
2791 (1992).
441. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2825.
442. Id. at 2822.
443. Id. at 2818, 2825-26.
444. Id. at 2825-26. "A particular burden is not of necessity a substantial obstacle ....
[T]he District Court did not conclude that the waiting period is such an obstacle even for
the women who are most burdened by it." Id.
445. The Casey brief by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
joined by other mainstream health organizations, also argued that the informed consent
provision was "antithetical to informed consent as currently understood and practiced,"
and that the waiting period "will significantly increase the risk of death and other
complications associated with abortions which correlate directly with gestational age."
Brief for the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the American Medical
Women's Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the American Public Health
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The joint opinion's reference to the medical emergency exception
as buffering the increased medical risk' is largely nonresponsive to
the record. The testimony showed that the risk of harm that the
woman might suffer during and after the abortion procedure itself
increases substantially with the delay created by the waiting period.
A statutory exception that requires an extraordinary emergent
complication of pregnancy, which necessarily precedes an abortion
procedure, would appear to be inapplicable to some complications of
abortion (such as the risk of uterine perforation or infection, which is
amplified by delay)."7
Association, the Association of Reproductive Health Professionals, the National League
for Nursing, and the National Medical Association as amici curiae in support of petitioners,
at § II.B., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (Nos. 91-744, 91-902).
446. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2822.
447. The joint opinion left open the possibility, however, that a waiting period could
be held unconstitutional on an adequate record. The opinion was careful to note that the
Pennsylvania law was challenged on its face and enjoined before it had ever been
enforced. 112 S. Ct. at 2803. The evidence of burden, strong as it was, therefore
necessarily had a speculative and hypothetical aspect. It may well be that evidence of
actual harm, or stronger evidence of specific prospective harm, might satisfy the undue
burden standard. This possibility is reinforced by the joint opinion's conclusion, discussed
immediately below, that the spousal notice requirement did impose an undue burden. Id.
at 2826-31. So far, however, results have not been encouraging. For example, in Barnes
v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12, 13-14 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992), the Fifth Circuit
in effect ruled that facial challenges to provisions like those upheld in Casey will not
succeed. Barnes suggests that challengers to laws like those upheld in Casey will not be
able to prevail before the laws go into effect by showing the likely and foreseeable impact
of such measures. Id. at 14 (showing that to succeed in a facially unconstitutional
challenge, plaintiffs must " 'establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the
act would be valid.' " (emphasis added) (quoting Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2870 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting in part); United Stated v. Solerno, 481 U.S. 739,745 (1987)). Instead, the
presumption is heavily in favor of constitutionality, the burden is on the plaintiff, and that
burden presumably can be carried, if at all, only by showing that women actually are being
precluded from choosing abortion. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821 (concluding that
regulations by which the state shows profound respect for fetal life are an undue burden
only if they are a "substantial obstacle to the woman's ... right to choose").
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania reached a different conclusion and allowed the
Casey plaintiffs to "supplement the record with new evidence-evidence that was not
necessary under the less rigorous strict scrutiny standard-that will show that the
challenged provisions are unconstitutional under the new undue burden standard."
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 822 F. Supp. 227,233 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (opinion on remand),
rev'd, 14 F.3d 848 (3d Cir. 1994). In rejecting the Fifth Circuit's analysis, the district court
reasoned that Casey was not a typical facial challenge in which the question is whether the
law is constitutionally applicable to any situation. Id. at 235. To the contrary, as the
Supreme Court specifically noted with respect to the spousal notice provision, the law was
to be tested for its effects on "the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group
for whom the law is irrelevant." Id. (quoting Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2829). The Third
Circuit, however, reversed the district court's decision, holding that the Supreme Court's
ruling had left no issues in the case open for further consideration, apart from the question
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The joint opinion thus is troubling when viewed from a caring
perspective. First, its semantic quibbling over the trial court's use of
the term "particularly burdensome," rather than "unduly burden-
some," is the kind of artificial-even cynical-legalistic distinction that
relationalists condemn and that provokes skepticism about the
coherence of rights. Second, it would be a cruel constitutional rule
indeed that required women actually to suffer predictable (and
probably inevitable) physical or psychological harm before an undue
burden could be shown; the availability of an "as applied" challenge
will do the already-injured women no good by the time it grinds its
way through the courts. The joint opinion's disposition of the waiting
period requirement tends in that direction, although its treatment of
the spousal notice provision points the other way. Third, the joint
opinion does not adequately reconcile its respective outcomes on
those two provisions. While the evidence of the spousal notice
requirement's burdensomeness was forceful, there also was ample
evidence of harm from the waiting period as well. This inconsistency
casts doubt on the undue burden standard's ability to protect women
when needed.
The Court held the spousal notice requirement un-
constitutional.' The anti-relationalists' position implies that such
a result demonstrates that the only way to protect abortion rights is
to sacrifice relational concerns (e.g., communication between spouses
about a matter of great importance to them both) to the pregnant
woman's autonomy claim to unfettered discretion over the abortion
decision. 9 This argument, however, would rest on a thin concep-
tion of care. To the contrary, the Court's analysis reflects a caring
responsiveness to actual harm while also protecting autonomy
interests.
of severability of the unconstitutional spousal notice provision. 14 F.3d 848, 860 (3d Cir.
1994). Justice Souter denied the application for a stay of the Third Circuit's mandate
pending submission of a petition for certiorari. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 114 S. Ct.
909, 909 (1994).
Other post-Casey plaintiffs similarly have had little success in challenging laws
modeled after the Pennsylvania Act. See, e.g., Utah Women's Clinic, Inc. v. Leavitt, 844
F. Supp. 1482, 1490-95 (D. Utah 1994) (rejecting facial challenge to Utah law, finding that
factual allegations of undue burden do not differ materially from those in Casey, and going
so far as to find plaintiffs' claim was brought in bad faith and therefore ordering plaintiffs
to pay defendants' costs and attorneys' fees).
448. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2826-32.
449. Although Karlan and Ortiz did not advance this argument, it is consistent with
their overall anti-relational position. See supra part I.C.
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The spousal notice requirement would have seriously hurt some
women. The trial court found that while most married women
voluntarily consult their husbands before having an abortion, the risk
of both physical and psychological abuse, along with the practical
unavailability of the statutory exceptions for reported cases of sexual
assault or fear of bodily injury, in many instances would mean that
the spousal notice requirement would preclude some women from
having an abortion.45 The Supreme Court accepted and even
supplemented those findings with an extensive recital of the problem
of domestic violence in the United States, concluding that the
requirement would go beyond making abortion more expensive or
difficult to actually imposing a "substantial obstacle."45'
The Court's analysis reflects a caring responsiveness to the plight
of battered women and the harmful impact of Pennsylvania's law on
their lives. The Court regarded the notification requirement as
tantamount to a spousal veto, because of the potentially devastating
consequences for the women it affects, and reaffirmed the balance it
previously had struck between the husband's interest and the pregnant
woman's.45 The Court also specifically noted that, even in a facial
challenge, "[t]he proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for
whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is
irrelevant."453  Because the consequences to affected women are
potentially so severe, the Court struck the provision even though the
affected class is relatively narrow. Finally, the Court recognized that
the provision violated equality norms by relegating women to second-
class status under an outmoded, patriarchal vision of gender roles.454
The joint opinion's failure adequately to distinguish the waiting
period from the spousal notice requirement, or fully to explain how
time has undermined its precedent in one case and not the other,
illustrates the difference that the presence of a genuine care focus can
make. The inconsistency may be attributable to the Court's own
ambivalence about abortion rights, and that difficulty shows the extent
450. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323,1360-62 (E.D. Pa. 1990), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), affd in part and rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct.
2791 (1992).
451. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2827-30.
452. Id. at 2831 (reaffirming Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976)).
453. Id. at 2829.
454. Id. at 2831 ("[The statute] embodies a view of marriage consonant with the
common-law status of married women but repugnant to our present understanding of
marriage and of the nature of the rights secured by the Constitution.").
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to which the abortion conflict has compromised the Court's commit-
ment to care.
The harm likely to follow from the waiting period requirement
is of a kind largely considered in the special context of abortion
restrictions. To be sure, mandatory delay of many surgical procedures
for nonmedical reasons might create or increase risk. But because
abortion has been the singular target of such regulations, one tends
to associate the problem of delay with that procedure. The problem
of domestic violence and sexual abuse, by contrast, is more
generalized and less related specifically to abortion regulation. The
Court therefore may have been more receptive to the harm that
spousal notice requirements can cause. Although the record with
respect to the waiting period requirement, fairly read, also established
a serious burden for at least some women (and, as the Court noted,
a law is to be tested for its impact on the affected group), the Court
appears to be much less receptive to the prospect of harm that is
more "abortion-specific." The spousal notice requirement is
inconsistent with modem, constitutionally enforceable norms of
gender equality. As discussed above, restrictive abortion laws in
general also violate those norms. Once again, however, the spousal
notice provision's threat to gender equality is not abortion-specific.
Instead, the problem is that the statute seeks to reestablish the
husband's dominant position in the marital relationship by vesting him
with "this troubling degree of authority over his wife."'455
The Court's apparent ambivalence is cause for concern. Affected
women suffer serious physical and psychological harm from either
delayed abortion or domestic violence. The record abundantly
established that the Pennsylvania law increased both risks. The joint
opinion offered no reason to suppose that the legal significance of
harm is a function of its source-for example, that a broken nose is
constitutionally distinguishable from a perforated uterus. Similarly,
sex discrimination is wrong whether or not the state also enlists an
abusive husband's participation in its campaign to exploit the woman's
capacity for mother-love or her socioeconomic vulnerabilities.
It is disturbing to think that the Court's sensitivity to such
problems is diminished when they are associated with a burden on
constitutional rights. If anything, one would expect the Court to be
more "care-full" in such a case. The joint opinion's contrary reaction
in Casey-apparently taking "abortion-specific" harm less serious-
455. Id. at 2829-31.
1995] 1457
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ly-indicates a lapse in the Court's commitment to protecting
unwanting pregnant women from some people's opposition to
abortion and consequently a failure of care.
Casey's inconsistencies, while troubling, are not surprising-even
to someone who does not embrace Justice Scalia's extreme
interpretivism. The centrifugal forces binding the Court to Roe are
barely stronger than the centripetal forces pushing the Court away.
At least two of the authors of the joint opinion, if not all three,
probably would have voted against the right recognized in Roe were
the Court writing on a clean slate. The four dissenters in Casey
plainly would have done so. That left only two aging Justices fully
committed to Roe. The authors of the joint opinion thus apparently
were writing largely in the service of abstract ideals-stare decisis and
autonomy rather than relation and care, mind you-that they would
rather not have applied to the case at hand. Little wonder that those
Justices stopped far short of giving Roe, or even their new undue
burden standard, full effect.
C. Regulating the medical aspects of abortion
Anti-relationalists might argue that allowing states broad
regulatory power over the medical aspects of abortion would be
consistent with an ethic of care, under the assumption that
government needs a free hand to ensure (in good faith) that women
receive adequate health care. As mentioned, some advocates,
including those calling themselves feminists, complain that Roe
unleashed a horde of unregulated and unscrupulous abortionists on
an unprotected public. Real care, however, would not accept that
assumption at face value in view of what is at stake for the woman
and past experience with governmental regulation of abortion. It
would instead warily examine the actual impact of state regulatory
measures for their capacity to hurt women in the complex special
circumstances created by abortion. It would also protect unwanting
pregnant women from being singled out for interference in their
health care needs.
Until recently, the Court's review of regulations in this category
has been relatively protective of women's welfare. Roe's trimester
framework recognized protection of maternal health as a legitimate
state objective for regulation of second-trimester abortions, based on
the assumption that the risks of abortion after the first trimester
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exceeded those of childbirth.4 56 The Court's pre-Webster application
of this standard at least tried to protect women from laws that
unnecessarily interfered with the independence of the physician's
medical judgment about pre-viability abortion and that appeared to
single out abortion for burdensome requirements. Those cases not
only reflect concern about the privacy and autonomy of the abortion
decision, but also include some measure of care.
For example, the Court has held unconstitutional sweeping re-
quirements that all abortions or all second-trimester abortions be
performed in hospitals.457 In addition to interfering with medical
judgment, by more than doubling the cost of the procedure and
imposing additional travel burdens for women living in remote areas,
such requirements "imposed a heavy, and unnecessary, burden on
women's access to a relatively inexpensive, otherwise accessible, and
safe abortion procedure." '458 The Court has, however, upheld laws
requiring second-trimester abortions to be performed in facilities that
meet the standards of outpatient surgical facilities.459 Although such
requirements can significantly increase the cost of abortion, the Court
has regarded them as sufficiently based in the state's interest in
protecting maternal health. The Court has rejected, however,
state laws that seek to prescribe potentially more dangerous methods
for second-trimester abortions."' The Court has also exhibited a
456. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
457. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 195 (1973).
458. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 438
(1983). The Court's conclusions in Doe and Akron Center are supported by the greatly
increased safety of second-trimester abortions. The American Public Health Association
has, since Roe, abandoned its recommendation that second-trimester abortions ought to
be performed in hospitals. Id. at 436-37. Similarly, the American College of Obstetrics
and Gynecologists has revised its position to recommend that abortions could be
performed safely in an outpatient clinic until the fourteenth week of pregnancy and in a
free-standing surgical facility until the eighteenth week. Id. at 437.
459. See, e.g., Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506,'516-17 (1983).
460. Id.
461. For example, the Pennsylvania law held unconstitutional in Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U.S. 379 (1979), required, for fetuses that "may be viable," that physicians "use the
abortion method that would provide the best opportunity for the fetus to be aborted alive
so long as a different technique would not be necessary in order to preserve the life or
health of the mother." Id. at 380-81 n.1 (quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6605(a) (1977)).
At that time, saline amino-infusion, which is almost always fatal to the fetus, was the
physician's method of choice in the second trimester. Other methods that increase the
chances of fetal survival-such as hysterotomy-involve serious disadvantages for the
woman. The statute's constitutional defect lay in its muddled interference in medical
judgment. Id. at 393-98. The law was unclear whether (and under what conditions) the
physician was required to compromise the woman's welfare against incremental increases
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care focus by remaining concerned about women's health-even after
setting. aside concern for her autonomy-in its review of laws
regulating post-viability abortion methods. 42
in the chances of fetal survival. Id.
The Court also has held unconstitutional more clear-cut interference with the
physician's choice of pre-viability abortion method. For example, the Court in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,75-79 (1976), rejected Missouri's attempt to prohibit
saline amniocentesis after the first trimester. Missouri contended that the prohibition was
reasonably related to the preservation of maternal health. Id. Quite to the contrary,
saline amniocentesis was at the time the most prevalent procedure nationwide and was
much safer than continuation of the pregnancy. Id. at 76. The Court concluded that this
forced choice of less safe methods was an unreasonable and arbitrary regulation designed
to inhibit the vast majority of second-trimester abortions. Id. at 79. The Court further
held unconstitutional a provision, enforced by threat of a manslaughter charge, requiring
physicians to use their skill to save the life of the fetus regardless of when in the pregnancy
the abortion is performed. Id. at 81-84.
462. After viability under Roe, the state may seek to protect fetal life to the extent
consistent with protection of the pregnant woman's health. Accordingly, some states have
required the attendance of a second physician at post-viability abortions to take care of
any child born alive. The Court has upheld such measures so long as they do not require
compromiseof maternal health. E.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476,
482-86 (1983). An example of a second-physician requirement upheld by the Court is
Missouri's statute requiring that a second physician attend all post-viability abortions and
provide medical care to a child born as a result of the abortion. Id. at 418-79 n.1 (citing
Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.030.3 (1983)). The statute also required both physicians to take all
reasonable steps-that did not increase the risk to the woman-to preserve the child's life
and health. Id. Missouri further forbade use of abortion procedures fatal to the fetus in
medically necessary post-viability abortions, unless alternative procedures would pose a
greater risk to the health of the woman. Id. In their plurality opinion in Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger concluded that,
given the ability of the second physician to tend to the fetus while the primary physician
looks after the woman, the statute reasonably furthered the state's compelling interest in
preserving the life and health of the fetus. Id. at 485-86. They reached that conclusion
notwithstanding the significant increase in cost and the relatively unlikely chance that the
fetus could be saved in any event. Id.
The Court has invalidated second-physician requirements that it viewed as threatening
the woman's health. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 769 (1986). In Thornburgh, the Pennsylvania law, for
example, imposed two requirements. First, a second physician was required to take all
"reasonable steps necessary, in his [or her] judgment, to preserve the child's life and
health." Id. at 769 n.15 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3210(c) (1982)). Second, the
law mandated use of the abortion procedure that would provide the greatest opportunity
for the fetus to be aborted alive unless that "method or technique would present a
significantly greater medical risk" to the woman's life or health. Id. at 768 n.13 (quoting
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3210(b) (1982)) (emphasis added). Because the statute
dictated a "trade-off" between the woman's health and fetal survival and did not ensure
that the woman's health would be the primary physician's paramount concern, the Court
in Thornburgh held the standard-of-care provision unconstitutional. Id. at 769-71.
Furthermore, unlike the Missouri statute, Pennsylvania's second-physician requirement
lacked an exception for endangerment of the woman's health caused by delay in arrival
of the second physician. Id.
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One of the very few changes in circumstances since Roe, apart
from changes in the Court's membership, is that abortion has become
safer than childbirth throughout pregnancy. 3 That development,
considered from the perspective of one who cares for the woman,
should have led firmly to even greater judicial mistrust of state efforts
to interfere with medical judgment at any point in pregnancy. Casey's
undue burden standard, however, lurches in the opposite direction.
The Court's decision to uphold Pennsylvania's medical emergency
exception to the Abortion Control Act's other requirements
represents a departure from its previous receptivity to the threat that
abortion regulations can present to women's health.
That exception is available when an immediate abortion is
necessary "to avert her death or for which a delay will create serious
risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily
function."'  The trial court had found that the exception's
definition of a medical emergency was "inconsistent with the generally
accepted definition of medical emergency in the medical profession"
and would chill the physician's exercise of medical judgment with the
threat of loss of license or criminal prosecution.' 6 The district court
concluded that the Act singled out the abortion procedure from all
other treatments for allowing state-mandated delays that could cause
a risk of an impairment of a bodily function, so long as the risk was
not "serious," the impairment not "substantial and irreversible," and
the bodily function not "major. 466
Rather than come to grips with those broad objections, the Court
focused instead on three specific examples of serious conditions that
the trial court found were not covered by the statutory exception:
preeclampsia; inevitable abortion; and premature ruptured
membrane. 7 Adopting the interpretation of the court of appeals
that those conditions were covered, the Court upheld the statute's
command that physicians must adhere to the Act's other provisions
(apart from the spousal notice requirement)-even if to do so would
463. See JUDGES, supra note 90, at 75.
464. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,2822 (1992) (quoting 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3203 (1990)).
465. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1346-47 (E.D. Pa. 1990), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct.
2791 (1992).
466. Id.
467. For a brief overview of the risks of pregnancy, see JUDGES, supra note 90, at 74-
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be medically contraindicated and would create some risk of impair-
ment of the woman's bodily functions.
In effect, the joint opinion allows states to interfere with the
woman's choice in a way that jeopardizes her health and forces
doctors to disregard their best medical judgment-provided that the
state does not perpetuate certain very serious conditions. This
outcome is directly at odds with one of the central premises in Roe
and most other pre-Webster cases,469 and with what simple care for
the woman obviously requires-that the pre-viability abortion decision
and procedure are matters between the woman and her doctor in
which the state may not interfere in a way that does not protect the
woman's health.47 Casey unethically authorizes states in some
circumstances to hold women's health and safety hostage to some
constituents' discomfort with abortion.
D. Private interference with access to abortion
The sometimes violent harassment and intimidation of abortion
providers and their patients has restricted the accessibility of abortion
services and made the procedure even more stressful. The practical
result can be as harmful as state legislative efforts to interfere with
access to abortion, and in some cases perhaps more so. The Court's
ruling in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic-that harassment
campaigns like that of Operation Rescue do not violate the Civil
Rights Act of 1871471-precluded recourse to an important source
of protection for women seeking abortion and probably, had Congress
not intervened, would have stimulated an increase in harassment
activity. A caring perspective might have produced a different result
in Bray, the reasoning of which remains a troublesome precedent
despite enactment of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances
Act.
472
468. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2822.
469. The parental consent and notice cases are exceptions.
470. As noted above, Robin West has explained that abortion rights are not simply
about the confidentiality of the woman's relationship with her doctor but are fundamental-
ly about allowing the woman to preserve her physical and psychic integrity. See West,
Jurisprudence & Gender, supra note 7, at 15. Nevertheless, while protection of the privacy
of that relationship may not be a sufficient basis for abortion rights, it surely is a necessary
prerequisite as a practical matter.
471. 113 S. Ct. 753, 760-62 (1993) (citing 42 U.S*C. § 1985(3) (1988)).
472. Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat. 694 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248 (Supp.
1994)); see also infra note 509.
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The Civil Rights Act of 1871 provides a federal cause of action
against conspiracies "for the purposes of depriving, either directly or-
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws."'473
The Supreme Court earlier had interpreted the 1871 Act as requiring
a showing of "class-based animus" which is "aimed at" interfering
with rights protected against private conduct.474 As noted above,
the Court found in Operation Rescue's activities only opposition to
abortion and no indication of bias against women.475 Although of
473. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988). The federal law in question was originally enacted as
the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 as part of the post-Civil War civil rights legislation. Act of
Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. "The central theme of [§ 1985(3)'s] proponents was that
the Klan and others were forcibly resisting efforts to emancipate Negroes and give them
equal access to political power. The predominate purpose of § 1985(3) was to combat the
prevalent animus against Negroes and their supporters." United Bhd. of Carpenters &
Joiners of Am., Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 836 (1983). Section 1985(3) covers two
kinds of claims: one for conspiracies to deprive plaintiff of certain rights (a "deprivation"
claim), and one for preventing or hindering government officials from providing persons
within the state with the equal protection of the laws (a "preventing" or "hindering"
claim). The Court denied the respondents' petition to brief the prevention issue. Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 14 (1992).
The plaintiffs in Bray, nine clinics providing abortion-related services and various
women's rights organizations, alleged that Operation Rescue and certain individuals had
conspired to deprive women of their constitutionally protected right to travel from one
state to another to obtain an abortion and their privacy right to abortion, and had also
violated plaintiffs' rights under state tort law, including the law of trespass and nuisance.
National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1493-96 (E.D. Va.
1989), affd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd in part and vacated in part sub nom. Bray
v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993). The trial court found for
plaintiffs on their travel, trespass, and nuisance claims and enjoined defendants from
blockading or impeding access to plaintiffs' facilities. Id. at 1496-97. The trial court
declined, on First Amendment grounds, to enjoin defendants from activities that tend to
intimidate, harass, or disturb patients or potential patients. Id. at 1497-98.
474. Scott, 463 U.S. at 833; Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
475. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 759-62. The Court in Bray reasoned that the abortion clinics
could meet the class-based animus requirement only if one of the following propositions
were true: "(1) that opposition to abortion can reasonably be presumed to reflect a sex-
based intent, or (2) that intent is irrelevant, and class-based animus can be determined
solely by effect." Id. at 760. The Court rejected both propositions. Id. at 760-62. Justice
Stevens's dissent pointed out that Griffin's animus requirement derived from the Court's
concern about constitutional limitations on congressional power to enact a general federal
tort law. Id. at 783-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He observed that no such concern arises
in interpreting § 1985(3) "to provide a remedy against the violent interference with women
exercising their privilege-indeed, their right-to engage in interstate travel to obtain an
abortion." Id. at 784-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also id. at 800 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (indicating that the class-based animus requirement comes from the Court's
earlier efforts to "avoid[] the constitutional difficulties of federalizing every crime or tort
committed by two or more persons, while giving effect to the enacting Congress'
condemnation of private action against individuals on account of their group affiliation").
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course only women 'can become pregnant and therefore need
abortions, the Court's intent requirement cannot be met even by such
inexorable and notorious coincidence. Instead it must be shown that
the action was taken "at least in part 'because of' not merely 'in spite
of,' " its adverse impact on the particular class. 476 With respect to
the "aimed at" requirement, the Court ruled that the only right
protected against private encroachment at issue in Bray was the right
to interstate travel (not abortion). Operation Rescue opposes
abortion, not interstate travel, the Court reasoned: The blockades do
not erect "actual barriers" to interstate movement, nor do they
discriminate against out-of-state women.477
Bray's remorseless celebration of abstract principle, which is
almost other-worldly in the perfect lifeless logic of its conclusion that
the violent harassment of abortion clinic patients and staff has nothing
particularly to do with women, is bad news indeed for abortion-rights
advocates in particular and women's rights advocates in general. Yet
it is, as discussed above, entirely consistent with a masculinist
approach to legal problem solving.478 I have already discussed two
conceptual bases on which an ethic of care would question the Court's
premises in Bray. One involves an ethic of care's view of equality
under the caste-abolition principle as concerned with exploitation,
domination, and marginalization rather than intent.479 Another
derives from the related critique of the Court's negative rights
paradigm, which underlies the intent requirement.4"
An interpretation informed by the caste-abolition principle would
be more faithful to the normative and remedial choices embodied in
section 1985(3) than is Justice Scalia's approach to the case "as
though it presented an abstract question of logical deduction.""4 ' As
Justice Stevens explained in his Bray dissent, section 1985(3) provided
a federal judicial remedy as "a response to the massive, organized
lawlessness that infected our Southern States during the post-Civil
War era."'  Those conditions, like the black codes, perpetuated
former slaves' caste status by effectively depriving them-through
terrorist rather than de jure means-of the ability to participate in the
476. Id. at 760 (quoting Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
477. Id. at 762-64.
478. See supra part III.B.
479. See supra notes 332-61 and accompanying text.
480. See supra notes 375-93 and accompanying text.
481. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 780 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
482. Id. at 779 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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civil community.' By the same token, Operation Rescue's use of
unlawful and violent means to oppose abortion, their purpose to
target a protected class on account of a class characteristic to prevent
class members' exercise of a variety of rights, and "the deliberate
decision to isolate members of a vulnerable group and physically
prevent them from conducting legitimate activities" have an analogous
impact.' Indeed, such action has been characterized as a form of
483. Cf. Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581 (1871) (Bradley, J., dissenting). Justice
Bradley argued in his dissenting opinion:
Suppose that, in any State, assault and battery, mayhem-nay, murder itself,
could be perpetrated upon a colored man with impunity, no law being provided
for punishing the offender, would not that be a case of denial of rights to the
colored population of that State? ... To deprive a whole class of the community
of this right [to bring the offender to justice], to refuse their evidence and their
sworn complaints, is to brand them with a badge of slavery; is to expose them to
wanton insults and fiendish assaults; is to leave their lives, their families, and their
property unprotected by law. It gives unrestricted license and impunity to
vindictive outlaws and felons to rush upon these helpless people and kill and slay
them at will, as was done in this case.
Id. at 597-99 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
484. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 802 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Assuming that women are a
protected class, under Justice O'Connor's view § 1985(3) would reach "conspiracies whose
motivation is directly related to characteristics unique to that class." Id. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). The relevant class characteristics are the ability to become pregnant and to
terminate pregnancy. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has not yet
decided whether gender bias falls within § 1985(3), although one case expressed doubt
whether discriminatory animus other than racial bias would be within the statute. United
Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 836 (1983). Most
Courts of Appeals to consider the question, however, have ruled that § 1985(3) does reach
gender-based animus. See National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582,
585 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd inpart and vacated in partsub nom. Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993) (collecting citations).
Justice Souter, who concurred in the judgment largely on the basis of stare decisis,
admitted that while the Court's "class-based animus" requirement
did, of course, effectively narrow the scope of the clause, it did so probably to the
point of overkill, unsupported by any indication of an understanding on the part
of Congress that the animus to deny equality of rights lying at the heart of an
equal protection violation as the legislation's sponsors understood it would
necessarily be an animus based on race or some like character.
Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 772 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Souter also would have reached the hindrance or prevention claim, would
have concluded that it was not subject to the same strictures as the deprivation claim, and
would have found a violation when a conspiracy's "purpose is to hinder or prevent law
enforcement authorities from giving normal police protection to women attempting to
exercise the right to abortion recognized in [Casey]." Id. at 777 (Souter, 3., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice Souter would have reached the latter
conclusion under a rational basis test: "[A] classification necessarily lacks any positive
relationship to a legitimate state purpose, and consequently fails rational basis scrutiny,
when it withdraws a general public benefit on account of the exercise of a right otherwise
guaranteed by the Constitution." Id. (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
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terrorism.' Justice Stevens roundly criticized the Court's context-
blind reliance on rationality as the test of discriminatory intent as
"inappropriate in the civil rights context, where what seems rational
to an oppressor seems equally irrational to a victim. Opposition to
desegregation, and opposition to the voting rights of both African-
Americans and women, were certainly at one time considered rational
propositions. ' '416
dissenting in part). Since Bray, at least one court of appeals has recognized a hindrance
claim against clinic harassment. National Abortions Fed'n v. Operation Rescue, 8 F.3d
680, 687 (9th Cir. 1993).
485. One study has concluded that
[a]ccording to official and academic definitions, most of the violence against
abortion clinics should be counted as terrorism. This is clearly so in cases of
bombings and arson. Many other incidents of terror inducement usually
considered harassment should also be included because of their fit with the
definition. Frequently they are forms of criminal activity aimed toward creating
fear in a manner that has affected personal practices and social policy and have
resulted in the attainment of certain political objectives.
Michele Wilson & John Lynxwiler, Abortion Clinic Violence as Terrorism, 11 TERRORISM
263, 270 (1988).
486. 113 S. Ct. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's reasoning thus has
difficulty standing on its own two feet. One commonly understood meaning of the term
"rational" is a principle of comprehension and consistency: Rational persons "know their
own interests more or less accurately; they are capable of tracing out the likely
consequences of adopting one practice rather than another; [and] they are capable of
adhering to a course of action once they have decided upon it." John Rawls, Justice as
Fairness, in POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY: TRADITIONAL AND CONTEMPORARY
READINGS 315, 319 (J. Charles King & James A. McGilvray eds., 1973). "Rational" also
implies the opposite of emotional. Neither definition compels Scalia's result. The
requirement of consistency with given premises tells us nothing about the normative
content of those premises. A person who hates women, or who (not necessarily
maliciously) believes that their "paramount destiny and mission are to fulfil the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother," (to quote Justice Bradley's concurrence in Bradwell
v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873)), could easily be acting "rationally," that is, dispas-
sionately and consistently with such a belief system, in opposing abortion. Reason often
has been deployed to justify racism and sexism. See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 352,
at 627-37 (noting that late nineteenth and early twentieth century social science's belief in
harmful effects of racial intermixing was cited in defense of state-mandated segregation).
Conversely, those evils have often been most successfully opposed by activating the
emotional responses of compassion for their victims and outrage at the injustice. See, e.g.,
MAHATMA GHANDI, THE ESSENTIAL GHANDI: AN ANTHOLOGY OF HIS WRITINGS ON
HIS LIFE, WORK, AND IDEAS (Louis Fischer ed., 1962).
Justice Stevens agreed that it is sufficient to show that the conspiracy targets "conduct
that only members of the protected class have the capacity to perform"; that is, "[i]t is
enough that the conspiracy be motivated at least in part by its adverse effects on women."
Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 787 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted). Stevens also
added that Operation Rescue's conduct was motivated, at least in part, by "the invidious
belief that individual women are not capable of deciding whether to terminate a
pregnancy, or that they should not be allowed to act on such a decision." Id. at 788
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Petitioners' conduct is designed to deny every woman the
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The Court's constricted approach to the "aimed at" requirement
also overlooks the practical impact of harassment activities.' A
substantial number of women travel interstate for abortion, a choice
that may result from several possible factors: the unavailability of
abortion services (either any at all or the kind needed) in their
community; the increasing differences in abortion laws from state to
state; concerns for confidentiality; and a desire to escape the kind of
harassment inflicted by petitioners in Bray.' The net result of the
Court's test is to ignore the cumulative effect of the conspiracy and
its interaction with laws like those upheld in Casey. It also perversely
allows the conspirators to acquire immunity from liability under the
opportunity to exercise a constitutional right that only women possess.").
487. As mentioned above, the "aimed at" requirement derives from the Court's concern
over the extent of congressional authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
regulate purely private action. The various opinions in Bray describe several approaches
to this problem.
One approach is to find, as did Justice Stevens under his more effects-oriented
"intent" test, an intent to obstruct respondents' right to interstate travel. There was ample
record evidence to support that conclusion; between 20 and 30% of the patients at one of
the respondent clinics and over half of the patients at another were from out of state.
Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 792 (Stevens, J., dissenting). More generally, the Alan Guttmacher
Institute reports that 26% of the women from a 10-state area traveled to other states to
obtain abortion services. Stanley Henshaw & Jennifer Van Vort, Abortion Services in the
United States, 1987-88, 22 FAM. PLAN. PRsp. 102, 105 (1990). "Making their destination
inaccessible to women who have engaged in interstate travel for a single purpose is
unquestionably a burden on that travel. That burden was not only a foreseeable and
natural consequence of the blockades, but indeed was also one of the intended
consequences of petitioners' conspiracy." Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 792 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The Court recognized an analogous problem in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the
companion case to Roe, in which it ruled that an in-state residency requirement for access
to abortion violated that right. The fact that Georgia also imposed restrictions that
burdened in-state residents hardly saved the measure. Doe, 410 U.S. at 200.
Another approach would find a violation of the second clause of § 1985(3), which
prohibits conspiracies "for the purpose of preventing or hindering... any State ... from
giving or securing to all persons.., the equal protection of the laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
(1988). The Court concluded that such a "hindrance" claim was not properly before the
Court, and suggested that even if it were, the animus and aimed at requirements probably
would apply to defeat it as well. 113 S. Ct. at 758-62. Justice O'Connor would have
allowed respondents to advance their hindrance claim. She would have applied to it her
much less demanding intent test and also would have found that the hindrance clause
covered conduct aimed at obstructing local law enforcement. Id. at 804 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Justice Souter also would have reached the hindrance claim. In his view, the
conspirators' act of thwarting state officials in the exercise of state authority "would be
tantamount to state action" and therefore well within congressional authority under § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 776 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
488. Brief for the National Abortion Federation & Planned Parenthood Federation of
America, Inc., as amici curiae in support of respondents at 20-23, Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993) (No. 90-985).
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1871 Act for the harm they inflict on women who need to travel
interstate to obtain abortion services by the simple expedient of
including some domestic victims.
49
The opinions of Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Stevens
demonstrate, from a variety of approaches, that neither the text nor
the history of section 1985(3) compel the Court's result.490 A Court
sensitive to the role of clinic harassment in the broader problem of
access to abortion would see that extending federal protection to
abortion patients would be consistent with the goals of the statute
transposed into a modern setting.491' By precluding, through the
exercise of lawless violence, harassment victims from exercising their
rights, clinic harassment campaigns in effect turn those victims into
second-class citizens in their need for abortion services-just as Klan
violence combined with other forces to perpetuate former slaves'
subjugation.4" This caste effect is evident, for example, from the
fact that the kind of harm inflicted on blockade victims specifically
targets their uniquely female circumstance as abortion patients.
493
489. Justice Stevens pointedly tied this criticism of the Court's discrimination test to the
purposes of the 1871 Act:
The Reconstruction Congress would have been startled, I think, to learn that §
1985(3) protected freed slaves and their supporters from Klan violence not
covered by the Thirteenth Amendment only if the Klan members spared local
African-Americans and abolitionists their wrath. And it would have been
shocked to learn that its law offered relief from a Klan lynching of an out-of-state
abolitionist only if the plaintiff could show that the Klan specifically intended to
prevent his travel between the states.
Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 795 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
490. See supra notes 486-88.
491. As Justice Stevens observed, the record in Bray showed "a striking contemporary
example of the kind of zealous, politically motivated, lawless conduct that led to the
enactment of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 and gave it its name." Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 782
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
492. See supra notes 483-84.
493. The trial court in Bray specifically found that the defendants' actions created a
substantial risk to clinic patients of physical and mental harm. 113 S. Ct. at 780 & n.5
(Stevens, J. dissenting). In addition to the stress and anxiety caused to women who
attempt to brave the demonstrators to enter the clinics, the court found that the
demonstrators sometimes succeeded in closing clinics temporarily and thus caused
substantial harm to those "patients requiring the laminaria removal procedure or other
vital medical services[, who] must either postpone the required treatment and assume the
attendant risks or seek the services elsewhere. Uncontradicted trial testimony established
that there were numerous economic and psychological barriers to obtaining these services
elsewhere." National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483,1489 (E.D.
Va. 1989), affd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd in part sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993). Indeed, such activities have interfered with
women's health care generally, because targeted clinics often provide a range of
gynecological services in addition to abortions.
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The need for federal protection in such circumstances parallels in
several important respects conditions that prompted enactment of the
1871 Act. Absent congressional action, clinics face the disadvantages
of reliance on state law that resemble the problems toward which
section 1985(3) was directed.494 State and local courts may be more
vulnerable to local political pressure from anti-abortion rights groups.
Even clinics that obtain injunctive relief would be dependent on state
and local law-enforcement resources to enforce a court order. A
frequent tactic is for demonstrators to overwhelm the capacities of
local police forces and courts.495 Women's rights are left with
494. Justice Kennedy suggested in his concurring opinion in Bray that respondents were
not entirely without recourse to federal relief. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 769 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Under 42 U.S.C. § 10501, states may seek federal assistance when state
resources are inadequate to protect state citizens and property or to enforce the criminal
law. Such a request would allow the Attorney General of the United States to make
available to the state the full range of federal law enforcement resources.
Section 10501 is hardly satisfactory from the patients' or clinics' perspectives. It first
requires them to persuade the state to make such a request. Even then, the request falls
within the discretion of the Executive branch, which until recently has been overtly hostile
to this very problem. For example, President Reagan promised not to prosecute clinic
blockaders, and the Bush administration sided with Operation Rescue in Bray. See
JUDGES, supra note 90, at 43-44. Section 1985(3), by contrast, provides for a prompt,
individual, judicial claim of right.
495. The amicus curiae brief submitted by the city of Falls Church, Virginia, in support
of the abortion clinics in Bray describes the difficulties faced by localities targeted for
Operation Rescue blockades:
Falls Church, Virginia was the site of Operation Rescue blockades enjoined in
this case, and the city.. . urge[s] the Court to affirm the injunction. Operation
Rescue repeatedly summoned hundreds of people to Falls Church to mass around
Commonwealth Women's Clinic and seal it off, barring women's access to the
clinic for abortions or other medical care. Faced with concerted efforts to
incapacitate them, the 30-member Falls Church police force cannot secure access
to the clinic premises and adjacent public streets. After entry of the injunction
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), however, the illegal blockades stopped. The federal
injunction has been critical to effective law enforcement in Falls Church.
Operation Rescue is a nationwide effort, and purely local solutions are unrealistic
and inappropriate. Injunctions under state law must be litigated on a case-by-
case basis, and pertain only to a particular property. Once one clinic is protected,
others in the state bear the brunt of the blockades. Moreover, jurisdiction to
prosecute persons in contempt of state court injunctions is only state-wide, and
many of the blockaders are from out of state.
Brief for Falls Church, Virginia, as amicus curiae in support of Respondents at ii, Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993) (No. 90-985). Falls Church explained
that local prosecutorial resources may also be inadequate to process charges against the
busloads of arrestees. Id Falls Church, for example, employs only one full-time City
Attorney and a part-time assistant, who were swamped by the hordes of arrestees. Id.
Similar limitations constrain local judicial resources. Again in Falls Church, the city had
to consolidate the defendants' trials and hold them in the community center gymnasium,
the only facility large enough to handle the crowd. Id. These problems are nationally
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ineffective, and certainly not equal, legal protection at the state
level.496
Unlike the Court, blockade activists plainly understand all too
well the interaction between their activities and other factors that
render access to abortion difficult for many women.49  The number
of abortion providers in the United States is decreasing and their
geographic distribution is becoming less uniform. 498  By several
measures, access to abortion services has become increasingly difficult
for many women living outside of metropolitan areas.49 Other
significant. The National Abortion Federation reports that between January 1987 and
December 1990, 419 clinic blockades resulted in over 26,000 arrests. The blockades
involved destruction of property, invasion of clinics, and overrunning of police lines. Brief
for the National Abortion Federation and Planned Parenthood Federation of America,
Inc., as amici curiae in support of Respondents at 4-6, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Clinic,
113 S. Ct. 753 (1993) (No. 90-985).
496. Here Judith Thomson's equality argument has considerable force. Men are simply
not subject to the kind of abuse inflicted on women by clinic harassment campaigns. The
very absence of a fitting and non-absurd parallel example (vasectomy or urology clinic
blockades?) demonstrates the inevitable inequality produced by these campaigns.
497. For data on the declining number of abortion providers, see infra notes 498-500.
In response to the data, Operation Rescue spokesman Bob Jewitt proclaimed: "We feel
we've had a significant impact. We're scaring the tar out of abortionists." Access: Drop
in Providers Due to Residency Training, AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK: ABORTION
REPORT, Apr. 15, 1992 [hereinafter Drop in Providers].
498. Between 1982 and 1985, for example, the number of providers declined by 8%.
Stanley K. Henshaw et al., Abortion Services in the United States, 1984 and 1985, 19 FAM.
PLAN. PERSP. 63, 68 (1987). Between 1982 and 1988, the number of providers fell by more
than 300. Drop in Providers, supra note 497 (quoting data from the Alan Guttmacher
Institute).
499. For example, 82% of American counties have no identified provider (up from 78%
in 1982); yet 30% of women of childbearing age live in those counties. Henshaw et al.,
supra note 498, at 65. Further, 92% of the U.S. counties, which house 43% of the women,
lack providers who perform more than 400 abortions per annum (and who are much more
likely to provide services on request rather than restricting service to the physician's
established patients or only in limited circumstances). Id. AGI also found that 79% of
all nonmetropolitan women live in counties with no providers at all. Id. Because "there
is abundant evidence that the local availability of abortion services has an important effect
on the utilization rate," the large disparity in abortion rates between states is additional
evidence of unequal access to abortion services. Id. at 66. Many women in rural states
like Arkansas-which has only a handful of overt abortion providers for the entire
population (operating in Little Rock in central Arkansas and in Fayetteville in the
northwest corner of the state), some very remote counties, and a relatively underdeveloped
transportation infrastructure-thus face substantial obstacles in obtaining access to
abortion services. Nationwide, rural states or states in which transportation to urban areas
might be difficult have some of the highest percentages of counties without clinics or
hospitals for abortions. For example, the following states have the highest such
percentages: Alabama, 91%; Arkansas, 96%; Kentucky, 98%; Louisiana, 92%; Minnesota,
94%; Mississippi, 96%; North Dakota, 94%; Oklahoma, 95%; South Dakota, 98%;
Missouri, 94%; Nebraska, 98%; Texas, 91%; West Virginia, 95%; and Wisconsin, 92%.
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factors also limit access to abortion services. One is the shrinking
number of hospitals that perform abortions and the limited number
of all providers who perform late-term abortions. The number of
providers is likely to continue to decrease." ° The cost of abortion
Compare the percentages for the following states: Connecticut, 13%; Delaware, 0%;
Maryland, 14%; District of Columbia, 0%; New York, 23%. NAF "Legal Abortions
Tougher to Get," AMERICAN PoLrnCAL NErWoRK: ABORTION REPORT, May 1, 1992
(quoting chart compiled by USA Today from National Abortion Federation data).
Developments in North Dakota, which does not even have a Planned Parenthood
affiliate, illustrate the problem. No public funds are available for abortions and public
hospitals are prohibited from performing abortions. In 1990, the only physician among the
state's 1200 who would perform abortions (he did about 450 a year) retired at the age of
72. The women's health clinic in Fargo has to fly doctors in from Minnesota to perform
the procedure. Lambs of Christ: "60 Minutes" on Lambs Who Won't Be Silenced,
AMERICAN POLITICAL NETwORK: ABORTION REPORT, Feb. 3, 1992 (excerpting Leslie
Stahl's report on Fargo clinic and Dr. Susan Wicklund's airplane commute from out of
state); North Dakota: A Hostile Landscape for Abortion, AMERICAN POLITICAL
NETWORK: ABORTION REPORT, May 7,1990 (reporting on Dr. Robert Lucy's retirement).
500. The number of medical school obstetrics/gynecology programs that provide
training in first trimester abortions has decreased from nearly 25% in 1985 to 12% today.
Only seven percent offer such training for second trimester abortions. Drop in Providers,
supra note 497 (quoting study by Dr. Trent McKay, University of California at Davis);
Julie Johnson et al., Abortion: The Future is Already Here, TIME, May 4, 1992, at 26, 29.
Furthermore, there has been an increase (from 27% to 31%) in the number of programs
that provide no abortion training at all. Drop in Providers, supra note 497. These factors
disproportionately affect younger and minority women, who tend to delay abortion longer.
JUDGES, supra note 90, at 36.
The shrinking provider pool has led to several controversial proposals. Recently, the
executive board of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists ("ACOG")
recommended that trained non-physicians (i.e., physicians' assistants) should be allowed
to perform routine, low-risk abortions. A 1986 study of 2,500 cases found no significant
difference in the complication rate between abortions performed by physicians and those
done by their assistants. Sandra G. Boodman, Should Non-Physicians Perform Abortions?
Shortage of Trained Providers of the Procedure Leads to a Controversial Proposal, WASH.
POST, Feb. 15,1994, at Z. The ACOG proposal, which is advisory only, does not provide
immediate relief from state laws requiring that abortions be performed by physicians; it
does, however, undermine the contention that such laws are justified by the state's interest
in protecting maternal health. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 428-39 (1983) (referring to ACOG and American Public Health
Association recommendations in reaffirming Roe's trimester framework and in invalidating,
as not reasonably related to protecting maternal health, Ohio law requiring that second-
trimester abortions be performed in hospitals). One could argue that, because of the
availability problem and the cost of physician time, a physician-only requirement
constitutes a substantial obstacle to pre-viability abortions if it is not justified on the basis
of protecting women's health.
Another proposal to address the availability problem is to require residency programs
to train OB/GYNs in abortion techniques (unless the resident has a religious or moral
objection). A committee of the Accreditation Council of Graduate Medical Education has
recommended such a requirement. Sara Aase, Many See Need for Abortion Training;
Many in Medical Profession Support Making Procedure Required Learning, ST. PAUL STAR
TRIBUNE, Feb. 10, 1994, at 7B; Boodman, supra, at Z7. Several metropolitan counties are
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services also obviously is an important factor, particularly for the
poor.501 Given the Supreme Court's current trend toward permitting
a variety of cost-increasing restrictions on abortion, as well as the
declining number of providers, it seems likely that costs will increase.
Regardless of whether the Supreme Court ever completely
overrules Roe v. Wade, access to abortion services may continue to
contract-especially for indigent and rural women.5" Viewed in this
context, harassment of abortion providers undoubtedly has an adverse
impact, on accessibility. Although polls indicate that most people
oppose such tactics, anti-abortion harassment is widespread in the
United States."m Harassment campaigns frequently target stand-
considering similar proposals for the hospitals under their control. Aase, supra, at 7B. As
this Article was going to press, the Accreditation Council adopted the abortion training
requirement. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Finances and Fear Spurring Hospitals to Drop
Abortions, N.Y. TIMms, Feb. 20, 1995, at Al, col. 1.
501. See supra notes 364-94 and accompanying text.
502. The Clinton administration has made some modest progress, for example in
removing a number of federal restrictions and in rescinding the gag rule, see supra note
394, but many access-inhibiting conditions remain in force.
503. Jacqueline D. Forrest & Stanley K. Henshaw, The Harassment of U.S. Abortion
Providers, 19 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 9, 13 (1987). According to a recent poll by
Political/Media Research (sponsored by the Sioux Falls, South Dakota Argus Leader), the
lowest disapproval rating of Operation Rescue tactics has been 76%. "Just about
everywhere we've [taken a poll], they're kind of viewed as being on the level of the (Ku
Klux) Klan, really viewed like slime." South Dakota: 55% Want Abortion Legal, 39% Do
Not, AMERICAN POLITICAL NETWORK: ABORTION REPORT, Apr. 9, 1993 (quoting
Political/Media Research Vice-President Del Ali).
To obtain a picture of the extent and nature of harassment activity nationally, the
Alan Guttmacher Institute ("AGI") surveyed providers in 1986, receiving responses from
722 hospitals and 927 nonhospital facilities. AGI reports that, in addition to being the
target of picketing:
[A]lmost half (42-48 percent) [of respondents] reported such activities as
distribution of antiabortion literature inside the facility, bomb threats, physical
contact with or blocking of patients by picketers, numerous no-show ap-
pointments made to disrupt the scheduling of legitimate patients and
demonstrations loud enough to be heard inside the facility. Twenty-nine percent
of facilities were invaded by demonstrators in 1985, and almost as many were
vandalized. More than 20 percent of facilities had their telephone lines jammed,
... Nineteen percent of the providers said their staff members had received
death threats, and 16 percent reported that the homes of staff members had been
picketed. Sixteen percent of the providers reported that patients had been
harassed with phone calls or visits at home ....
Forrest & Henshaw, supra, at 10. Furthermore, according to the National Abortion
Federation, 51 providers received bomb threats in 1986, five were the victims of arson or
bomb attempts, and six facilities were actually damaged or destroyed. Id. at 9. AGI
reports that anti-abortion harassment was most widespread and severe in the Midwest and
South. Ld. at 11. More recent accounts indicate that threats and violence continue. For
example, "it is estimated that antiabortion violence has resulted in $7.6 million in direct
damages." Brief of the National Abortion Federation and Planned Parenthood Federation
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alone clinics, where most abortions are performed. Harassment
ranges from peaceful picketing to blockades, firebombing, chemical
attacks, death threats, and now assassination."° While such cam-
of America, Inc., as amici curiae in support of Respondents at 4-6, Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Clinic, 113 U.S. 753 (1993) (No. 90-985).
According to a national survey reported by The Fund for the Feminist Majority, one-
half of all responding abortion clinics had been subject to some form of violent harassment
in the first seven months of 1993. Roni Rabin, Study: Clinics Under Fire; Bill Seeks to
Halt Attacks on Abortion Centers, NEWSDAY, Nov. 5, 1993, at 17. The actions included
death threats (20%), bomb attacks (18%), chemical attacks (10%), arson, and blockades
(16%). Id. A survey conducted by the anti-abortion group Life Dynamics (which
disguised its orientation for purposes of the survey by calling itself "Project Choice")
boasted that 87% of the respondents reported being victims of anti-abortion harassment
or violence. Activists: Pro-Lifers Conduct "Deceptive Survey," AMERICAN POLITICAL
NETWORK: ABORTION REPORT, Apr. 16, 1993.
504. See supra note 503; Forrest & Henshaw, supra note 503, at 9. Operation Rescue
in particular has been very active in campaigns in a number of cities, including Atlanta,
New York, Buffalo, Wichita, and Baton Rouge. The Georgia State Bar Journal describes
Operation Rescue's tactics during the "Siege of Atlanta" in the summer of 1988:
Demonstrators arrived en masse, swarming onto the private property of the
clinics, sometimes invading inside the clinic by deception or force. Then locking
arms, sitting down, crawling and sprawling, they refused to move or allow any
person access into or out of the clinics for hours at a time. Meanwhile, hundreds
of demonstrators unwilling to risk arrest marched, chanted, screamed, and prayed
for the television cameras amidst gory pictures, plastic fetuses, and graphic
placards.
Elizabeth J. Appley, Two Decades of Reproductive Freedom Litigation and Activism in
Georgia: From Doe v. Bolton to Atlanta v. Operation Rescue, 28 GEO. ST. B.J. 34, 38
(1991). Operation Rescue often hopes to overwhelm municipalities' law-enforcement
capabilities with thousands of arrestees. See supra note 495. Its campaigns have imposed
substantial costs on target communities.
Dr. William Harrison, the only remaining open abortion provider in northwest
Arkansas, relates his experiences with harassment. His Fayetteville Women's Clinic, which
offers a general OBIGYN practice that includes abortions, has been vandalized twice and
firebombed once. Protesters would congregate in front of his clinic and scream at his
patients. He has had numerous threats made against his life, several in person and
apparently serious. According to Dr. Harrison, the firebombing was committed by a 14-
year-old boy who, after being shown the film "Silent Scream" and being told that babies
were being killed in the clinic, placed an incendiary device in the clinic's basement window.
Dr. Harrison states that before the harassment began in earnest in Fayetteville,
coincident with political exploitation of the abortion issue in the 1982 off-year election, 13
physicians openly provided abortion services in northwest Arkansas; now he is the only
one. As a result of the harassment, Dr. Harrison lost two partners (neither of whom did
abortions to begin with) and two employees. Although well-respected in the medical
community, he remains unable to attract a partner because of the threat of harassment.
His casualty insurance was canceled after the second vandalism attack and he was unable
to obtain replacement coverage for four years; his premiums increased six-fold. JUDGES,
supra note 90, at 44-45.
Of course, the shooting of Dr. David Gunn has become a symbol of anti-abortion
excesses. According to Florida abortion clinic owner Patricia Baird-Windle, two of her
three doctors abruptly quit within 12 hours of the Gunn shooting. Clinic Access: Pro-
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paigns have been largely unsuccessful in directly closing many clinics,
both abortion and nonabortion patients are scared away or
delayed.505 Furthermore, "the effects of such harassment on women
who are already undergoing a stressful experience can only be
adverse,... [and] patients seeking other types of care may encounter
harassment as well."5' Such tactics are a powerful disincentive for
health care providers to enter the field."° Harassment also can
combine with the distribution problem to have a greater impact on
access for many women than what the numbers might first sug-
gest.508 In states that have only a few providers, the closing of even
one clinic or the chasing out of one provider can have a devastating
impact on access to abortion for the women who happen to live
there.5 o
Choicers Link Violence to Access, AMERICAN POLIcAL NETWORK: ABORTION REPORT,
Oct. 15, 1993.
505. For example, Operation Rescue's extended "Summer of Mercy" campaign in
Wichita, Kansas failed to close any clinics; it did, however, focus extensive media attention
on its cause and is estimated to have interdicted at least 29 abortions. Georgia M.
Sullivan, Protection of Constitutional Guarantees Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3):
Operation Rescue's "Summer of Mercy," 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 237,238 (1992).
506. Forrest & Henshaw, supra note 503, at 13; see also Operation Rescue v. Women's
Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 668-69 (Fla. 1993), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub
nom., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2522 (1994) (relating trial
court findings that attempted blockade of Florida clinic increased stress to, and interfered
with treatment of, clinic patients and drove patients away, causing delay and thus increased
risk).
507. For example, Dr. Harrison belongs to the dwindling pre-Roe generation of
physicians who remember the harm inflicted on women by illegal abortion. His willingness
to endure the disruption, discomfort, abuse, and danger of extended harassment derives
from his commitment to the welfare of his current patients informed by his memory of the
harm suffered by his past patients. He also has concluded that speaking out publicly on
the abortion issue is the best antidote to harassment, and his willingness to do so-along
with community opposition to harassment and vigorous enforcement of criminal trespass
laws-has played a large role in the decline of anti-abortion harassment in Fayetteville.
See JUDGES, supra note 90, at 44-45. An entire generation of post-Roe physicians,
however, have now entered the profession with no such perspective.
508. Another problem encountered by abortion providers is cancellation of insurance
or difficulty with local officials, including denial of necessary permits. Johnson et al., supra
note 500, at 28. For example, approximately 32% of the providers in the AGI study were
notified that their malpractice insurance was being canceled or not renewed; 22% faced
an analogous problem with their fire and casualty insurance. "Twenty-six percent said they
had been asked to meet new or newly interpreted licensing requirements ... ." Forrest &
Henshaw, supra note 503, at 12.
509. See supra note 499 (discussing North Dakota's experience with a shortage of
providers). An additional impact is increased costs for abortion providers, especially for
security and legal services.
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Congress, goaded by the outcry following Bray and the escalation
of clinic violence, has now provided relief51 There is much to be
said for a specific, contemporary political commitment to protect clinic
patients from harassment.5 ' But legislative relief notwithstanding,
Bray remains an unfortunate example of how rights interpreted
without care can become no rights at all.51
CONCLUSION
Is a care-based approach to abortion simply too "good" to be
true? And is the abortion debate inevitably a Rorschach test for
one's own personal perspective? In addition to the problem of
difference discussed above, potential external and internal critiques of
relationalism with respect to abortion merit response. First, the
relational account of abortion described above could be challenged as
510. On May 26, 1994, President Clinton signed into law the Freedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances Act, Pub. L. No. 103-259,108 Stat. 694 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248
(Supp. 1994)), which provides both criminal and civil relief for actual or attempted force,
threats, or physical obstruction to injure or interfere with anyone providing or receiving
abortions or other reproductive services.
511. Too much should not be made of this argument. Bray did not involve an
unenumerated constitutional right, it involved interpretation of a statute. Congress has not
attempted to undo the Court's reinvigoration of the Reconstruction era legislation. See
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164,171 (1989) (declining to overrule Runyon
v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), in part for that reason). To the contrary, in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,105 Stat. 1071, 1072 (1991) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), Congress strengthened § 1981 by overruling Patterson's
distinction between hiring and conditions of employment. Democratic-process arguments,
without more, thus do not provide a complete defense of Bray. Indeed, an argument
could be made that the legislative inertia ought to be cast in the other direction. Because
the claim in Bray fit comfortably within the language and purposes of § 1985(3), perhaps
groups who would defy those purposes ought to be put to the burden of having to seek
relief in Congress. In Patterson, the Court reasoned that its previous interpretation of §
1981 in Runyon had not proved by experience to be at odds with prevailing notions of
social justice or social welfare; "[t]o the contrary, Runyon is entirely consistent with our
society's deep commitment to the eradication of discrimination based on a person's race
or the color of his or her skin." Patterson, 491 U.S. at 174. The opposite result in Bray
would also be entirely consistent with our national norms. The issue is clinic violence, not
simply opposition to abortion, and such lawlessness runs counter to national values
concerning the rule of law and respect for rights of others.
512. To be sure, some federal protection is also now available under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988) ("RICO"). The
Court's interpretation of civil RICO not to require proof of economic motive allows civil
enforcement actions in some cases to be brought against clinic harassers. See National
Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 806 (1994). Nevertheless, the broader
and more far-reaching problem of the Court's limited equality paradigm persists.
Furthermore, § 1985(3) would have been a much more sensible statute to apply, as its
origins and broad purposes are much closer to the problem of clinic harassment than are
those of the already much-overworked RICO statute.
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far too one-sided in its sensitivity to the woman's needs and its
willingness to sacrifice the conceptus. From an external perspective,
this objection invokes the familiar anti-abortion argument that the
conceptus is a "person" equally entitled to the most basic human
rights; and "official-story" pro-choicers would complain that
relationalism thus fails adequately to counter the anti-abortion
assertion of the unborn's interests.
Those objections assume that there ultimately is a correct
resolution to the "personhood" paradox and would set a test for
validity and coherence that neither the pro-life nor the liberal pro-
choice side yet have met. The liberal pro-choice side's response to
the personhood problem is incomplete and flawed whether formulated
as a matter of constitutional law or morality. While even Roe's critics
concede that the Court's reading of text and historical intent on the
question of personhood is accurate,513 it is difficult to see why the
text should be read more strictly and historical intent should be more
controlling when interpreting the constitutional term "person" than
when adjudicating a claim to abortion rights. The liberal abortion-
rights position thus begs the question whether the meaning not only
of "liberty" but also of "person" can evolve. 14 Further, the Court's
refusal in Roe on epistemological grounds to admit arguments
concerning when "life" begins reflects a diffidence not evident in the
Court's consideration of what "liberty" includes."' The proposition
that one's constitutional status as a "person" depends upon the
Court's definitional criteria has been powerfully criticized. 16
More particularly, resort to equality-based arguments concerning
the unique burdens that pregnancy imposes on the woman conflates
the question of the conceptus's personhood with the issue of balancing
513. See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, Why Roe v. Wade Should Be Overruled, 67 N.C. L.
REV. 939, 942 n.21 (1989) ("There is not one shred of historical evidence, of which I am
aware, that would suggest that the framers thought of fetuses as persons against whom the
state could not act except with due process of law.").
514. Anti-abortion forces point to a range of developments-advances in embryology,
fetology, and genetics; recognition of claims for wrongful fetal death; and prosecutions for
in utero exposure to controlled substances and for fetal homicide-as evidencing the law's
growing acknowledgement of the fetus as a person. See JUDGES, supra note 90, at 150.
515. The Court's professed agnosticism ignores several points: (1) there is something
undeniably human and individually unique about the conceptus (at least at some point
relatively early in gestation); (2) the conceptus is "alive" if a sensible definition of that
term is the entity's dynamic ability to establish itself and to flourish; and (3) a conceptus
arguably is much more of a human being than is a corporation, which the Court
peremptorily concluded is a "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 151.




the competing interests at stake. Such anomalous arguments
implicitly, and disturbingly, assume that one's status as a
"person"--and thus one's claim to the law's most basic protec-
tions-can be contingent on the impact that recognition of one's
personhood has on the interests of another. Liberal pro-choicers shift
to the opposite extreme, as in Thomson's effort to provide a moral
defense of abortion. As discussed above, Thomson's analysis accords
so much "personhood" status to the conceptus (to avoid the relational
implications of gestation) that it hardly resembles a conceptus at
all.517
Nor does the range of anti-abortion rights arguments on the
personhood question withstand close scrutiny. For one thing, some
anti-abortion arguments reveal the mirror image of the pro-choice
interpretive inconsistency. They often insist on a strict interpretivist
approach to the question of a right to reproductive freedom, yet rely
heavily on natural law theory to support their contention that a
conceptus is a "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment-even
though "liberty" is arguably a more capacious and flexible noun than
is "person." '18  Next, at least some formulations 'of the pro-life
personhood argument (1) can lead to such dubious conclusions as that
spermicide amounts to homicide, and (2) are oblivious to the
enormous differences among various stages of gestational develop-
ment. Finally, Thomson's defense implicitly suggests how the
personhood element of the anti-abortion argument may be more
powerful than even its proponents would admit: If the conceptus,
after all, is an ontologically distinct person, what then justifies its
extraordinary and voracious claim to occupy, consume, and perhaps
threaten the soma and psyche of its host?
From an internal perspective, the anticipated critique of this
Article is two-fold. First, Goldstein's argument might be turned on
itself to conclude that just as society cannot command mother-love,
so too does the Court lack the power to force society to care for the
unwanting pregnant woman in her distress. Second, as the anti-
relationalists argue, abortion rights are arguably inconsistent with an
ethic of care for the conceptus, who after all is the party least able to
care for itself.
One response to the first point is that the level of care, in most
cases, is not the same. The care demanded by Roe of the state is not
517. See supra notes 109-42 and accompanying text.
518. See JUDGES, supra note 90, at 150-51.
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personal care, but instead is an impersonal substitute for it. The care
demanded of the woman by abortion restrictions, by contrast, is
personal in the strongest sense of the word. The state can coerce the
woman into providing minimal sustenance, but not the fullness of
mother-love necessary to the infant's flourishing. The care extracted
by Roe is the minimal care-like response of not interfering. Unlike
abortion restrictions, Roe does not exploit a special, innate sensitivity
of an historically oppressed group, nor does it appropriate the
existential integrity of the burdened group (persons uncomfortable
with abortion) and transform that group's members into physically
and psychologically different entities to accomplish the state's ends.
Roe's demands therefore are not subject to equality objections
informed by an ethic of care. Nor does Roe inhibit the flourishing of
those persons who are distressed by abortion in the persistent, global
way that unwanted coerced pregnancy constrains the woman; it
therefore is less objectionable on autonomy grounds interpreted
through an ethic of care.
The foregoing point is evident from Casey's outcome. The
informed consent and waiting period provisions upheld in that case
were not really about saving babies' lives or promoting informed
consent. Such measures, while seriously affecting the women they do
impact, will produce no more than a negligible decrease in the total
number of abortions. And, as explained above, they add little to what
is usually an already carefully considered decision. What such
measures are really about, then, is the political appeasement-through
largely symbolic legislation-of constituents troubled by abortion.
That goal is achieved largely. by the unethical bullying of the most
vulnerable, disadvantaged women.
Fundamentally, as both aspects of this internal critique illustrate,
the dilemma of abortion is that someone will inevitably be forced into
the role of unwilling caregiver. The combination of unwanted
pregnancy and the technological availability of safe abortion creates
one of those painful situations in which it is impossible to avoid
hurting someone. Roe seeks to strike a compromise-an appealing
approach to such an intractable conflict-which is rendered more
intelligible by adding considerations of care to liberty- and equality-
based arguments.
Roe puts the burden on society when it arguably can better be
borne there, and on the woman when arguably it can't. Whether the
Court has identified the optimal fulcrum for shifting that burden is
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open to question. 5" But reference to some gestational datum is
intelligible from a variety of angles: the growing relational potential
of the conceptus; 20 the conceptus's increasing capacity for charac-
teristically "human" functions such as cognition;521 the conceptus's
increasing morphological resemblance to a small person, the dismem-
berment of whom is morally repugnant to our shared sense of
empathic kinship with our fellow human beings; the intuitive fairness
of requiring the woman to make up her mind before any or all of
these forces become too compelling; and the increasing likelihood that
she will have made a commitment at some level anyway, even if she
would much prefer not to have done so.
Given the divisive nature of the abortion controversy, it is not
surprising to find rifts within the pro-abortion rights side that are
almost as deep as those between pro- and anti-abortion rights
activists. The predominance of an adversarial, power-oriented
approach to abortion's painful dilemmas encourages polarization and
exaggeration. To the extent that "masculinist" thinking is character-
ized by those attributes, the abortion debate has seen far too much of
it already. Most participants seem to regard others with different
views as opponents to overcome rather than as neighbors to
understand, and the overall issue as a battle to win rather than a
wounded relation to heal. Unencumbered by much sense of
responsibility for the hurt inflicted by the conflict itself activists are
free to devote all their attention to tactics. The anti-relationalists in
their own way perpetuate this approach. Their pro-choice partisan-
ship perceives care-talk as imperiling abortion rights and therefore
seeks to stamp out the threat, with little or no thought given to the
harm occasioned by the dominance in this area of the individualistic,
adversarial paradigm that they champion. This Article does not
contend that relationalism offers the definitive, exclusive argument for
reproductive freedom. It seems doubtful whether any conceptual
system can do that, although most advocates appear determined to
try.
I have not attempted to win the abortion wars here; I have
argued only that relationalism has a positive contribution to make to
the case for abortion rights. To be sure, the relationalist approach has
519. See, e.g., id. at 280-95.
520. See supra notes and accompanying text at 263-83.
521. CARL SAGAN, THE DRAGONS OF EDEN: SPECULATIONS ON THE EVOLUTION OF
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 209 (1977); Carl Sagan & Ann Druyan, Is It Possible to Be Pro-
Life and Pro-Choice?, PARADE MAGAZINE, Apr. 22, 1990, at 4.
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its limits; but to require that it be beyond criticism would demand
more from relationalism than any of the other leading perspectives on
abortion have managed to provide. I have argued elsewhere that
partisans on either side of the abortion debate could learn something
valuable from each other if they could find a way to shout less and
listen more.5' Similarly, differing theorists who share the ultimate
goal of securing women's equality and freedom have little to lose and
much to gain from reconsidering the doubtful formulation of the issue
as a contest between antipodal values of autonomy and connection.
The real harm to women in that regard has resulted not from too
little justice-talk and too much care-talk but from just too much talk
and not enough real justice or care.
522. JUDGES, supra note 90, at 280-95.
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